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ABSTRACT 
Turkey-EU relations have attracted high public attention and academic curiosity as a 
special case that has provided a fruitful environment for a wide-ranging group of 
study areas. This thesis is particularly interested in the way in which AK Party and 
specifically Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have been represented in the mainstream western 
media and political discourse, and how these representations have influenced 
specific encounters in Turkey-EU relations.  
The changes in the dominant representations over time have a special place in this 
analysis. This thesis mainly claims that, although there is no linear or causal 
relationship between representations and policy choices, western media and political 
discourse on AK Party had decisive influence in limiting possible policy options for 
policy makers. Positive and praising discourse on AK Party and Turkey that 
dominated western political landscape enabled EU leaders to open the way for 
membership negotiations.  Similarly, negative and even demonising discourse on 
AK Party became the biggest obstacle for the continuation of the negotiations.  
This thesis claims that understanding the international social context is crucial in 
grasping the background of discourses and their influences on actors. Thus, it 
focuses on post-9/11 international social context with specific emphasis on western 
security discourses and the rise of Islamophobia in western societies, as crucial 
factors in shaping the international context during the relevant period. 
Turkey-EU relations is at its lowest point since the beginning of accession talks in 
2005. The prospects for Turkey’s EU membership are looking bleaker than ever 
now, as is the representation of Erdoğan and AK Party in the mainstream western 
media and political discourse. By using discourse analysis method, this thesis 
analyses the representations of AK Party in western mass media and political 
landscape, especially in the political turmoil during and after infamous Gezi Park 
incidents in Turkey that highlighted the problems in Turkey-EU relations as a 
negative turning point. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AK Party  Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – Justice and Development Party 
BDP  Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi – Peace and Democracy Party 
CDU   Christian Democratic Union of Germany 
CHP   Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican People’s Party 
CSU  Christian Social Union of Bavaria 
DHKP-C  Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front 
EU  European Union 
İP   İşçi Partisi - Workers Party 
LDPR   Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
MHP  Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – Nationalist Movement Party 
PKK  The Kurdistan Workers' Party 
SPD   Social Democratic Party 
TGB   Turkey Youth Union 
TKP   Turkish Communist Party 
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INTRODUCTION 
Turkey-EU relations have attracted high public attention and academic curiosity as a 
special case that has provided a fruitful environment for a wide-ranging group of 
study areas. The story of Turkey’s EU membership journey, which dates back to 
1959 in which it applied for associate membership for the then European Economic 
Community, has experienced many ups and downs at various stages. As 
undoubtedly the most contested EU candidate, Turkey has faced numerous barriers 
to achieving membership. Turkey’s EU membership negotiation process has been 
subject to “lively, heated and sometimes acrimonious” debates.1 This negotiation 
process is clearly not an issue that is dealt only by European and Turkish 
bureaucrats. Rather, it is something that even ordinary citizens are used to hear or 
read on the news. 
There have been dramatic developments in this fluctuating relationship during 
Justice and Development Party (AK Party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) era that 
commenced in 2002 with an election that is generally accepted as a political 
earthquake in Turkish political history. Contrary to initial negative and cautious 
expectations, performance of AK Party’s EU stance has been welcomed by the 
majority of observers in a short period of time. Especially the unexpected progress 
of Turkey-EU relations in the first years of the AK Party government and the 
                                                          
1
 Elie Podeh, “The Final Fall of the Ottoman Empire: Arab Discourse over Turkey’s Accession to the 
European Union,” Turkish Studies 8, no. 3 (September 2007): 317. 
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beginning of Turkey’s EU membership negotiations confused the minds of those 
who expected AK Party, perceived as representative of political Islam, to be an 
obstacle on the way that leads Turkey to Europe. The dominant representation of 
AK Party and Turkey in the western discourse was highly positive in this time 
period.  
AK Party was frequently praised as a ‘model’ that had to be exported to the rest of 
the Muslim world. Its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was applauded in the 
mainstream western media as one of the rarest blends in the Islamic world and the 
champion of Turkey’s westernisation reforms.2 The European Union also praised the 
economic success of AK Party-ruled Turkey. Prime Minister Erdoğan has become 
“the darling of the international community” within this period.3 Western political 
and media landscape was dominantly talking about Turkey’s success story under 
AK Party rule. It is argued in this thesis that this positive representation of AK Party 
rule was one of the main factors that has made Turkey’s EU membership a possible 
and attractive enlargement policy for the EU members and opened the way for 
Turkey’s membership negotiations. 
However, beginning from the opening ceremony of the negotiation process that 
turned into a political crisis, the relations soured in a relatively constant pace. 
Likewise, it was possible to observe a sharp contrast in representations of Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan and AK Party in the western media narratives before and after the 
opening of negotiations. Interestingly, AK Party’s representation in the majority of 
                                                          
2
 Andrew Purvis, “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Turkey’s Builder of Bridges,” The 2004 Time 100, 26 
April 2004. 
3
 Daron Acemoglu, “The Failed Autocrat,” Foreign Policy, 22 May 2014. 
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observers’ discourses shifted from being anti-Western, to pro-Western and again 
anti-Western, consecutively, within a decade.  
It is mainly claimed in this thesis that both positive and negative representations of 
AK Party have been central in re-shaping possibilities for the nature of the EU-
Turkey relationship and Turkey’s accession process. This does not mean that it 
seeks to find a single factor that explains everything about the ups and downs of the 
relationship or a scapegoat for the obvious failure of the negotiation process. Rather, 
it is an attempt to focus on an important factor that is generally neglected in the 
efforts to understand and/or explain Turkey-EU relations during AK Party era: 
mainstream media and political discourse. 
It is claimed in this thesis that there are many factors at play and negotiation process 
and Turkey-EU relations are not happening between two unitary and rational actors. 
The actions and interaction are continuously influencing the outcomes alongside 
many other factors, including material ones. While the main focus in the literature is 
generally on what AK Party has or has not done while analysing the good and bad 
times of the relationship, the role of EU is generally neglected in influencing the 
possibilities of Turkey-EU relations both in positive and negative directions.  
International context have been in continuous influx during Turkey’s EU 
membership negotiations. New developments like Arab Spring, European economic 
crisis, and unexpected rise of tension between Russia and EU over Ukraine have 
complicated the already hot debate on AK Party’s identity and foreign policy 
destination. Identity debates concerning AK Party-led Turkey have fluctuated within 
a wide spectrum of labels, including but not limited to European, Middle Eastern, 
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Asian, Eurasian, Muslim, model democracy or autocracy. In this era of fast change, 
the dominant categories defining identity of AK Party or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
during the good relations before the opening of EU membership negotiations have 
been considerably different from those that emerged along with the worsening of 
Turkey-EU relations. 
There has never been a single factor that defines the pace and fate of Turkey’s EU 
membership negotiations. From EU bodies to EU member states, from domestic 
political groups to the domestic and international media, from Turkish government 
to Turkish society, there are many actors at play. Sometimes an unresolved dispute 
(for instance, Cyprus issue), sometimes changes of governments in member 
countries (for instance, rise of Angela Merkel in Germany and Nicholas Sarkozy in 
France to power), sometimes unrelated requests of EU members (for instance, 
Austria’s insistence on start of Croatia’s EU membership negotiations in return for 
lifting its veto on Turkey), sometimes personal efforts of a political leader (for 
instance, Nicholas Sarkozy), sometimes EU’s own problems (for instance, 
enlargement fatigue and Eurozone crisis), sometimes an international problem (for 
instance, Middle East turmoil or global economic crisis), sometimes changes in 
public opinions (for instance, considerable decrease in Turkish public support for 
EU membership and its influence in domestic political arena) and sometimes actions 
of the Turkish government (for instance, slowing pace of reforms) may influence the 
negotiations negatively. These factors may be involved directly in the process as in 
cases of vetoes against opening Turkey’s specific negotiation chapters or indirectly 
through being part of wider debates as in cases of discussions about EU’s 
enlargement and Europe’s future. 
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There is no dispute that the current situation of the negotiation process cannot be 
explained solely by the performance of AK Party government in adopting the acquis 
communitaire. As underlined by Turkey's Minister of European Affairs and Chief 
Negotiator Volkan Bozkır, Turkey would have opened up to 28 chapters by the end 
of 2014 instead of 14 and closed about 14 instead of only one, if 17 chapters out of 
total 35 chapters were not blocked by various member states.
4
 
It should be emphasised that, instead of directly causing foreign policy actions, this 
thesis claims that socially constructed representations “frame the context of the 
‘perceived’ reality of decision-makers at any given time.”5 This conception 
obviously leaves an important room for agency. This highlights the importance of 
the concept of ‘logic of appropriateness’ that is referred as the behavioural logic 
emphasised by constructivist analysts. According to this approach “a certain course 
of behaviour is adopted because it is in agreement with the intersubjectively shared, 
value-based expectations of appropriate behaviour emanating from the actor’s social 
environment.”6 
For instance, the actions and declarations of UK during its efforts to successfully 
open Turkey’s negotiations can be seen through this perspective. United Kingdom 
was carrying the EU Presidency when Turkey started its EU membership 
negotiations in October 2005. When there was a crisis because of Austria’s last-
minute demands during the summit, a new possibility of deadlock and failure arose. 
                                                          
4
 Volkan Bozkır, Quoted in "Turkey's EU Accession Blocked By Some Member States, EU Min. 
Claims," Daily Sabah, 12 November 2014. 
5
 Christopher Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of 
Finland (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008): 22. 
6
 Volker Rittberger, “Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International Relations 
Theories,” Center for International Relations/Peace and Conflict Studies - University of Tübingen, 
no. 49 (2004): 9. 
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However, that policy option was unthinkable according to UK Foreign Secretary 
Jack Straw, who said failure to open Turkey’s negotiation process could harm 
relations between Christian and Muslim nations.
7
 He argued that keeping Turkey out 
of the EU would widen the "theological-political divide, which could open up even 
further down the boundary between so-called Christian-heritage states and those of 
Islamic heritage.” According to Straw, “the heavy responsibility rest[ed] on all 
member states.”8 His French, German and Greek counterparts have strongly 
supported these arguments. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was 
joining this line of argument by saying “Either [the EU] will show political maturity 
and become a global power, or it will end up a Christian club ... We will, however, 
be saddened that a project for the alliance of civilisations will be harmed.”9   
Within that framework, Turkey’s supporters in EU welcomed the opening of 
negotiations as “truly historic for Europe and for the whole of the international 
community.” And they hailed the deal as an important step in undermining “Islamist 
extremists by showing that the EU is not an exclusively Christian club” and helping 
“relations with millions of Muslims in today's EU.”10 These discourses cannot be 
analysed out of their historical and social context (as will be done in the preceding 
chapter). It is claimed in this thesis that mainstream media discourse on AK Party in 
the relevant time frame was an important factor in shaping such policy possibilities 
for political leaders. 
                                                          
7
 BBC News, "EU deadlocked over Turkish entry," 3 October 2005. 
8
 BBC News, "Deadlock delays EU Turkey talks," 3 October 2005. 
9
 Nicholas Watt, "Turkey EU talks deadlocked as Austria digs in," The Guardian, 3 October 2005. 
10
 Nicholas Watt, "Europe embraces Turkey as diplomatic deadlock is broken," The Guardian, 4 
October 2005. 
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Within this framework, this thesis accepts the important role of mainstream media in 
shaping identity and policy narratives that are dominant among public and elites. It 
does not deal with discussions on whether politicians are sincere in their public 
discourses or they simply try to use it as a tool to achieve their hidden goals. It is 
assumed in this thesis that media texts are a significant target of discourse analysis 
because of their central role in the production and reproduction of dominant 
discourse.
11
  
Literature Review 
The existing literature on Turkey-EU relations have widely focused on the situation 
of specific issue areas of the relationship, such as economy, foreign policy or 
democracy. Pros and cons of the relationship in the relevant issue areas as well as 
handicaps and advantages of Turkey as a candidate are largely covered in this group 
of literature.
12
 Majority of this literature do not explicitly deal with theoretical 
concerns and they are descriptive in nature and they generally accept material 
factors as independent from interpretative processes.  
An important amount of scholars have analysed Turkey-EU relations from an 
explicitly rationalist-materialist perspective. The first stimulus for this thesis arose 
from the observation that this dominant group of accounts have remained far from 
being enough in comprehending Turkey-EU relations. They not only depended on 
                                                          
11
 Julia E. Janes, Bonny Ibhawoh, Narda Razack and Nathan Gilbert, “The Trouble with Triumph: 
Discourses of Governmentality in Mainstream Media Representations of Urban Youth,” Journal of 
Progressive Human Services 25, no.1, (2014): 55. 
12
 For instance, Erdem Başçi, Sübidey Togan and Jürgen Von Hagen (eds.), Maceoeconomic policies 
for EU accession (Northampton: Edward Elgar Pub., 2007); Alison Burrell and Arie Oskam (eds.), 
Turkey in the European Union: implications for agriculture, food and structural policy (Cambridge, 
MA: CABI Pub., 2005); Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jørgensen (eds.), Turkey and the European 
Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Reza 
Moghadam et al., Turkey at the crossroads: from crisis resolution to EU accession (Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund, 2005). 
12 
 
explanations based on presumed ‘objective’ material factors, but also ignored the 
role of social interactions in continuous construction of actors’ identity and interest 
narratives, which they take as stable and pre-given. Essentialist efforts to “fixate a 
group identity through a definition”13 and “stereotypical and/or partially self-
sulfilling generalizations”14 about Turkey and AK Party have caused these 
approaches to increase confusion regarding Turkey’s new ruling AK Party instead of 
explaining its behaviour; and to produce false predictions about its foreign policy 
actions. From their perspective, AK Party’s identity, interest perceptions and foreign 
policy preferences were already clear from their very first day in office. For 
instance, some analysts were certain that Turkey would have to say “goodbye” to 
EU, if AK Party had won the election.
15
 Some of them though that the already 
reluctant EU “may take the AK Party's election as a pretext to refuse” Turkish bid 
for EU membership.
16
 However, many of their expectations and predictions, 
including this one, turned out to be wrong throughout time. Of course, not all 
analyses from rationalist materialist perspective have been this much pessimist about 
AK Party. 
Identity and interests of actors are accepted to be given and exogenous by 
mainstream theories; i.e. neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism.
17
 For instance 
analyses that are “based on structural realist approach,” assume that “a country’s 
                                                          
13
 Naomi Scheman, “Queering the Center by Centering the Queer,” in Diana Tietjens Myers (ed.) 
Feminist Rethinking the Self (Boulder: Westwivew Press, 1997): 124-162. 
14
 Anders Berg Sorensen, Nils Holtug, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “Essentialism vs. Constructivism: 
Introduction,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 11, no.1 (2010): 39-40. 
15
 Tufan Türenç, “AKP ile AB’ye Elveda,” [Goodbye to EU wih AK Party] Hürriyet, 14 September 
2002. 
16
 Kemal Kaya, "Turkey's Elections: What Impact for Eurasia?" The Central Asia-Caucus Analyst, 6 
November 2002. 
17
 John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization, no.52 (Autumn 1998): 862. 
13 
 
national interest is derived from its position within the international system.”18 
Generally, they describe Turkey as a “middle power” and derive conclusions from 
the conception of middle power within a realist depiction of international system. 
Such approaches do not accept Turkey as a unique case, but treat it simply as an 
example of many other middle powers. This view ignores all special characteristics 
of Turkey and prevents grasping the roots of all actions. It draws strict boundaries 
about what Turkey can and cannot do. This quotation provides a good example for 
such approach: 
“A middle power is much stronger than the small nations but considerably 
weaker than the principal members of the system... Turkey can be classed as a 
middle power when placed within a hierarchy of states. Because of its 
weakness, it is greatly influenced by the actions of the major players. On the 
other hand, it exerts some influence in the region where it is located.”19 
This kind of realist analysis does not leave room for alteration in Turkey’s foreign 
policy. It also takes the state body as a unitary rational actor. It takes interests as 
given and does not question how those interests are produced and how they may 
evolve in time. 
Within this framework, analyses in this group claim that Turkey will seek EU 
membership to the extent that it helps Turkey to achieve its pre-determined national 
interests. According to this understanding, “The more Turkey is believed to benefit 
from the continuation of the Westernization/Europeanization process the longer it 
                                                          
18
 Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1997): 6. 
19
 Ibid., 7. 
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would be willing to pay the costs of becoming a Western/European country.”20 In 
other words, they try to explain the relationship in terms of alleged rational cost-
profit analyses of actors. Within this scope, they provide foreign policy prescriptions 
to meet some ‘real’ interests. However, their analyses and predictions have been 
among the victims of the fluctuating nature of Turkey-EU negotiation process. 
Since actors adopt a cost-benefit calculus in developing their policies according to 
this approach, their position towards EU accession is highly predictable for a 
successful analyst. Analysts from this group claim to have found the rational reasons 
behind current and future actions of actors. They accept Turkey’s EU membership 
bid case as ‘hypothesis-generating case study.’ However, such generalisations fail to 
match with the developments on the field, especially when dramatic changes occur.  
It is not possible to mention and analyse each and every hypothesis that was 
produced by analysts within this group. One example is enough to illustrate the 
major problem of this approach. For instance, in his article titled “Why It was 
Rational for an Islamist Party to be ‘Pro-European’ and a Secularist Party to be 
‘Anti-European’,” Joerg Baudner produces a hypothesis that says “domestic actors 
who are disadvantaged in domestic resources embrace EU accession, whereas 
domestic actors who feel threatened in their domestic resources adopt an opposite 
strategy.”21 This hypothesis follows that political actors evaluate policies according 
to cost-benefit calculations. Yet, such hypotheses deeply suffer when actors do not 
follow the prescribed policy choices of this approach.  
                                                          
20
 Mustafa Kibaroğlu and Tarık Oğuzlu, “Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey? 
Who’s to Blame?” Turkish Studies 10, no.4 (December 2009): 580. 
21
 Joerg Baudner, “The Politics of ‘Norm Diffusion’ in Turkish European Union Accession 
Negotiations: Why It was Rational from an Islamist Party to be ‘Pro-European’ and a Seclarist Party 
to be ‘Anti-European’,” Journal of Common Market Studies 50, no.6 (2012): 922-938;  
15 
 
In that framework, this analysis fails when there is no major domestic actor that 
favours EU membership in the current Turkish political environment, including the 
‘Islamist party’ of his analysis. Moreover, current studies show that the desire of all 
segments of Turkish society to join the European Union has cooled considerably 
over the past decade. The majority of this remaining support still comes from the 
supporters of the governing party that is claimed to have gained the control of 
domestic resources. Moreover, allegedly disadvantaged domestic groups are far 
from being the champions of Turkey’s EU membership bid. Unless he claims that 
Turkey does not have any disadvantaged domestic actors anymore or that all rational 
actors suddenly started to act irrationally, this situation creates a breakdown for this 
hypothesis. 
Some of these analysts within this group claim that historical and institutional 
factors have forced actors into specific policies, without leaving almost any room for 
change. For instance, some analysts claimed that “the historical and institutional 
trend of modernization has locked Turkey into a pattern of domestic and foreign 
policies which is difficult, if not impossible, for current policymakers to break or 
reverse.”22 The governments are mere followers of specific policy choices, which 
are determined by forces that are mainly out of their reach and control. 
This deterministic approach assumes the policymakers to have limited policy 
choices in Turkey-EU relations. For instance, starting from the observation of the 
existent historical data, some of them claimed to be better suited for explaining 
“why Turkey has not substantially diverted from the path to European integration 
under various governments that represented different social interest and values, and 
                                                          
22
 Isa Camyar and Halit Mustafa Tagma, “Why Does Turkey Seek European Union Membership? A 
Historical Institutional Approach,” Turkish Studies 11, no.3 (September 2010): 371-386. 
16 
 
in the face of numerous short and medium-term turbulence.”23 The problems of such 
assertions become much more visible when a government suddenly and radically 
diverts from the asserted behavioural pattern. 
Labelling and categorising AK Party and Turkey; drawing the boundaries for that 
pre-given identity; and making predictions about its foreign policy behaviours 
according to this identity narrative has been the common way of argument for this 
group. However, these types of approaches have faced serious failures in dealing 
with the continuous changing nature of the relationship in the relevant period of this 
thesis. For instance, claims about historical and institutional factors that had forced 
Turkey’s persistence for joining the EU crumbled with the dramatic drop of AK 
Party government’s desire and efforts for EU membership within a short period of 
time. Hence, although they have something to say in dealing with continuity and 
behavioural patterns, they hit the wall in handling ‘change’. 
Another group of analyses focused on the reasons for some countries being 
prioritised over others.
24
 In that framework, different types of reasons (i.e. 
pragmatic, ethical-political and moral) reasons behind this prioritisation are 
evaluated. For instance, “pragmatic” approach is accepted to justify action with 
reference to the output that is expected to produce. In an “Ethical-political” 
approach, justification would be based on particular perception of the collective ‘us’ 
and a particular understanding of the values of a specific community. On the other 
hand, according to “moral” approach, policy is not justified with reference to cost-
                                                          
23
 Ibid. 383. 
24
 Helene Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’S 
Enlargement Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no.3 (2002): 491-513; Helene Sjursen, 
“Introduction: Enlargement and the nature of the euro-polity’, in Helene Sjursen (ed.), Questioning 
EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity (London: Routledge, 2006). 
17 
 
benefit analysis nor with reference to values, but with reference to universal 
standards of justice.
25
 
Comparative analysis of different enlargement waves are used for this purpose. In 
line with a tradition of “explanation through interpretation,” EU enlargement is 
explained by “making intelligible the goals for which it was undertaken.”26 These 
social constructivist works treat identity and discourse as explanatory rather than 
constitutive factors.  
Influenced by the downturn of Turkey’s EU membership negotiations and the 
serious decline of European public support for Turkish membership, a group of 
scholars have concentrated on the negative arguments in political debates in specific 
member countries.
27
 While these discourse analyses produce valuable insight in 
understanding the problems in the negotiation process, they do not deal with 
differences in discourses in different time frames and do not reflect the changing 
nature of representations of Turkey and AK Party. 
A considerable group within the existing literature have focused on a single aspect 
of the relationship: religion/culture. This trend gained momentum especially after 
the stalemate in the negotiation process and the increase of religious and cultural 
arguments used by European opponents of Turkey’s EU membership. Analyses that 
focused on religious/cultural aspects of Turkey-EU relations from this perspective 
                                                          
25
 Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’S Enlargement 
Policy,” 494-507. 
26
 Ibid., 507. 
27
 For instance, Hakan Yılmaz, “Turkish identity on the road to the EU: Basic elements of French and 
German oppositional discourses’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 9, no.3, (2007): 293–
305; Beyza Ç. Tekin, Representations and Othering in Discourse: The Construction of Turkey in the 
EU Context (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2010). 
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provided very useful contributions to the literature, especially for analysing the 
problems of the relationship.
28
 
Within this group, opposition arguments that based on factors like the absorption 
capacity of the EU, Turkey’s geographic location or Europeanness of Turkey are 
generally seen as “political tactics”29 and excuses to hide the real argument, which 
says “a predominantly Muslim country has no place in the EU.” Popularity of this 
approach increased after the rise of problems in the negotiation process in spite of 
Turkish reforms that has made EU membership a more “realistic prospect,”30 in 
terms of meeting the relevant membership criteria. 
Although religion is undeniably an important factor in analysing Turkey-EU 
relations, it is far from being the only relevant aspect of the relationship. Moreover, 
explanations based on Islamophobia or Christian identity of Europe without 
deconstructing the concepts and making comparative analysis fail to account for the 
shifts in discourses and actions of the same actors. For instance, such simplifications 
generally cause to miss out the fact that countries, which currently oppose Turkish 
membership, have unanimously decided to open the membership negotiations with 
                                                          
28
 Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere (eds.), Religion, Politics and Turkey’s EU Accession (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); (Benefiting from theoretical insights of Constructivism and 
Realism) Giray Sadık, “Magic Blend or Dangerous Mix? Exploring the Role of Religion in 
Transforming Turkish Foreign Policy from a Theoretical Perspective,” Turkish Studies 13, no.3 
(September 2012): 293-31; (Descriptive) R. Quinn Mecham, “From the Ashes of Virtue, A Promise 
of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey,” Third World Quarterly 25, no.2 (2004): 
339-358; Valerie Amiraux, “Breaching the Infernal Cycle? Turkey, the European Union and 
Religion,” in Aziz Al-Azmeh ne Effie Fokas (eds.), Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and 
Influence (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007): 183-207; Erik Jones, “Review Essay: 
Turkey, Islam and Europe,” Survival 51, no.5 (October-November 2009): 163-172; Selcen Öner, 
“Turkey’s Membership to the EU in Terms of ‘Clash of Civilizations’,” The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Economics 20 (2009): 245-261. 
29
 Ingmar Karlsson, “Turkey’s Historical, Cultural and Religious Heritage: An Asset to the European 
Union?” in Christiane Timmerman , Dirk Rochtus and Sara Mels (eds.), European and Turkish 
Voices in Favour and Against Turkish Accession to the European Union (Brussels, P.I.E Peter Lang, 
2008): 100. 
30
 Fraser Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy, Second Edition (London: 
Routledge, 2012): 167-168. 
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Turkey that is ruled by ‘Islamist’ AK Party only a few years ago. Using ‘Muslim’ 
identity of Turkey and ‘Christian’ identity of EU as explanatory and pre-
determined/fixed rather than constitutive and fluxional factors open the way for 
(mostly negative) essentialist assumptions like “EU hates Turkey” or “Turks hate 
EU” and leads to questionable predictions about foreign policy actions of actors. 
Additionally, this approach generally causes to overlook the differences and 
varieties of the meanings of concepts like ‘Islam’ or ‘Europe’, and to assume that 
everybody implies and understands the same meanings while using these concepts. 
Another important group of literature shows a special interest to the concept of 
“identity” since ‘Europeanness’ of Turkey has become a dominant theme in political 
debates and media coverage of Turkey’s EU membership bid. A segment of this 
literature takes “European identity” at the centre of their analysis, especially after the 
increasing debates about “what Europe is and where it ends?” following the last 
enlargement waves and discussions on prospective candidates.
31
  
Studies in this category predominantly treated ‘identity’ as a more or less coherent 
independent variable that has generally hindered Turkey’s membership process.32 
Most of them take concepts like “Islamist” as given without feeling the necessity to 
deconstruct such labels. Some of them acknowledge the “historicity and 
evolutionary potential” of identity politics for criticising the usage of identity related 
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opposition as “a cover for racist arguments that are based on an understanding of 
identity as something set in stone and inalterable over time.”33  
Some of the analyses within this group have focused on specific aspects of identities 
of actors. For instance, some studies examined “differences between Turkey and the 
EU in terms of their security identities and foreign policy behaviour.” However, they 
start from an assumption about existence of “distinctive security identities”34 of 
Turkey and EU. Alterations in Turkey’s security discourse and increasingly visible 
divisions in security discourses of EU member-states create serious problems for 
such assumptions and explanatory efforts. 
Poststructuralist scholars Like Neumann, Rumelili and Diez have provided valuable 
contributions to the literature by focusing on the discursive construction of 
identity.
35
 They have mainly showed interest in analysing the construction of 
European identity through difference. They analysed various constitutive 
dimensions along which self/other relationships vary to produce or not to produce 
relationships of Othering. They have emphasised that “constitution of identity in 
relation to difference... does not necessarily lead to behavioural relationship based 
on the perception and representation of the other as a threat to self’s identity.”36 
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Analysts within this group have focused on the roles of factors such as Europe’s 
relations with the ‘East’ or EU’s enlargement policy. Some poststructuralist analysts 
like Düzgit, focused specifically on the role of EU official discourses on Turkey in 
constructing European identity.
37
 She has used discursive data from official debates 
and documents of EU bodies and member state parliaments as well as interviews 
with politicians in her analysis. 
Majority of the studies mentioned above contribute to the analysis of Turkey-EU 
relations with different degrees. There are many factors, including material factors 
and unexpected developments like the recent crisis in Ukraine that are at play in this 
relationship. Thus, no single study is exclusively enough in grasping all aspects of 
Turkey-EU relations. Standing closer to the poststructuralist approach, my thesis 
analyses the changing nature of competing representations of AK Party in the 
western mainstream media and political discourse, which is widely neglected in 
spite of its importance in the process. My thesis rejects rationalist materialist 
assumption on natural and pre-given identity understanding. Within that framework, 
it deconstructs concepts and labels like Islamist or secular, which are taken for 
granted within debates. It analyses dominant discourses on AK Party and Turkey’s 
identity, as well as foreign policy predictions emanating from these discursive 
positions. Thus, it highlights the changes and interactions among different sources of 
discourses during the relevant period, benefiting from the latest discursive data, 
especially during the Gezi Park incidents in Turkey that has caused Turkish-EU 
relations to hit rock bottom. 
My thesis takes Turkey-EU relations as the policy area to analyse the relationship 
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between discursive representations and policy choices. If one only analyses the 
material factors in Turkey and EU, that has no use in understanding the changes in 
Turkey-EU relations. Although there have been some developments that caused 
negative reactions from the West, changes in material conditions of Turkey in 
meeting the membership criteria do not reflect the dramatic negative change in 
Turkey’s EU membership destination. Although, the pace has been criticised, new 
reform steps have been taken in addition to already existent reforms that hardly 
anyone in Turkey and abroad denies. Moreover, there have been considerable 
positive developments about the reasons that were used to support Turkey’s 
membership bid, such as good performance of Turkish economy or its importance in 
terms of Europe’s energy security. 
This qualitative research claims that the dominant rationalist materialist and 
essentialist analyses in the literature and media fell short of understanding Turkey, 
its new governing party and Turkey-EU relations. It challenges the plausibility of 
essentialist arguments like “they hate us”, “they will not take us”, “they are not like 
us,” or “they will ruin us.” Moreover it argues that these dominant approaches have 
had decisive influences on western actors’ perceptions and actions related to AK 
Party and Turkey under its rule. As it underlines “the power of incomplete, 
ambiguous, and contradictory discourses to produce a social reality that we 
experience as solid and real,”38 this thesis examines how language constructs 
phenomena and how that influences policy choices. Since “discourse is not produced 
without context and cannot be understood without taking context into 
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consideration,”39 it pays special attention on the role of social context during the 
relevant period. 
Moreover, this thesis argues that material elements have a secondary status, because 
they gain meaning only through intellectual processes. As has been pointed out by 
Kevin Dunn, reality “is unknowable outside human perception, and there is never 
only one authority on a given subject.”40 In Friedrich Nietzsche’s words, “There are 
no facts in themselves. It is always necessary to begin by introducing a meaning in 
order that there can be a fact.”41 
This is what enables constructivists like Martha Finnemore among many others to 
believe in the possibility of change in the social world and to reject a constant, pre-
given, and natural-like ‘social world’ perception.42  Actions of social beings depend 
not only on physical constraints or individual preferences and rational choices, but 
also on shared knowledge, collective meanings and rules, legitimacy of self, 
institutions, practices and even creativity.
43
 From this perspective, human beings 
“make” our social world “from the raw materials that nature provides, by doing what 
[they] do with each other and saying what [they] say to each other.”44 
This thesis accepts the important role of mainstream media in shaping identity and 
policy narratives that are dominant among public and elites. Differently from other 
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negotiation processes, public opinion has always been a substantial part of Turkey’s 
membership debate. Contrary to the formal discourse, the process has been much 
more than a technical procedure. Turkish membership has been an important subject 
of various national election campaigns in EU member states. New laws that required 
national referendum in some of these members (i.e. France and Austria, both of 
which are among the countries with the least public support percentages in polls 
about Turkey’s EU membership) regardless of the success of Turkey’s negotiations 
increased the role of media and public opinion in the process. 
It is possible to claim that “the EU appears to have reached the limits of a top-down, 
elite-driven Project.”45 What people on the street think is becoming more and more 
important especially after the rise of public resentment in numerous member 
countries against the policies of EU. This trend has become much more visible after 
the last European Parliament elections that increased the pressure on the mainstream 
political parties and EU bodies, while providing an increasing voice for anti-EU and 
anti-enlargement actors.  
Within that framework, this thesis is particularly interested in the way in which AK 
Party and specifically Erdoğan have been represented in the Western media 
discourse, and how these representations have influenced specific encounters in 
Turkey-EU relations. The changes in the dominant representations over time have a 
special place in this analysis. It is claimed that western media and political discourse 
on AK Party had decisive influence in limiting possible policy options for policy 
makers. Positive and praising discourse on AK Party and Turkey that dominated 
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western political landscape enabled EU leaders to open the way for membership 
negotiations.  Similarly, negative and even demonising discourse on AK Party 
became the biggest obstacle for the continuation of the negotiations. 
As has been done in the works like Roxanne Doty’s Imperial Encounters46, Cynthia 
Weber’s Simulating Sovereignty47 and Faking It48, Kevin Dunn’s Imagining the 
Congo
49
; this thesis puts emphasis on the contested meanings of AK Party and 
Erdoğan and traces how the dominant representation has shifted over time. Because, 
as has been argued by Iver Neumann, when “a discourse maintains a degree of 
regularity in social relations, it produces preconditions for action.”50 It is claimed 
that the changes in representations of AK Party and Turkey under its rule defined the 
limits of possible policy choices both for the EU and Turkey. Analysing these 
changes  reveal important clues in understanding how the opening of negotiations 
emerged as a political option, how other options were shunted aside at that time, and 
how those options became dominant after some time.  
Assuming that identities are constructed discursively, how is the representation of 
AK Party is constructed in mainstream Western media and political discourses? 
How did labels like “Islamist” that is commonly used for AK Party in the literature 
and Western political discourse influence the debates, in the post-9/11 social 
context? How did these discourses change during AK Party’s rule in a continuous 
interactive way within the context of Turkey-EU relations? How did differences in 
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these discourses shape actors’ policies and positions about Turkey’s EU accession? 
In an attempt to provide answers to these questions, this thesis analyses the 
representations of AK Party in western mass media and political landscape, 
especially in the political turmoil during and after infamous Gezi Park incidents in 
Turkey that highlighted the problems in Turkey-EU relations as a negative turning 
point.  
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SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST FRAMEWORK 
A Special Case: Turkey’s Negotiation Process 
As European Commissioner Olli Rehn rightly points out “every time the EU accepts 
new members, it changes.”51 However, Turkish membership, contrary to other ones, 
seems to force Europeans to question their identity and interest discourses at 
unprecedented levels. Many things that had been taken for granted were questioned. 
In the words of David Phillips, Turkey’s membership will not only change Turkey 
but also “transform what it means to be European.” 52 As Jose Torreblanca puts it, 
the process showed that “to be European in Turkey is quite different from being 
European in Paris, Stockholm or Dublin.” But this is the case, he continues, for 
every member country. It is not only Turkey, which is different.
53
  
Thus, identity-related and civilisational arguments seem to dominate the opposition 
against Turkey’s EU membership. For instance, former French president Valery 
Giscard d’Estaing argues that “Turkey’s capital is not in Europe; 95 per cent of its 
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population lives outside Europe; it is not a European country.”54 However, his real 
concern is the identity and Muslim population of Turkey. Although Turkey is 
officially accepted by the Union to share the European values that are known to 
everybody, some Europeans like Edmund Stoiber, the Bavarian prime minister, 
believe that “Turkey is not part of Europe’s community of values,”55 without 
specifying what these values are. Looking at these examples, many commentators 
believe that there is at least a certain amount of hostility to Turkey in some EU 
member countries.
56
 
The reasons for objections have sometimes become harsh as in the example of 
Dutch European commissioner, Frits Bolkestein, who warned that Turkey’s 
membership will mean “the Islamisation of Europe” without hesitating to claim that 
it will mean “the relief of Vienna in 1683 will have been in vain.”57 For Turkish 
public, nothing can be more awkward than using this argument to oppose Turkey’s 
membership to a Union that arose from the ashes of the most brutal war the world 
has ever seen. This seemd to show a problem of understanding even at 
commissioner level about the logic behind the establishment of the Union on the 
basis of cooperation of two recent enemies, namely France and Germany. 
The role of media is crucial to mention at this point. After a general survey on the 
news related to Turkey in the European press, Ellen Svendsen concludes that the 
most important characteristics is “negativity.” By focusing only on negative things 
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like bomb attacks, catastrophes, violations of human rights and ignoring all positive 
developments the news coverage create a negative image of Turkey
58
, especially 
after the downturn of Turkey-EU negotiation process. Another important aspect of 
media coverage is the emphasis on Turkey as a Muslim country. With influences of 
negative image of Islam after 9/11 in the eyes of European citizens, this became one 
of the reasons of opposition to Turkish membership. In Svendsen’s words, 
“throughout European history, Turks have persistently been associated with 
violence, sexual perversion and stupidity.” Combined with the historical ‘otherness’ 
of Ottoman Empire in shaping European identity, it became more common to argue 
that Turkey is culturally different than other Europeans whatever the developments 
are. It also became commonplace to hear European politicians asking for opening a 
debate about European Union’s identity when they are asked about Turkish 
membership. However, the same politicians do not refrain from giving long 
speeches about the success of European Union, although they claim that they do not 
know what it really is. For those who cannot tell what Europe is, says Ellen 
Svendsen, Turkey plays a crucial “role of the convenient other that can tell us who 
we are.”59 
One interesting argument of those who oppose Turkish membership like Wolfgang 
Schauble, deputy head of the CDU/CSU group in German Bundestag, is that Europe 
has made a crucial mistake by “postpon[ing] for too long a discussion about the 
ultimate limits of EU extension and about the meaning of European identity.” 60 
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Although David Phillips criticises him in the same article for reflecting the view of 
Europe’s older generation, Schauble asserts that Europe should stop lying to Turkey 
and be “honest” enough to say that it will never be a full member.61 This perspective 
is well reflected by a speech of another CDU member in the Bundestag who claimed 
they are the honest ones by saying Turkey can only have a privileged partnership, 
while SDU is giving wrong hopes (or lying) to Turkey about full membership. 
Turkish public is becoming increasingly indignant towards the EU because of the 
perception that Europeans are not keeping their promises and applying double-
standards against Turkey. This anger is making it harder for the government to 
introduce reforms and slowing down the negotiation process. This point was 
emphasised by European Commission Vice-President Günter Verheugen, in an 
interview when he warned that “Europe is sending Turkey almost exclusively 
negative signals.” He continued that “we are focusing on the weaknesses of the 
country and not encouraging them to change. This is feeding a reluctance to make 
the reforms we are asking for, which in turn leads Europe to the view that the Turks 
simply can’t manage it.” According to him, this “is a dangerous spiral that threatens 
to lead to a global political failure of the highest order.”62  
International context have been in continuous influx during Turkey’s EU 
membership negotiations. New developments like Arab Spring, European economic 
crisis, and unexpected rise of tension between Russia and EU over Ukraine have 
complicated the already hot debate on AK Party’s identity and foreign policy 
destination. Identity debates concerning AK Party-led Turkey have fluctuated within 
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a wide spectrum of labels, including but not limited to European, Middle Eastern, 
Asian, Eurasian, Muslim, model democracy or autocracy. In this era of fast change, 
the dominant categories defining identity of AK Party or Erdoğan during the good 
relations before the opening of EU membership negotiations have been considerably 
different from those that emerged along with the worsening of Turkey-EU relations. 
Turkey’s EU membership negotiation process is different and more problematic than 
the previous ones. It took less than one year after the start of the negotiations for the 
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn to warn the parties about a potential “train 
crash.”63 Following intellectual problems, practical obstacles arose in the process. In 
December 2006, the European Council decided to provisionally suspend eight 
chapters from the accession negotiations with Turkey as a reaction to Turkey’s 
refusal to apply the additional protocol to the agreement on the EU-Turkey Customs 
Union to Cyprus. Austrian Foreign Minister was emphasizing that decision to 
suspend chapters is “a clear break in the negotiations.” According to her, “"tailor-
made partnership, say in the form of a European-Turkish Community” is more 
realistic option than full membership.
64
 
During German presidency, France pushed hard to block opening one of the three 
negotiation chapters that were ready to be opened. That chapter was the key area of 
economic and monetary policy. The only reason for Sarkozy to lobby hard to 
prevent opening that negotiation chapter was the political, economic and symbolic 
importance of the chapter by giving a full membership perspective. In the words of a 
German official, not opening that chapter “was a political decision emanating from 
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Paris.” Turkish side reacted to this decision by claiming that, for the first time ever, 
a negotiation chapter is not opened “on the grounds that it would bring Turkey 
closer to full membership.” 65  More important point is the fact that it has not been 
the last time. One of many other blows came when France and Austria accepted to 
hold referenda for Turkey’s membership.  
There are various arguments used by those who oppose a potential Turkish 
membership. Its identity, geographical location, religion, culture, large and 
agricultural population come among the most popular ones. However, the tension in 
the debates dramatically increased when the opposition about Turkey’s EU 
membership became based on arguments with identity and civilisational basis. It is 
generally accepted that economy or any other material criteria will not be the real 
concern in deciding about Turkey’s full membership. This argument is supported 
with the relative success of Turkey about these criteria. Very few Europeans deny 
the fact that Turkey’s situation, in measurable material terms, is similar to the two 
newcomers in the Union, namely Bulgaria and Romania, and at least as good as 
Spain and Portugal when they applied.
66
 
The prospects for Turkey’s EU membership are looking bleaker than ever now, as is 
the representation of Erdoğan and AK Party in the mainstream western media. 
Turkey’s relatively independent foreign policy choices and domestic developments 
that started with Gezi Park protests and continued during the power struggle 
between Turkish government and Gülen Movement made things worse. Many EU 
countries and EU bodies have increased their criticisms about the AK Party 
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government and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Political leaders from various EU 
member states are much more frank in their opposition to Turkey’s EU membership 
by saying that Turkey is not part of Europe.
67
 
In continuous interaction process, Turkish government’s discourse has shown a 
parallel downturn in terms of Turkey’s EU membership prospects. For instance, in 
his statement that marked Turkey’s first high-level acknowledgement that its 
decades-long bid for membership may never be successful, Egemen Bağış, Minister 
of EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator at the time, said Turkey will probably never 
become a member of the European Union because of stiff opposition and 
“prejudiced” attitudes from the bloc’s current members.68 Haluk Ilıcak, Turkey’s 
undersecretary of the Ministry of EU Affairs reflected mental preparations for the 
possibility of ultimate failure in negotiations by saying “The process means more 
than the accession. Once the necessary levels are achieved, Turkey is big enough to 
continue its development without the accession.”69 
Public opinions show a similar trend. According to the “Transatlantic Trends 2013” 
public opinion survey released by the German Marshall Fund of the United States 
(GMF), the desire of Turks to join the European Union has cooled considerably over 
the past decade and only 44% of Turkish respondents favoured joining the European 
Union in 2013, down from 73% in 2004. 34%, up from 9% in 2004, said that it 
would be bad for Turkey to join the EU. Citizens of EU member states are much less 
enthusiastic about Turkey’s EU membership, since only 20% of EU respondents 
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said that Turkey’s accession would be good, while 33% said it would be bad and 
37% said that it would be neither good nor bad.
 70 
Contrary to the official discourse, Turkey’s membership negotiation process is much 
more than a technical procedure that is dealt only by European and Turkish 
bureaucrats. This thesis rejects the analyses, which assume that membership 
negotiations have opened or halted upon objective cost-benefit calculations of 
rational actors. It argues that, alongside other factors like the performance of Turkish 
government, AK Party’s positive representation in the western mainstream media 
within the immediate post-9/11 social context provided an environment for 
supporting Turkey’s EU membership in European identity and interest discourses. 
Moreover, changing conditions and representations created considerable obstacles 
for Turkey’s membership later on by producing sources of fear and confusion in the 
minds and hearts of Europeans. This has been reflected well in the fact that “the 
more Europeans have began to see Islam as an existential threat in post-September 
11 era, the more they tend to define Turkey as one of the potential ‘others’ of the 
EU’s emerging identity.”71 Later on, ‘autocracy’ allegations about Erdoğan, who 
seems to have the political power to rule Turkey in the foreseeable near future, have 
created a scarier blend. The representation of AK Party and its leader in the western 
media has played a key role in this discursive interaction and change. 
 “Islamist” has become the single dominant adjective used for AK Party and 
Erdoğan, especially after the downfall of Turkey-EU relations and the increase of 
active foreign policy choices of AK Party government that are relatively more 
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independent from its traditional western allies. Personal attacks against Erdoğan 
have become more common firstly in the pro-Israeli and neo-con segments of the 
western media. For instance, Bloomberg View columnist and The Atlantic’s national 
correspondent Jeffrey Goldberg, who was named as "the most influential 
journalist/blogger on matters related to Israel"
72
 by Columbia Journalism Review 
contributing editor Michael Massing, has said that: "It's time to call Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan what he is: a semi-unhinged bigot."
73
 Gideon 
Rachman, the chief foreign affairs commentator for the Financial Times was joining 
the group by saying "I'm beginning to think Erdogan may actually be quite stupid."
74
  
Especially after the anti-government Gezi Park protests in 2013, it has become much 
more commonplace in the mainstream western media to call Erdoğan autocrat75 and 
even dictator.
76
 There has been close relationship and even cooperation between 
domestic anti-government groups and considerable number of authors in the western 
media to enhance this representation of Erdoğan.77 His policies like banning Twitter 
until it recognises Turkish court decisions, while emphasising that he does not care 
what others (especially western media) would say about him, accelerated this 
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trend.
78
 This was followed by the widespread criticisms in the mainstream Western 
media about increasing number of AK Party supporters for not seeing the reality (!) 
and “rewarding” Erdoğan for his wrongdoings. In addition, political tactics were 
provided for Erdoğan’s critics to beat him up in the next elections.79 
While Erdoğan’s long-time opponents are welcoming this change by claiming that 
“western depictions of Turkish politics have finally begun to catch up with the 
authoritarian reality,”80 Merve Şebnem Oruç from Daily Sabah summarises this 
radical change in Erdoğan’s representation in the Western media discourses by 
saying: 
“Almost all the stories on Turkish politics penned by Western or West-
obsessed Turkish writers start with the same cliche: "Once upon a time, Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was a moderate, successful, exemplary 
Islamist democrat. Oh, we loved him so much. When the Arab Spring spread, 
many pointed to Erdoğan-led Turkey as a model for guiding the 
transformation of the Middle East. But those days are over. Suddenly - yes, 
suddenly - Erdoğan became an autocrat - no wait, he became more evil: a 
dictator. He became "the dark one" in the Middle East. He somehow ruined 
the country; now, Turkey is a mess. And it all started with the holy Gezi Park." 
Their code is simple, actually.”81 
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Although the public opposition in Turkey towards EU membership and the 
downturn of AK Party government’s efforts for reforms in line with acquis 
communautaire are important factors in determining the pace of negotiations, they 
are not what make Turkish membership negotiations different than others. Because, 
the character of that public opposition and governments’ reluctance in reform efforts 
in the absence of a clear membership perspective are not too much different than 
what can be observed in other candidate countries. On the other hand, the major 
challenge comes from the scale of opposition in the EU against Turkish 
membership, which is unprecedented in enlargement history. 
The reasons behind the difficulties in the negotiation process are mainly based on 
identity and interest discourses among Europeans that are shaped within the new 
international structure after September 11. Non-material factors play a considerable 
role even in those cases that might be argued to be material factors such as 
geographical location or Turkey’s big population. The debates on the borders of the 
Union or the debates about the labour force requirements of Europe in the future 
show the importance of constructivist perspective in understanding such issues. As 
mentioned by Antonio Missiroli, “it is extremely difficult to base the debate [about 
Turkey] on an objective assessment” because of the fact that “where one stands 
depends on what one sees” in this case. Turkey’s characteristics like its population, 
size, and geographical location are perceived as “strategic assets” by some, while 
they are seen as “structural liabilities” by others. 82  
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Background and purpose of this study 
This qualitative research analyses the changing nature of competing representations 
of AK Party in the western mainstream media discourse. The aim of this thesis is to 
illustrate how the options available for Turkey’s EU membership orientation have 
emerged in the processes that construct AK Party’s representation in the western 
mainstream media narrative. Although it accepts that, as has been put by Wendt, 
“brute material factors have some effects on the constitution of power and 
interest;”83 it rejects rationalist materialist assumption on natural and pre-given 
identity understanding. It claims that identities are “endogenous, malleable and 
intersubjectively frame the reality which rationalist materialist approaches take for 
granted.”84Within that framework, it deconstructs concepts and labels like Europe or 
Islamist, which are taken for granted within debates. It focuses on dominant western 
media discourses on AK Party and Turkey’s identity, as well as foreign policy 
predictions emanating from these discursive positions. Thus, it highlights the 
changes and interactions among different sources of discourses during the relevant 
period. 
It takes Turkey-EU relations as the policy area to analyse the relationship between 
discursive representations and policy choices. It has no use in understanding the 
changes in Turkey-EU relations if one only analyses the material factors in Turkey-
EU relations or treat identity as pre-given and as one of many factors that influence 
cost-benefit analysis of rational actors. Although there have been some 
developments that caused negative reactions from the West, changes in material 
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conditions of Turkey in meeting the membership criteria do not reflect the dramatic 
negative change in Turkey’s EU membership destination. Although, the pace has 
been criticised, new reform steps have been taken in addition to already existent 
reforms that hardly anyone in Turkey and abroad denies. Moreover, there have been 
considerable positive developments about the reasons that were used to support 
Turkey’s membership bid, such as good performance of Turkish economy or its 
importance in terms of Europe’s energy security. 
This qualitative research claims that the dominant rationalist materialist analyses in 
the literature and media fell short of understanding the dynamics and nature of 
Turkey-EU relations. It challenges the plausibility of arguments like “Turkey is not 
European,” “Islamist AK Party is the real problem,” “They are not like us,” or 
“Erdoğan has his own hidden agenda.” Moreover it argues that these dominant 
approaches have had decisive influences on western actors’ perceptions and actions 
related to AK Party and Turkey under its rule. As it underlines “the power of 
incomplete, ambiguous, and contradictory discourses to produce a social reality that 
we experience as solid and real,”85 this thesis examines how language constructs 
phenomena and how that influences policy choices. Since “discourse is not produced 
without context and cannot be understood without taking context into 
consideration,”86 it pays special attention on the role of social context during the 
relevant period. 
Moreover, this thesis argues that material elements have a secondary status, because 
they gain meaning only through intellectual processes. As has been pointed out by 
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Kevin Dunn, reality “is unknowable outside human perception, and there is never 
only one authority on a given subject.”87 In Friedrich Nietzsche’s words, “There are 
no facts in themselves. It is always necessary to begin by introducing a meaning in 
order that there can be a fact.”88 
This is what enables constructivists like Martha Finnemore among many others to 
believe in the possibility of change in the social world and to reject a constant, pre-
given, and natural-like ‘social world’ perception.89  Actions of social beings depend 
not only on physical constraints or individual preferences and rational choices, but 
also on shared knowledge, collective meanings and rules, legitimacy of self, 
institutions, practices and even creativity.
90
 From this perspective, human beings 
“make” our social world “from the raw materials that nature provides, by doing what 
[they] do with each other and saying what [they] say to each other.”91 
It is possible to claim that “the EU appears to have reached the limits of a top-down, 
elite-driven Project.”  What people on the street think is becoming more and more 
important especially after the rise of public resentment in numerous member 
countries against the policies of EU. This trend has become much more visible after 
the last European Parliament elections that increased the pressure on the mainstream 
political parties and EU bodies, while providing an increasing voice for anti-EU and 
anti-enlargement actors.  
                                                          
87
 Kevin C. Dunn, “Historical Representations,” in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (eds), Qualitative 
Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 79. 
88
 Cited in Roland Barthes, “The Discourse of History,” Comparative Criticism 3 (1981): 16. 
89
 See Martha Finnemore, National Interest in International Society (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1996). 
90
 Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal 
of International Relations 3, no.3 (1997): 321. 
91
 Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User's Manual,” in Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf and 
Paul Kowert, (eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World (New York: ME Sharpe, 1998): 
59. 
41 
 
Within that framework, this thesis is particularly interested in the way in which AK 
Party and specifically Erdoğan have been represented in the Western media 
discourse, and how these representations have influenced specific encounters. The 
changes in the dominant representations over time have a special place in this 
analysis. It is claimed that western media discourse on AK Party had decisive 
influence in limiting possible policy options for policy makers. Positive and praising 
discourse on AK Party and Turkey that dominated western political landscape 
enabled EU leaders to open the way for membership negotiations.  Similarly, 
negative and even demonising discourse on AK Party became the biggest obstacle 
for the continuation of the negotiations. 
Since it has been the dominant political force in Turkey for over a decade and it still 
remains as the main power in the foreseeable future, the negative representation of 
AK Party limits the possible policy options for European policy makers. Positive 
and praising discourse on AK Party and Turkey that dominated western media 
landscape enabled EU leaders to open the way for membership negotiations.  
Similarly, negative and even demonising discourse on AK Party became the biggest 
obstacle for the continuation of the negotiations. 
As has been done in the works like Roxanne Doty’s Imperial Encounters92, Cynthia 
Weber’s Simulating Sovereignty93 and Faking It94, Kevin Dunn’s Imagining the 
Congo
95
; this thesis puts emphasis on the contested meanings of AK Party and 
Erdoğan and traces how the dominant representation has shifted over time. Because, 
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as has been argued by Iver Neumann, when “a discourse maintains a degree of 
regularity in social relations, it produces preconditions for action.”96 It is claimed 
that the changes in representations of AK Party and Turkey under its rule defined the 
limits of possible policy choices both for the EU and Turkey. Analysing these 
changes  reveal important clues in understanding how the opening of negotiations 
emerged as a political option, how other options were shunted aside at that time, and 
how those options became dominant after some time.  
Assuming that identities are constructed discursively, how is the representation of 
AK Party is constructed in mainstream Western political and media discourses? 
How did labels like “Islamist” that is commonly used for AK Party in the literature 
and Western political discourse influence the debates, in the post-9/11 social 
context? How did these discourses change during AK Party’s rule in a continuous 
interactive way within the context of Turkey-EU relations? How did differences in 
these discourses shape actors’ policies and positions about Turkey’s EU accession? 
In an attempt to provide answers to these questions, this thesis analyses the 
representations of AK Party in western mass media in two different time frames: one 
is from the first election victory in 2002 to the beginning of EU membership 
negotiations in 2005; second is the political turmoil during and after infamous Gezi 
Park incidents in Turkey that highlighted the problems in Turkey-EU relations as a 
negative turning point.  
The rest of the chapter evaluates the constructivist framework used in this thesis in 
order to tackle the role of ideational factors in understanding highly debated identity 
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of AK Party, with special concentration on continuous interaction between identity 
narratives and policy practices. In that framework, it unfolds objections against the 
dominant rationalist materialist approaches. Secondly, it clarifies the type of 
constructivism used in this thesis. Ontological and epistemological standpoint of this 
study is explained in that respect. Other constructivist tools used in this study are 
evaluated subsequently. Then the methodological toolkit, namely discourse analysis, 
is explicated.  
Mainstream Rationalist Materialist Literature on AK Party 
AK Party’s foreign policy is generally described as “a significant break with the 
past” in terms of “foreign policy parameters and practices.”97 Turkey’s changing 
foreign policy and the interesting nature of Turkey’s relations with the outside world 
under the so-called ‘Islamist’ AK Party is the puzzling situation that gave rise to not 
only this research but also other academic studies and political debates.  
This study arose from the observation that the dominant rationalist materialist 
accounts and approaches that take identity as a pre-given factor have remained far 
from being enough in comprehending AK Party and Turkey-EU relations. They not 
only depended on explanations based on presumed ‘objective’ material factors, but 
also ignored the role of social interactions in continuous construction of AK Party’s 
identity and its interest narrative, which they take as stable and pre-given. Efforts to 
“fixate a group identity through a definition”98 and “stereotypical and/or partially 
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self-sulfilling generalizations”99 about AK Party have caused these approaches to 
increase confusion regarding Turkey’s new ruling AK Party instead of explaining its 
behaviour; and to produce specific policy options for outsiders in their relations with 
AK Party-ruled Turkey. From their perspective, AK Party’s identity, interest 
perceptions and foreign policy preferences were already clear from their very first 
day in office.  
Although decision-making approaches have a considerable difference from 
structural rationalists by acknowledging the importance of decision makers, they 
still share a common ground by treating decision-makers as “hollow, faceless and 
interchangeable... rational utility-maximisers with exogenously framed interests.”100 
Changing the level of analysis and involving the role of domestic actors in the 
process does not prevent these approaches from relying on similar assumptions 
about the behaviours of decision-makers as rational utility maximisers.
101
 
Cognitivist approaches within rationalist materialist group take ideational factors 
into consideration as tools to strengthen their materialist-oriented explanations. 
Although these approaches accept that what people think matters, they defend a 
rational choice approach, once beliefs about a given situation are observed.
102
 
Moreover, they tend to assume ideational factors as “intervening variables with the 
potential to distort the actors’ true perception of reality and of his objective rational 
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interest.”103 It is possible to see the tendency of this group to attribute a 
‘legitimising” role for ideas as an instrument. Krasner openly reflects this tendency 
by claiming,  
“In the efforts to construct sovereignty ideas have been used to codify existing 
practices rather than to initiate new forms of order. Ideas have not made 
possible alternatives that did not previously exist; they legitimated political 
practices that were already facts on the ground. Ideas have been among several 
instruments that actors have invoked to promote their own, usually mundane, 
interests.”104 
Identity and interests of actors are accepted to be given and exogenous by 
mainstream theories; i.e. neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism.
105
 Works like 
Meltem Müftüler-Bac’s Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe, which are 
“based on structural realist approach,” assume that “a country’s national interest is 
derived from its position within the international system.”106 Generally, they 
describe Turkey as a “middle power” and derive conclusions from the conception of 
middle power within a realist depiction of international system. This approach does 
not accept Turkey as a unique case, but treats it simply as an example of many other 
middle powers. This view ignores all special characteristics of Turkey and prevents 
grasping the roots of all actions. It draws strict boundaries about what Turkey can 
and cannot do. This quotation provides a good example for such approach: 
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“A middle power is much stronger than the small nations but considerably 
weaker than the principal members of the system... Turkey can be classed as a 
middle power when placed within a hierarchy of states. Because of its 
weakness, it is greatly influenced by the actions of the major players. On the 
other hand, it exerts some influence in the region where it is located.”107 
This kind of realist analysis does not leave room for foreign policy alteration 
through agency or through changes in ideational factors. Change in Turkish foreign 
policies may only occur because of changes in the structure of the balance of power 
according to this approach. It also takes the state body as a unitary rational actor. It 
takes interests as given and does not question how those interests are produced and 
how they may evolve in time. 
According to rationalist materialist approaches, there is a deterministic relationship 
between the distribution of material capabilities in the international structure and the 
behaviours of states. Obtaining correct (!) information about the material capabilities 
of an actor is enough to predict the foreign policy choices of that actor, since 
“material capabilities are considered the defining characteristics” of a particular 
structure of the international system.
108
 Structural Rationalist theories base their 
explanations on what Ringmar calls “the logic of situation”109 and they emphasize 
the causal impact of material factors and structures on state actions.  According to 
these theories, a state’s behaviour is quite predictable as long as enough information 
is gathered about the international system.  
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Some realist materialist accounts, which could not deny the “attractive[ness]” of 
identity-based arguments, insist that their approach is still necessary in totally 
grasping what is going on. For instance, in his article on Turkey-Israel relations, 
Tarık Oğuzlu makes structural realist analysis, which he claims to be 
complementary to the ones focusing on domestic and identity-related factors. 
Although, he accepts that identity features like AK Party’s “Islamist tendencies... 
might have affected” (emphasis added) the relations between these two states, he 
adheres to the assumption that domestic, identity-related and structural factors are 
three separable “explanatory variables.”110 Within this perspective, he emphasises 
the importance of “systemic and exogenous factors (that) leave states with no option 
but to follow the dictates of realpolitik.”111 However, as in many similar bold 
rationalist analyses, the structural causes mentioned in explaining Turkish-Israeli 
relations as well as predictions for future developments in this article proved to be 
highly contradictory and questionable, if not wrong, especially with the contrary 
developments after the publication of the article. 
Traditional rationalist materialist approaches were fuelled by hard-line Kemalists, 
Turkish and Kurdish ultra-nationalists, who obsessively claimed that AK Party has a 
pre-given “Islamist” identity, despite its leaders’ continuous refutations and contrary 
policy practices. This group even refused to use the Party’s official short name (i.e. 
AK Party), since AK means white and clean in Turkish. Instead of those legal 
initials, they used AKP, which is simply something they made up. They accused 
anyone, including academics, who use the official short name to be pro-government 
or even advocate of AK Party. This approach has been strikingly reflected in the 
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practices of media outlets associated with Gülen Movement, which used the name 
“AK Party” while the Movement’s relations were good with AK Party and suddenly 
started to use “AKP” in its coverage after the rise of tension between the 
government and the movement. This unofficial short name has become more 
common in international literature, mostly due to the fact that it is shorter and easier 
to use than the original one.  
This group, including some segments of civilian and “military bureaucracy” 
alongside “main opposition party” and “the media associated with it,” remained 
“highly suspicious of the AK Party and believe that it has a hidden agenda to use EU 
reform process as a tool to transform Turkey into an Iranian style Sharia-based 
Islamic theocracy.”112 Interestingly, “their arguments overlap with many arguments 
of those who are against Turkey’s EU membership in Europe.”113 When the actions 
of AK Party were different from what they expected and predicted; and because AK 
Party’s policies have not fit into their framework expected from an ‘Islamist’ 
political party, they started to search for some mysterious secret intentions.  
Zeyno Baran, Director of the Center for Eurasian Policy at the Hudson Institute, is 
one of the many in this camp, who warn about AK Party’s alleged plan to introduce 
Islamic Sharia (code of law based on the Koran). She warns, alongside many other 
“threats,” that Turkey is “moving towards the Russia-Iran axis.”114 She asserts that 
AK Party “has worked hard privately” (emphasis added) as well as publicly to 
improve cooperation with Iran, without mentioning how she obtained knowledge 
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about those private activities.
115
 Baran defines AK Party leaders as “Islamists.”116 In 
a Hudson Institute panel, without mentioning AK Party’s name, she claims 
“Islamists cannot be democrats.” Because, in her words, “they hate Jews, Christians, 
Hindus and other Muslims who are not like them.” In continuation she asks, “If you 
bring that kind of mentality to leadership, what is going to happen to Israel?”117  
Similarly Soner Çağaptay, Director of the Turkish Research Program at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, claims that ‘Islamist’ AK Party has 
maintained its good relations with European Union since that “is good for its PR 
image.” Because, in his words, derailment in EU process “would be a confirmation 
of the assessment that it does not really want the EU and it is not sincere about it.” 
In addition, he continues, in reality AK Party is viewing Middle East “not as a 
region of nations, but as a region of religions.” Party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
“has sympathies for regimes in the region with Islamist ideologies.” Thus “under his 
rule, Turkey established good links with Sudan, which is run by an Islamist dictator. 
Also with Iran and Qatar. But not with Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, which are 
secular, moderate, pro-Western regimes” (emphasis added). 118   
Such scary rationalist predictions about AK Party’s foreign policy, which are 
identified by Jose Casanova simply as “preposterous,”119 widely ranged from 
turning Turkey into a theocratic regime like Malaysia or Iran, to selling Cyprus to 
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Europeans in return for EU membership.
120
 AK Party became possibly the only 
governing party on earth that managed to be accused for being pro-American, pro-
Iran, pro-EU, pro-Hamas, pro-Assad and pro-Muslim Brotherhood in different times 
during its rule. Due to their relative domination in the mainstream media, this type 
of rationalist materialist and essentialist approaches convinced many foreign 
observers, at least, to suspect the real intentions of AK Party.  
Some like Iranian author Amir Taheri even claimed that its opponents “fear that 
AKP may be a wolf disguised as a lamb to confuse its opponents while waiting to 
make its final deadly move.” In continuation to this argument, it is argued that “even 
some of those who express sympathy for AKP admit they cannot be sure that the 
party does not have a hidden agenda.” 121 Texas Governor Rick Perry, in a 
broadcasted debate between Republican presidential candidates, went so far as to 
argue that Turkey “is being ruled by what many would perceive to be Islamic 
terrorists.” Not surprisingly, in the same speech applauded by a cheerful audience he 
continued; “it is time for us to have conversation about whether or not [Turkey] 
belongs to be in NATO... There should be no space between United States and 
Israel. Period! And we need to send powerful message to countries like Iran, Syria 
and Turkey.”122  
Labelling and categorising AK Party, even naming it the way they wish; drawing the 
boundaries for that pre-given identity; making predictions about its foreign policy 
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behaviours and producing foreign policy prescriptions for European politicians 
according to this identity narrative has been the common way of argument for this 
approach. As Ruggie underlies, by taking state interests as identical, this approach 
rejects the importance of the particular cultural and historical features of individual 
states and specific self/other conceptions emanating from those features in the 
foreign policy making processes.
123
 
Rationalist materialist approaches to foreign policy analysis are “preoccupied with 
positing universal laws of rational behaviour.” They take agents and their 
preferences “as given prior to social action, which means that question of how 
particular subjectivities (nations, states, individuals) and identities are constituted is 
excluded from analysis.” In other words, “actors and their identities and interests can 
be taken as pre-given, rather than as being constituted in social interaction and 
requiring investigation and explanation.”124 Within this framework, AK Party’s 
identity has been mainly described with labels like ‘pro-Islamist,’ ‘Islamist leaning,’ 
‘mildly Islamist,’ or ‘moderate Islamist.’  
For almost all analyses on AK Party-led Turkey, Islam is accepted as an inseparable 
and generally the most preponderant element of Turkish identity. This approach 
gained more popularity after the end of Cold War and reached its peak with AK 
Party governments. One of the first controversial examples was Huntington’s highly 
debated and cited work The Clash of Civilizations, which depicts the hegemonic 
description of Turkish identity as a Muslim state. In his words, Turkey is 
“historically the most obvious and protypical torn country” that “rejected Mecca” 
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and that is “rejected by Brussels.”125 He is confident that Turkey will not become a 
member of the Christian EU because of its Muslim identity.  
At this point, the important role of post 9/11 international context on how inferences 
are drawn from this “Islamist” label should be mentioned. This concept has become 
a keyword to define anything that is from the Muslim world. For instance, BBC’s 
usage of the title “Islamist” as the single adjective to define different actors within 
the very same week ranges from Egypt's President Mohammed Morsi
126
 to 
Somalia’s Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys (considered a terrorist by the UN and the 
United States)
127, from a ‘militant network’ in Germany128 to ‘Al-Qaeda-linked 
militants’ in Syria129 and the rebels ousted by France from Northern Mali130, from 
Afghanistan’s Taliban131 to Erdoğan and AK Party.132 
Many analysts have given reference to work’s like Huntington’s book in the 
aftermath of 9/11 attacks. This increased the enthusiasm in western circles about the 
prospective ‘other’ for the West, namely the Islamic world. However, prejudices and 
misunderstandings have prevailed in the western world, especially with the negative 
influences of terrorists with the ‘Islamist’ banner. Yet, it is important to mention that 
this problem is not a new development. In his book written in 1981, well-known 
scholar Edward Said criticises the West for taking Islam as the scapegoat for 
everything that seems to be wrong in the world system. He believes that there is 
almost unanimity in the West about the guilt of Islam about the problems that world 
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faces today. In his words, “for the right, Islam represents barbarism; for the left, 
medieval theocracy; for the center, a kind of distasteful exoticism.” Thus, instead of 
starting by telling what Islam is, Said starts his book by saying that “Islam is not 
what it is generally said to be in the West today.”133 
This study claims that understanding the post-9/11 international context is crucial in 
grasping the background of discourses and their influences on actors’ behaviours. 
Moreover, the flaws of rationalist materialist predictions are embedded within the 
“truth” claims related to this context. Thus, transformation of security discourses, 
rise of Islamophobia and xenophobia in the West that are fuelled by economic crisis 
are evaluated in the next chapter as the important components of post-9/11 
international context. In addition, identity labels like ‘Islamist’, ‘conservative’ or 
‘secular’ that are used commonly in defining actors’ in Turkish politics are 
questioned in following chapters, instead of taking them for granted. 
At this point, it is also crucial to emphasise that this study does not reject the 
existence of material facts. It is undeniable that some material factors like economic 
productions and military capabilities of Turkey and EU have changed during the 
relevant period in this analysis. There is always possibility for changing material 
factors to influence the course of Turkey-EU relations. For instance, changes like 
finding new energy resources in the Mediterranean or energy crisis due to straining 
relations with Russia may have considerable influence in the direction of the 
relationship. However, even these material facts gain meaning only through 
intellectual processes and, as has been mentioned by Lene Hansen, they need 
“human and discursive agency” in order to “influence the production and 
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reproduction of foreign policy discourse.” Moreover, “neither ideas nor materiality 
have meaningful presence separate from each other.” 134 Thus, this thesis rejects the 
competency of rationalist materialist approaches in understanding and explaining 
AK Party and its foreign policy behaviours. Instead, it argues that constructivist 
analysis has necessary tools in comprehending them. The next section details the 
type of constructivist approach applied in this study. 
Social Constructivist Framework 
Social constructivism arose in 1980s and became a challenging alternative way of 
thinking in international relations literature against orthodox rationalist theories. 
However, its roots can be traced back to the 18
th
 century with the works Italian 
philosopher Giambattista Vico with his belief in the historical world as the product 
of Man, while the natural world is made by God. Immanuel Kant is another ancestor 
of constructivism with his belief in the subjectivity of the human beings’ knowledge 
about the world that is filtered through human consciousness. Another forerunner of 
constructivism is Max Weber, who argues that “subjective understanding is the 
specific characteristic of social knowledge.”135 
Especially after the end of Cold War, constructivism gained popularity and has been 
seen by many as the new rival of the mainstream theories. It was celebrated as the 
new party of the third grand debate in IR theory against rationalism.
136
 Its biggest 
contribution to the literature is generally argued to be its success in shifting the 
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attention from material factors to ideational factors in understanding and explaining 
the social world. It is generally described as a theory that emphasises the importance 
of subjective and commonly held (intersubjective) ideas and beliefs in shaping the 
social world that human beings are living in. By this way, it was seen as a 
challenging view, which rejects any truth claim that can be applied in all times and 
places. It also opened the way for analysing the active interaction between humans 
as agents and the social world as the structure. In foreign policy analysis realm, it 
became the greatest rival of rationalist materialist approaches, which “lack 
dynamism and are unable to account for the processes through which social reality 
and foreign policy are generated and change over time.”137 As a result, it was 
perceived as a new way to analyse the mutual construction process between agents 
and structures. 
All this being said, however, it is still very hard to talk about clarity and consensus 
on constructivism’s “nature and substance.”138 Confusion and debate seem to prevail 
in the literature about the characteristics and the place of constructivism in 
International Relations (IR) theory. Different authors use the term in different 
meanings and this makes it more difficult to understand what social constructivism 
really is. For instance, although Wendt insists on the need for clearly separating 
constructivism from postmodernism, Jackson and Sorensen list postmodernists 
among the critical wing of constructivism, while Adler identifies them as a wing of 
radical constructivism.
139
 Moreover, constructivist scholars themselves support 
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different views in the name of constructivism. Thus, scholars like Colin Hay argue 
that constructivists are “unified more by what they distance themselves from than 
what they share.”140  
Emanuel Adler defines constructivism as “the view that the manner in which the 
material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on 
dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.”141 
However, this is only one of the various definitions of constructivism. Thus, with 
reference to Hay’s criticism, it seems more efficient to analyse what constructivists 
distance themselves from in the first place, in order to grasp the core characteristics 
of constructivism.
142
 As can be inferred from its widely used portrayal by Adler as 
the “middle ground,” constructivism seeks to distance itself from the opposing sides 
in IR theory, namely materialists versus ideationalists, rationalists versus relativists, 
individualists versus structuralists.
143
 However, the middle ground chosen by each 
constructivist is somewhere on a wide spectrum in between these poles. Thus, a 
basic distinction is made between thin constructivists and thick constructivists. Yet, 
there are no clear boundaries to classify them with strict labels. 
As an example of the many categorisation attempts in the literature, Jeffrey Checkel 
divides constructivism in three main groups: conventional, interpretative and 
critical/radical.
144
 In his words, conventional constructivist, mostly based in USA, 
focus on the role of norms. They prefer positivist epistemology and use qualitative, 
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process-tracing case study as methodology. Their “theoretical inspiration” arises 
mainly from sociology and institutional/organisational theory. Interpretative and 
critical/radical types of constructivism, he continues, are more popular in Europe. 
Interpretive constructivists ask “why” questions, using discourse analysis 
techniques, with special emphasis on the role of identity. Critical scholars, on the 
other hand, focus more on the “power and domination inherent in language” with 
discourse-theoretical methods. Even he, in the same paper, accepts that such 
categorisation is oversimplification.
145
 
Although theoretical framework of this thesis can be identified as a “critical” one in 
Checkel’s categorisation, considering the difficulties in finding a common 
classification and labelling for constructivists, instead of naming the “type of 
constructivism” in this thesis, constructivist elements that are used in this analysis 
are evaluated below: 
Ontological and Epistemological Position 
The first major issue that should be addressed is the position held in this study about 
ontological matters. It is fair to claim that the constructivist position held in this 
thesis is relatively closer to poststructuralist approach, on the wide spectrum 
between rationalist materialist and poststructuralist poles. Such attitude gained 
ground among constructivists, as constructivists like Wendt started their works with 
a special criticism of neorealism. Its role as the ‘other’ in the constructivist analysis 
is so important that Jackson and Sorensen argue that neorealism is still the main 
rival of constructivism while there is a considerable room for cooperation with 
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neoliberalism, international society theory and even some versions of neo-
Marxism.
146
 This unique role of neorealism can be easily observed in Wendt’s 
widely cited book Social Theory of International Politics as he clearly states that he 
positions himself according to Waltz’s structural realism, namely as a critique of 
it.
147
 The most important reason for this seems to be the dominant position of 
neorealism in IR theory. It should be mentioned that despite its different place 
because of its belief in the causal power of norms and social learning, neoliberalism 
is in the same camp with neorealism for sharing its materialist ontology and core 
assumptions. 
In short, its ontology is the main departure point of this thesis from this mainstream 
camp (i.e. neorealism and neoliberalism). In other words, its answer to a question 
like “What is out there in social world?” is different from mainstream rationalist 
materialist theories. While a mainstream theorist’s answer includes only ‘objective’ 
material factors that are completely outside of human control with its own laws, this 
research claims that there are both intellectual and material elements in the social 
world and all elements are dependent on human mind. In this respect, in Adler’s 
words, it is “mediativist” in the sense that it accepts the existence of reality out there 
and believes that this reality is “not determined solely by material reality” and is 
“also socially emergent.”148 
Moreover, this thesis argues that material elements have a secondary status, because 
they gain meaning only through intellectual processes. As has been pointed out by 
Kevin Dunn, reality “is unknowable outside human perception, and there is never 
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only one authority on a given subject.”149 This is what enables constructivists like 
Martha Finnemore among many others to believe in the possibility of change in the 
social world and to reject a constant, pre-given, and natural-like ‘social world’ 
perception.
150
  Actions of social beings depend not only on physical constraints or 
individual preferences and rational choices, but also on shared knowledge, collective 
meanings and rules, legitimacy of self, institutions, practices and even creativity.
151
 
From this perspective, human beings “make” our social world “from the raw 
materials that nature provides, by doing what [they] do with each other and saying 
what [they] say to each other.”152 
The most famous declaration of constructivism’s different ontology is Wendt’s 
claim that “anarchy is what states make of it.”153 This claim challenges the 
mainstream from its roots by showing that even the most commonly-accepted 
concept in our social world is not given, natural and material. Although, Wendt 
himself accepts that there is anarchy in the international system, he argues that “it is 
the interaction and intersubjective understandings of states which gives rise to the 
condition of anarchy.”154 
Another outcome of constructivism’s different ontology is its emphasis on the role 
of non-material factors, like norms, in shaping the social world. In the mainstream, 
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realists argue that norms do not have a causal power, while neoliberal regime theory 
argues that norms have some influence in certain areas. However, even neoliberals 
believe that norms are parts of the “superstructure built by agents on a material base 
and have only regulative function.” On the other hand, constructivists claim that 
norms have not only regulative but also constitutive effects on identities, interests 
and behaviours of agents.
155
 
Although its rejection of purely materialist ontology is mentioned above, it should 
be emphasised that ontological stance held in this thesis is also different from 
postmodernism’s strictly idealist ontology that ignores the material elements in the 
social world and takes the “world only as it can be imagined or talked about.”156 As 
a “middle ground,” it believes in the coexistence of both material and social factors 
in the social world.  
This brings us to the second point to be clarified about theoretical framework in this 
thesis: epistemology. Its epistemological stance again closer to poststructuralism on 
the wide spectrum between rationalist materialist and poststructuralist poles. It 
shares cynicism of poststructuralism to a certain extent about truth claims of social 
scientists, yet it does not reject social scientific knowledge. In other words, its 
answer to a question like “What can we (hope to) know about social reality?” is 
slightly closer to postmodernism’s answer than mainstream’s reply. Postmodernists 
reject the possibility of objective knowledge and thus, scientific study about social 
world. Moreover, they believe that “truth claims cannot be adjudicated 
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empirically.”157 Hansen describes poststructuralism’s rejection of causal relationship 
between identity and foreign policy as follows: “Poststructuralists conceptualize 
identity and policy as ontologically inseparable and this inseparability is enacted 
through discourse, and they cannot therefore adopt an epistemology documenting 
the causal effects of identity on foreign policy.”158 
Social world is so complex and foreign policy decisions necessitate that complexity 
to be reflected in decision making processes. If having vast amount of information 
and blueprints, even rules, for action was enough for taking a good (!) decision, one 
could have easily argued that in the near future high-technology computers will 
decide about the fate of countries soon. New supercomputers can store and analyse 
enormous amount data, and make accurate calculations at speeds of nanoseconds, 
which is well beyond beyond human comprehension. Nobody has yet listed Tianhe-
2 among the top players of Chinese foreign policy making process, although it is the 
fastest supercomputer in the world as of June 2014. Tianhe-2, a supercomputer 
developed by China’s National University of Defence Technology, is the world’s 
fastest system with a performance of 33.86 Pflop/s (quadrillions of calculations per 
second).
159
 It is not a coincidence that nobody has ever proposed to upload countless 
number of rules and scenarios for foreign policy actions alongside any available 
(historical, economic, social etc.) data, and let the supercomputer to decide what 
China’s foreign policy should be on a specific issue area. 
Although this thesis shares the scepticism of post-modernists about the universally 
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applicable law-like truth claims in social sciences and about the attempts to discover 
a ‘final truth’ about the world which is true across time and place, it accepts the 
possibility of scientific analysis. This scepticism does not prevent it from making 
“truth claims about the subjects [it] ha[s] investigated...while admitting that [its] 
claims are contingent and partial interpretations of a complex world.”160 
For some scholars, like Steans and Pettiford, this acceptance of science comes from 
constructivists’ desire to “say something meaningful about the (social) world.”161 
Whatever their desires are, constructivism, Adler argues, has an epistemology “that 
makes interpretation an intrinsic part of social science and that stresses contingent 
generalizations,” which does not try to fasten up the understandings about social 
world.
162
 In line with this argument, this thesis does not reject all truth claims and 
accepts the possibility of explaining social world in some certain ways as well as 
understanding it.
163
 
Although possibility of science is accepted, this thesis rejects mainstream’s claim to 
find the ‘truth’ for everyone and explain the social world in the same way with a 
scientist working on the laws of material world. Wendt underlines this difference by 
arguing that constructivism’s “propositions are conditional rather than universal.”164 
Agents and Structure 
One of the most important points that should be taken into consideration in 
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understanding constructivism is its position in the debate over the relationship 
between agents and structure. As Onuf defines, structure is a “stable pattern of rules, 
institutions, and unintended consequences.”165 It is also identified as “a set of 
constraints on the behaviour” of agents.166 According to Went, social structure 
includes three basic elements: shared knowledge, material resources, and practices; 
and these three elements are interrelated. In this analysis, “material resources only 
acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in 
which they are embedded,” and it is their intersubjectivity what makes the ideas and 
structure social. He also emphasises that “social structure exists, not in actors’ heads 
nor in material capabilities, but in practices. Social structure exists only in 
process.”167 
From a constructivist perspective, as Wendt mentions, agent-structure debate arises 
from the fact that “human agents and social structures are, in one way or another, 
theoretically interdependent.”168  Especially with the rise of constructivism, this 
debate began to attract the attention in the literature on the nature of the relationship 
between agents and structures. In his influential article, Wendt analyses the 
perspectives of influential theories (namely, neorealism and world-system theory) 
that claim to make structural explanation of how states behave in the international 
system and defines constructivism’s approach. 
In his analysis, Wendt argues that there are two possible ontological positions about 
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the issue: one of them is to accept either structure or agents are “ontologically 
primitive,” while the other one is to give them “equal and therefore irreducible 
ontological status.” He continues that both neorealism and world-systems theory 
choose the first option. Neorealism accepts the agents, while world-systems theory 
takes the system as ontologically primitive. Wendt’s solution to the problem is to see 
agents and system as “co-determined” or “mutually constituted.”169 
Wendt borrowed the concept of ‘structuration’ from Anthony Giddens in his study. 
Giddens uses the concept of ‘structuration’ to describe an interactive relationship 
between agents and structure. According to him, structures (i.e. the rules and 
conditions that guide social action) do not determine what agents do in a mechanical 
way, or vice versa.
170
 Rather, there is a continuous interaction between them that 
shapes both sides. In other words, Giddens’ agents are not “structural idiots.” 
Instead, they consciously have their own constructed identities, structures and 
practices.
171
 However, it should not be ignored that there is no full independence for 
any agent. Thus, “full independence is a... fiction, and sovereignty is a matter of 
degree.”172 In other words, “people make society, and society makes people” in a 
continuous two-way process.
173
 
This perception of ‘mutual constitution’ became one of the foundation stones of 
constructivism. Thus, constructivism is known for its criticism of mainstream not 
only for its materialism, but also for its methodological individualism.
174
 
Methodological individualism is described by Rhoads to be based on “the belief that 
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society consists solely of its members.” In this view, the members “alone are real” 
and “individualism rules out social structures as supraindividual causes and traces 
causal inferences to particular individuals in general.”175 
In continuation to this understanding, Adler argues that the main aim of 
constructivism is “to provide both theoretical and empirical explanations of social 
institutions and social change, with the help of the combined effect of agents and 
social structures.” By this way, constructivism tries to establish a bridge between 
individual agency and social structure.
176
 This thesis analyses AK Party as an agent 
within a specific international and domestic structure. Instead of taking it as an 
independent actor with pre-given identity and interests, this research underlines 
continuous mutual construction of AK Party with an evolving international 
structure. 
Language, Identity and Interest 
The connection between language, identity and interest has been a central issue for 
constructivist research agenda. Jutta Weldes argues that “national interest... is 
created as a meaningful object, out of shared meanings through which the world, 
particularly the international system and the place of the state in it is understood.”177 
Within that framework, Iver Neumann claims that human beings “sort and combine 
sensory impressions of the world through categories (or models or principles).” 
Language, she continues, “as a social system with its own relational logic, produces 
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reality for humans by mediating these sense data.”178 Derrida claims that language is 
a system of differential signs, and meaning is established not by the essence of a 
thing itself but through a series of juxtapositions, where one element is valued over 
its opposite.
179
 
Kevin Dunn emphasises that representations in language are historically and 
contextually contingent. In his words, “representations are inventions based on 
language, but they are not neutral or innocuous signifiers. Because they enable 
actors to ‘know’ the object and to act upon what they ‘know,’ representations have 
very real political implications. Certain paths of action become possible within 
distinct discourses, while other paths become unthinkable.”180 In continuation to this 
understanding, the central aim of actors who are making and influencing foreign 
policy is to present their choice as legitimate and enforceable, by establishing “a link 
between policy and identity that makes the two appear consistent with each 
other.”181 
There is a strong link between language and identity of actors. States’ identities and 
interests are shaped by the “norms, institutions, and other cultural features of 
domestic and international environments.”182 As Hansen puts, “it is only through the 
construction in language that ‘things’ –objects, subjects, states, living beings, and 
material structures- are given meaning and endowed with a particular identity.” 
There is also an important interdependence between identities and practices. Hansen 
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underlines this interdependence by claiming “identities are articulated as the reason 
why policies should be enacted, but they are also (re)produced through these very 
policy discourses: they are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and the product.” 
183
 
This continuous interaction and evolution is well reflected in the changing nature of 
discourses. “It is impossible for discourses ever to reach absolute fixity and stability, 
thus on the one hand no policy-identity links or articulations of identity are ever 
completely stable.” However, these fluctuations do not prevent emergence of 
identities with a certain level of stability. Since, “identities are constructed through 
an articulation of a larger number of signs in process of differentiation and process 
of linking, it is possible to analyze the relative ability of a discourse to present a 
construction of identity which is not (seen as) highly internally unstable.” 184 
In addition to social identities, Alexander Wendt claims that states have corporate 
(pre-social) identities that are self organising, without a need for a particular ‘other’ 
to which the self is related.
185
 In her poststructuralist critique of Wendt, Lene 
Hansen points out the necessity of drawing and maintaining boundary between self 
and other in order to constitute an actor as a physically distinct being. She also 
emphasises that “discursive epistemology makes a pre-social, corporate and intrinsic 
identity an impossibility, and vice versa.”186 This analysis chooses poststructuralist 
relational conception of identity over Wendtian intrinsic one and claims that no 
identity is constructed in isolation from others, and AK party was not an exception. 
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Emphasising the importance of national roles or identity perceptions in defining 
foreign policy choices of states is neither a new practice nor unique to 
constructivists. In his article that dates back to 1970, Kal Holsti talks about and 
criticise IR theorists who make “references to national roles as possible causal 
variables in the operation of international systems, or in explaining the foreign 
policies of individual nations.”187 However, it was after the rise of constructivism, 
when attention has dramatically shifted in the literature from material factors to non-
material factors, like identity, in explaining national interests and foreign policy 
actions. As Finnemore puts it, constructivists opened a new way of scholarship by 
“developing a systemic approach to understanding state interests and state behaviour 
by investigating an international structure, not of power, but of meaning and social 
value.”188 
Identities play three main roles in a society: “they tell you and others who you are 
and they tell you who others are.” As Ted Hopf correctly points out, identities are 
necessary parts of both domestic and international societies for establishing a basic 
level of order. In that framework, “durable expectations between states require 
intersubjective identities that are sufficiently stable to ensure predictable patterns of 
behaviour.”189 
Intersubjective beliefs, ideas, conceptions and assumptions that are widely shared 
among people have precedence over subjective ones. In other words, “ideas need to 
be widely shared to matter; nonetheless they can be held by different groups such as 
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organisations, policymakers, social groups and etc.”190 It should be emphasised that 
“intersubjective meaning is not simply an aggregation of the beliefs of individuals 
who jointly experience and interpret the world.” Instead, it exists “as a collective 
knowledge that is shared by all who are competent to engage in or recognize the 
appropriate performance of a social practice or range of practices.”191 The life of this 
kind of knowledge is much longer than individuals’ lives and is “embedded in social 
routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their 
production and workings.”192 Intersubjective meanings have structural 
characteristics that do not only constrain actors but also define their social realities. 
Identities are relational, meaning a necessity for other in understanding self. In other 
words, “one’s identity is relevant only in relationship to other individuals or 
groups.”193 Thus, in order to reveal identities through discourse analysis, the main 
questions to be asked are “who is the ‘we’ in these texts and who are the ‘others’ 
with or against whom we identify?”194 As has been suggested by Ole Waever, an 
actor’s other can be spatial (external) other as well as temporal (internal) other of its 
own past.
195
 
Contrary to mainstream rationalist theories, this study rejects constant, pre-given 
identity understanding. From this constructivist framework, it adheres to Wendt’s 
claim that “interests and identities of actors emerge only in an interactive 
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process.”196 In this process, identity has an important role in defining states’ 
interests. States, from this perspective, “do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that 
they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests 
in the process of defining situations.” The actors may face some unprecedented 
situations that force them to re-construct their interests by constructing the meaning 
of their new environment. “The absence or failure of roles makes defining situations 
and interests more difficult, and identity confusion may result.” 197 
Bukovansky argues that “analysis of the social construction of state identities ought 
to precede, and may even explain, the genesis of state interests.”198 In other words, 
state identity is the basis of interest. Thus, state identity is argued to precede state 
interests because “actors often cannot decide what their interests are until they know 
what they are representing- ‘who they are’ which in turn depends on their social 
relationships.”199 
In terms of identity studies, Ted Hopf divides constructivism into three categories: 
systemic constructivism concentrating on the role of interactions among states; 
societal constructivism focusing on intersubjective domestic sources of identity 
discourse; and norm-centric constructivism working on the relationship between 
norms and state identities. He also makes a distinction between constructivist 
discourse studies focusing on domestic societies (i.e. intersubjectivist theory which 
is structural and social) and those focusing on elites (i.e. subjectivist theory which is 
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individualistic and personal).
 200
  
Even systemic constructivists do not reject the importance of domestic factors in 
shaping the identities of states. For instance Alexander Wendt, as a leading systemic 
constructivist, accepts the importance of domestic factors by arguing that the way a 
state satisfies its corporate interests (namely, physical and ontological security, 
recognition as an actor, and development) is determined by the way it identifies 
itself in relation to others, “which is a function of social identities at both domestic 
and systemic level of analysis.” Wendt also accepts that “some state identities and 
interests” arise “primarily from relations to domestic society,” while others stem 
from international society. Thus, he agrees that “the content of national interest” is 
only partly shaped by “structurally constituted identities.” 201 However, he refrains 
from getting into domestic realm in his studies. 
Methodology: Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis gained popularity among constructivists as a way to “illustrate 
how... textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in 
specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in 
the contemporary world.”202 This interest arose from two characteristics of 
discourse: “it enables the actors’ understanding of the social world of which they are 
part, and it constitutes and defines the social parts and practices of this world.”203 As 
Roxanne Dotty asserts, discourses “produce meanings and in doing so actively 
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construct the ‘reality’ upon which... policy is based.”204 In that framework, Nelson 
Phillips and Cynthia Hardy claim that discourse analysis goes “one step further” 
than other methods “in embracing a strong social constructivist epistemology.”205 
Paltridge illustrates the interactive nature of discourses in social construction of 
reality as follows:  
“The texts we write and speak both shape and are shaped by [social and 
cultural] practices. Discourse, then, is both shaped by the world as well as 
shaping the world. Discourse is shaped by language as well as shaping 
language. It is shaped by the people who use the language as well as shaping 
the language that people use. Discourse is shaped, as well, by the discourse 
that preceded it as well that which might follow it. Discourse is also shaped by 
the medium in which it occurs as well as it shapes the possibilities of that 
medium. The purpose of the text also influences the discourse. Discourse also 
shapes the range of possible purposes of the texts.”206 
In this approach, discourse is accepted to provide a “degree of regularity in social 
relations” by producing “preconditions for action.” In Neumann’s words, it 
“constrains what is thought of at all, what is thought of as possible, and what is 
thought of as the ‘natural thing’ to do in a given situation.” On the other hand, it 
should be emphasised that discourse only provides alternative policy options, 
instead of a single determined one.
 207
  This aspect of discourse analysis prevents it 
from reaching short cut answers to ‘why?’ questions. 
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Discourse analysis “examines how the use of language is influenced by relationships 
between participants as well as the effects the use of language has upon social 
identities and relations. It also considers how views of the world, and identities, are 
constructed through the use of discourse.”208 As Hansen maintains, “the strategy of 
discourse analysis is to ‘incorporate’ material and ideational factors rather than to 
privilege one over the other... The analytical intend is not to measure the relative 
importance of ideas and materiality but to understand them as constructed through 
discourse which gives materiality meaning by drawing upon a particular set of 
identity constructions.”209 
The theoretical claims of discourse analysis, according to Jennifer Milliken, can be 
categorised in three groups. The first one is to accept “discourse as structures of 
signification which construct social realities.” The second commitment of such 
analysis is to assume “discourses as being productive (or reproductive) of things 
defined by discourse.” In this framework, “discourses define subjects authorized to 
speak and to act... [and] also define knowledgeable practices by these subjects 
towards the objects which discourse defines. [Moreover] discourses produce as 
subjects publics (audiences) for authorized actors, and their common sense of the 
existence and qualities of different phenomena.
210
 Final aspect of discourse analysts’ 
“theoretical commitment” is the involvement in “studying dominating or hegemonic 
discourses, and the structuring of meanings as connected to implementing practices 
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and ways of making these intelligible and legitimate.”211 
Discourses are generally accepted to function as “background capacities” for human 
beings “to differentiate and identify things, giving them taken-for-granted qualities 
and attributes, and relating them to other objects.” 212 One important characteristic of 
discourses is that discourses interact with each other and they are in continuous 
change within themselves while changing the hierarchy of discourses at the same 
time. Roxanne Doty points this out by arguing discourse’s “exterior limits are 
constituted by other discourses that are themselves also open, inherently unstable, 
and always in the process of being articulated.”213 Within this interactive and 
changing nature, focusing on the relations between hegemonic discourses and the 
suppressed ones has a significant place for critical discourse analysis. 
Lemke emphasises the principle of intertextuality among all texts, by claiming we 
“make sense of every word, every utterance, or act against the background of (some) 
other words, utterances, acts of a similar kind.”214 In continuation to this 
understanding, Cameron and Kulick claim that “we cannot understand the 
significance of any word unless we attend closely to its relationship to other words 
and to the discourse (indeed the competing discourses) in which words are always 
embedded.” Constant changes in discourses make it a requirement to keep in mind 
that “words and their meanings are never settled once and for all.”215 Thus, this 
thesis does not take terms like ‘Islamist’ for granted, which are commonly used in 
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identity discourses related to AK Party. Since they have great influence on 
predictions and expectations about AK Party, which is defined mainly as an 
‘Islamist’ movement, such concepts are questioned within their relevant domestic 
and international contexts. 
Choosing some people or sources over others is not immune from “objectivity” 
criticisms. However, a discourse analysis needs to be based on “a set of texts by 
different people presumed (according to the research focus) to be authorized 
speakers/writers of a dominant discourse or to think and act within alternative 
discourses.”216  
Both primary and secondary resources are used in this study. Discourse data is 
delimited to mainstream conventional media and related social media discourses 
produced by mainstream politicians and media members. As has been put by 
Hansen, “the emphasis in discourse analysis on the importance of language makes 
knowledge of a particular language and its codes essential.” One of the solutions in 
meeting this requirement is to “shift the focus of the analysis to texts that were 
aimed at an international, usually English speaking, audience.”217 English-language 
mainstream media that target a more general audience has been the main resource. 
Mainstream American and British media are included in this group in addition to 
English-language mainstream media outlets like Der Spiegel, France 24 and RT 
News. Since they are part of debates in western political discourse by being followed 
by a considerable amount of western elite audience and by being contributed by 
western authors, English-language media outlets like Al Jazeera and Haaretz are 
also included.  
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Moreover, mainstream western media publications in other languages were used by 
benefiting from various online translation services when they are referenced in 
Turkish and English language media. Mainstream Turkish media was also 
extensively used as a source, since its interaction with the rest of the western media 
is key in understanding AK Party’s representation in western political/media 
discourse. This thesis used only publicly available information and data. It is not 
intended to uncover some hidden agendas or find the so-called ‘real’ motives behind 
discourses and behaviours. 
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POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL CONTEXT 
It is crucial to contextualise all data, that is, “they must be related to, and situated 
within, the social environment in which they were gathered, in order to understand 
their meaning.”218 Within that framework, the evolution of representations can only 
be understood by taking historical, political and social contexts into consideration. 
Moreover, “social and political events change our vocabulary, and linguistic 
ambiguities and rhetorical innovations facilitate the advancement of new political 
strategies and projects.”219 That is why this chapter analyses the international social 
context with special focus on relevant political developments, in order to provide a 
background for the positive representation of AK Party that have enabled the 
opening of Turkey’s EU membership negotiations and the negative representation of 
AK Party in the mainstream western media that came along the worsening of 
Turkey-EU relations. 
There are two preponderant keywords in representations of Turkey and AK Party in 
the mainstream western media during the relevant time period of this thesis: security 
and Islam.  
Firstly, security debates have dominated the world agenda in the post-9/11 social 
context. Turkey’s position in these security concerns has been the most prominent 
theme in debates on AK Party-led Turkey. These debates and foreign policy choices 
of AK Party played a determinant role in shaping the developments related to 
“Turkey-EU” and “Turkey-US” relations. 
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Secondly, there is almost a consensus in the current literature and debates in 
describing AK Party’s identity mainly with labels like ‘pro-Islamist,’ ‘Islamist 
leaning,’ ‘mildly Islamist,’ or ‘moderate Islamist.’ For almost all analyses on AK 
Party-led Turkey, Islam is accepted as an inseparable and generally the most 
dominant element of Turkish identity. This thesis draws attention to the important 
role of post 9/11 international context on how inferences are drawn from this 
“Islamist” label. 
Justice and Development Party was established on 14 August 2001, less than one 
month before the September 11 attacks. As in the cases of important turning points 
in the history, 9/11 terror attacks opened a new era in international relations. It was 
also significant in shaping the international environment AK Party was born into. 
Due to the dramatic impact of the event on changes in identity discourses of Western 
and Middle Eastern actors, it is covered in the following pages. Moreover, rise of 
Islamophobia and xenophobia in western societies, as crucial factors in shaping the 
international context during the relevant period, are evaluated in this chapter.  
9/11 Attacks: Unprecedented Shock 
After 9/11 terrorist attacks, some emotional reactions followed that nothing will be 
the same anymore. Some cautious observers claimed that time is necessary to 
calculate the impacts of the event.
220
 However, there was almost a consensus on the 
fact that the event is much more than a mere terrorist attack and will have long-term 
consequences. As has been mentioned before, 9/11 signalled the beginning of a new 
era within which international norms are interrogated, East-West perceptions are 
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reconsidered and identities are reconstructed. In this new environment, more people 
started to believe that Islam is in conflict with the West and western values. 
Perceptions of foreign actors about the establishment and the rise of so-called pro-
Islamist AK Party have not been immune from the influences of this new ideational 
environment. 
As has been said by British Prime Minister David Cameron in an interview about its 
10
th
 anniversary, September 11 attacks “has been one of the defining events of this 
century.”221 In this thesis, 9/11 is taken as a “system level development,” which is 
defined by Bülent Aras as an event that is “an international happening which does 
produce direct conclusions on the founding principles and institutions of the whole 
system that... includes several well-known issues such as power hierarchy in the 
system, the role and policies of hegemon, general trends etc...” In this sense, 9/11 is 
analysed in this study as a unique event in its influence on world politics in the post-
Cold War world that “raised many questions” about “the structure and agents of 
world politics.”222 However, it should be emphasised that, contrary to realist analysis 
of systemic change, this research does not focus on “the alteration of power in the 
international order,” with special emphasis on “the rise and decline of the dominant 
states that govern the particular international system.”223 Rather, it takes the system 
level changes in non-material social world into consideration, including discourses 
and representations. 
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There are various studies on this kind of systemic events. For instance, in a study 
about this topic, Robert Gilpin argues that systemic change occurs within the system 
rather than a change of the system itself and refers to the “changes in the 
international distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige, and the rules and the 
rights embodied in the system.”224 In their article on the changing world after the 
collapse of Soviet Union, Koslowski and Kratochwil talk about “fundamental 
changes” in the international system that occur “when actors through their practices, 
change the rules and norms constitutive of international interaction.” In 
continuation, they add that these kinds of changes occur when beliefs and identities 
of domestic actors and the rules/identities that are constitutive of their political 
practices are adjusted.
225 
 This seems to be exactly what happened after September 
11 attacks. 
According to Aras, one can talk about a “change in the imagination of world politics 
and international relations” after September 11 attacks. In this respect, he insists that 
9/11 at least changed “our conceptual understanding of world politics” and forced us 
to find “new analytical methods and tools to have a better understanding of its 
transforming nature.”226  In this world, one can talk about a new set of meanings and 
symbols that are created after the attacks and influenced our perceptions about the 
event. 
On September 11, 2001, with the help of the advanced communication technologies, 
billions of people received enormous amount of information about the attacks in real 
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time. However, at the end of the day, everybody had their own story to tell about the 
event. A value-free description of the 9/11 may probably be as follows: 
On the 11th of September 2001, several people took four airplanes under control on 
the Northern part of American continent. Two of these planes crushed into two tall 
buildings in the city named New York, one of them crushed into another building in 
the city named Washington, and the other one crushed into the ground. Two tall 
buildings collapsed and nearly 3.000 people died. 
Any contribution to this story is very likely to be influenced by ideas, values and 
perceptions of the storyteller and reflect a constructed intellectual background. One 
possible version of such a story may start as follows: 
On the 11
th
 of September 2001, the black day for the humanity, several Middle 
Eastern radical Islamist terrorists hijacked four civilian planes in the U.S. airspace. 
In order to achieve their evil plans, they consciously crushed two planes into the 
World Trade Center towers that represent the economic power of U.S. and one plane 
to Pentagon that represents the American military might. The other plane crashed 
into the ground as a result of heroic efforts of the passengers before it reached to its 
target. Over 3000 innocent human beings died in the attacks, many of whom were 
American citizens. This terrorist act is not merely an attack to the American people; 
rather it is a dangerous blow to the free and civilized world and a declaration of war 
to democracy-loving peoples of the world. 
On the other hand, another possible story may be as follows: 
82 
 
On the 11
th
 September 2001, a group of heroes in the jihad against infidels 
successfully took control of four U.S. planes. They crushed the planes to their 
targets: World Trade Center, the symbol of western imperialism and exploitation, 
and Pentagon, the centre of cruelty of American evil plans all over the world. Some 
infidels and their allies died in the attacks. This day is an important step in our war 
against the infidels and their unjust order. This day is just an example of the 
consequences that infidels have to face as a result of their actions. 
There are limitless numbers of various stories about the day, most of which are less 
emotional and less ideological than the ones above. However, one fact is important 
to mention at this point: the behaviours of the actors in post-9/11 international 
context were mostly shaped by these differences in stories. How people perceived 
the event shaped the subsequent events and developments to a great extent. 
In one sense, it is important to note that this single incident was not enough on its 
own to explain the post-9/11 world. There are various cultural, sociological, 
economic, historical, political, and even psychological reasons behind the attacks 
that might be the subject of scholarly work. However, in this thesis, the focus is on 
the impacts of the attacks as a systemic development and the reactions of the actors.  
Through constructivist lenses explained in the previous chapter, this study is based 
on the assumption that international environment and actors shape each other in a 
continuous process of construction. Thus, the interaction between agents and the 
structure is crucial. Discourses of the agents about themselves, the attacks and the 
international system have played a decisive role in shaping the post-9/11 world. 
Firstly the situation in the USA is evaluated, since it has been one of the main actors 
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that played an active and important role in Turkey’s EU bid with its “mounting 
pressure on the European Union member countries to include Turkey in the 
enlargement process.”227 In the words of Günter Verheugen, the European 
Commissioner for Enlargement from 1999 to 2004, USA applied “too much 
pressure” on the EU for starting Turkey’s membership talks.228 
Moreover, as the biggest player in the current system, United States’ reaction 
necessitates special attention in this respect. Its perceptions and reactions have had 
decisive impacts in forming the international environment after the attacks. Thus, 
many observers believe that 9/11 “has so fundamentally transformed America and 
its relations with the rest of the world that it ... either directly or indirectly 
impact[ed] every corner of the globe.”229 Another actor whose discourses and actions 
should be taken into consideration in evaluating post-9/11 world is the European 
Union. The first part of this chapter evaluates these actors within this new 
international environment by focusing mainly on their security discourses.  
The United States after 9/11 
It was shocking to see the attacks on TV for U.S. citizens who felt safe in their 
territories, which had not been attacked by a foreign power since the American War 
of 1812. However, there was confusion about the possible reaction of U.S. 
administration in response to the attacks. There were some observers who expected 
9/11 to provide the necessary stimulus for U.S. to soften its conduct of diplomacy. 
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For instance, in his article written before the American invasion in Afghanistan, 
Steve Smith argued that a more multilateral US foreign policy should be expected in 
post-9/11 world.
230
 Yet, the formal reaction was harsh and composed of a mixture of 
shock, sadness, and anger. September 11, 2001, was officially described as “a day of 
unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the United States.”231 American 
policymakers and media pundits almost immediately described the attacks as an act 
of war.  
Bush administration found dramatic and mainly emotional reasons for Americans to 
be attacked by terrorists: In President Bush’s words, “America was targeted for 
attack, because [Americans] are the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in 
the world.”232  However, many do not believe that this was the real reason that lies 
behind the attacks. Believing in this reason has led to a considerable level of 
misperception about the roots of global terror and became an important obstacle in 
the fight against it. However, this perception has been one of the main arguments 
that has been widely used by U.S. policymakers after 9/11. In the immediate 
aftermath of the attacks Colin Powell declared: “Once again, we see terrorists, 
people who don’t believe in democracy...”233  Brian Roehrkasse, spokesman for 
Homeland Security, argued in a similar way that “terrorists hate our freedoms. They 
want to change our ways.”234 
The post 9/11 world according to the official American discourse was not safe for 
                                                          
230
 Steve Smith, “The end of the Unipolar Moment: September 11 and the Future of World Order,” 
www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/smith.htm. 
231
 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 
(22 July 2004): 1, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm. 
232
 Cited in Robert Fisk, “Bush is walking into a trap,” The Independent, 16 September 2001. 
233
 Miami Herald, 12 September 2001. 
234
 Washington Post, 1 August 2003. 
85 
 
anybody. There were two clear-cut groups of people in this world: the good ones 
and the bad ones. If you are among the good ones, you are the target of terrorists. 
George W. Bush made this point clear by arguing that “the threats we face are global 
terrorist attacks. That’s the threat. And the more you love freedom, the more likely it 
is you’ll be attacked.”235 If you are among the bad ones, you are the target of the 
world’s biggest power and its good allies. Thus, nobody was immune from threat 
and insecurity in post-9/11 world from this perspective. In his speech to the Joint 
Session of Congress on 20
th
 September 2001, President Bush declared that 
everybody has to make a choice in the new war on terror by presenting his famous 
options: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”236 By defining Iran, 
Iraq and North Korea as an axis of evil, Bush reinforced this image of a world 
divided between good and evil. 
This kind of analysis became so popular that some observers even started to think 
that the rhetoric of American, British and Israeli experts about 9/11 has become as 
dangerous as the terror itself.
237
 Within this environment, the new official U.S. 
policy regarding post-9/11 world was shaped with the influence of neo-cons in the 
Bush administration. Their belief in the importance of military power and 
unilateralism in maintaining the superpower role of USA in the international system, 
determined the reaction of U.S. after the attacks. 
Conservatives have traditionally been highly involved in influencing U.S. foreign 
policy discourse and policy-making processes either directly through their members 
in the administrations or indirectly by means of influential think tanks. The Project 
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for the New American Century is a good example for such involvement. As can be 
guessed from its name, it was established in 1997 with the aim of promoting 
American identity as the global leader by applying “Reaganite policy of military 
strength and moral clarity.”238  
Its first considerable action was the letter written by its members to President Bill 
Clinton on Iraq in 1998, three years before the 9/11 attacks. In the letter, members 
suggested that removing Saddam Hussein by using military force should have 
“become the aim of American foreign policy.” Moreover, they claimed that the 
administration should have given up its insistence on diplomacy that, in their words, 
“is clearly failing.” They argued that there was no need for a new UN resolution or a 
decision from UN Security Council in order to take military steps in the region.
239
 
Influential intellectual figures like Francis Fukuyama and Robert Kagan were also 
among the authors. The interesting fact about the letter is that seven out of eighteen 
authors of the letter took important seats in Bush administration and led the creation 
of U.S. interest discourses and foreign policy choices after the attacks. This gave 
them a better position in voicing their discourse more strongly. These authors and 
their positions in the Bush administration are as follows: 
Donald Rumsfeld           Secretary of Defence 
Paul Wolfowitz         Deputy Secretary of Defence 
Richard Perle            Pentagon Policy Advisor 
Zalmay Khalilzad        Special Presidential Envoy of Afghanistan 
Richard L. Armitage         Deputy Secretary of State 
Elliott Abrams            National Security Council 
John Bolton            Under Secretary Arms Control & International Security 
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The Project members were among the first ones who congratulated President Bush 
for his “admirable commitment to lead the world to victory in the war against 
terrorism.”240 They claimed that any strategy against terrorism should be determined 
to remove Saddam Hussein from power, “even if evidence does not link Iraq directly 
to the attack.” They also argued that U.S. administration should “fully support 
[USA’s] fellow democracy,” Israel. Moreover, they warned the administration not to 
hesitate “in requesting whatever funds for defense are needed.”241 
Project Members consistently insisted on three main points that established the basis 
of post-9/11 foreign policy priorities of neo-cons: removing Saddam Hussein from 
power in Iraq, fully supporting Israel and increasing the defence budget and 
enlarging the armed forces.
242
 This insistence was so high that Robert Kagan and 
William Kristol even suggested their “old friends” Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz to 
resign for not being able to convince the White House to increase defence budget.
243
 
In their analysis, Schmitt and Donnelly claim that the Bush Doctrine, which is 
highly influenced by the ideas mentioned above, is based on three main elements. 
Firstly, he advocated an active American global leadership that fights against its 
enemies in all corners of the world. Secondly, he prioritised regime change in rogue 
regimes, namely Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Finally, he saw “in the war [against 
global terror] not just danger but an opportunity to spread American political 
principles, especially into the Muslim world.” In addition to describing what Bush 
Doctrine is, the authors also explain what it is not. For them, Bush’s doctrine is 
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neither close to “multilateralism of Clinton that cares a lot about UN system and 
expects too much from peace processes. Nor is it his father’s balance of power 
realism.”244 
National Security Strategy documents of the United States prepared in 2002 and 
2006 by Bush administration revealed the ongoing importance of September 11 in 
the outlook about the threats to national security. The latter document demonstrated 
its spirit in the following words: “America is at war. This is a wartime national 
security strategy required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism 
fuelled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the 
American people on September 11, 2001.”245 
Many analysts, like John Judis, argue that not only Bush administration and neo-
cons but also conservative Republicans in general have “an unbroken record of 
failure” in terms of foreign policy decisions.246 The most popular criticism in this 
respect is about Bush administration’s ignorance of international community and 
legitimacy concerns. This ignorance arose mostly from the over-confidence about 
the ability of USA in acting on its own. For instance, in his televised interview 
Richard Perle claimed that the “U.S. did not need any coalition to win the war 
against terrorism” and he added it is better for the U.S. to “act alone” rather than 
being “held back by the requirement to hold the coalition together.”247  
During its war against terror, Bush administration refused any help even from 
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NATO that invoked its Article V for the first time ever and accepted 9/11 as an 
attack on all of its members. Wolfowitz said that this help is not necessary because 
“the mission would define the coalition.”248 This approach, as Aras mentions, is 
criticised for “de-legitimiz[ing] the UN system and international law, and most of 
all, consolidat[ing] the widespread idea of a Western double standard toward the rest 
of the world.”249 In this respect, Hirsh argues that the new Bush Doctrine was “used 
to justify a new assertiveness abroad unprecedented since the early days of the Cold 
War.” By this way, he continues, it “redefined U.S. relationships around the 
world.”250 
During its term, Bush administration was also highly criticized for its unconditional 
support for Israel. For many analysts, it is almost impossible to establish stability in 
the Middle East without finding a fair solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Bush’s 
plan to transform the region “through the fire of violence” seemed to fail in Iraq and 
did not work anywhere else. On the contrary, his vision worsened the situation in the 
Middle East and strengthen terrorist organizations by creating a fruitful environment 
for them.
251 Seeing only one side of the coin and perceiving Israel as a “fellow 
victim of terrorist violence” that “is targeted in part because it is [America’s] friend, 
and in part because it is an island of liberal, democratic principles - American 
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principles - in a sea of tyranny, intolerance, and hatred”252 disabled the U.S. 
administration from being part of the solution. 
The Fight against Terror and the War in Iraq 
Threat narratives have had a crucial importance in shaping the reactions of 
international agents in the post-9/11 world. It became common among observers, 
especially in the USA, to argue that September 11 attacks proved the existence of a 
new type of threat that has been mentioned for various times before: “a truly global 
terrorist group, engaged in an all-embracing conflict with the USA and its allies.”253  
However, even in this environment, there were some opposing voices that put the 
blame on U.S. and its previous policies rather than taking some fanatics as the 
scapegoats. Some commentators like Kabbani argued that U.S. has a considerable 
responsibility in the process that created the so-called Islamist terrorism. And the 
most obvious proof for this responsibility was its support to Afghan mujahedeen, 
including Osama bin Laden himself, against Soviets.
254 
Some analysts even warned 
U.S. Administration that “retaliation” is a “trap” that was laid down by Osama bin 
Laden for George W. Bush. 
255
 
However, the Bush administration was determined to retaliate with military force 
and declared that a war is going to be waged. However, reasons for the war and 
tactics planned by the U.S. administration turned out to be wrong. Although, the 
quick success in Afghanistan helped to create an image of a strong American 
supremacy and the early stages of Iraqi war seemed to support this image, the 
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obvious failure in Iraq turned out this image at the end. After a decade since 
President Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq in front of a 
“mission accomplished” banner, there is still no room to speak about a clear success 
in Iraq. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations seem to be more powerful than 
ever in the region where American troops claimed to bring democracy.  
For some analysts, after U.S. actions “the world is a more dangerous place, not 
safer.”256 The Iraq Study Group started its report in 2006 with the following 
sentence: “The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.”257 After this failure in the 
war against global terror, especially in Iraq, reasons and the tactics of the war 
became extremely questionable.
258
 Finally, in 2007, General David Petraeus, the 
U.S. commander in Iraq, admitted “there is no military solution to a problem like 
that in Iraq, to the insurgency of Iraq.”259 All these facts raised questions about the 
perceptions of U.S. administration about the post-9/11 world. Stephan Waltz reflects 
the current common public feeling about the invasion as follows:  
“In the Iraqi case, it is obvious to anyone who isn’t a diehard neo-con or committed 
Bush loyalist that the (dubious) benefits of that invasion weren’t worth the enormous 
price tag. There were no WMD and no links between Saddam and al Qaeda, and the 
war has cost over a trillion dollars (possibly a lot more). Tens of thousands of people 
died (including some 4500 Americans), and millions of refugees had to flee their 
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homes. And for what? Mostly, a significant improvement in Iran’s influence and 
strategic position.”260 
The place of international norms in the eyes of neo-cons also necessitates special 
attention. Although international values may have a place in their analyses, at the 
end of the day, they are seen merely as burdens that USA should get rid of, if 
necessary. For instance, one of the most prominent supporters of the war in Iraq, 
Robert Kagan, accepts that international legitimacy matters. However, he believes 
that U.S. administration did the right thing by not really caring about such 
legitimacy. Because, in his view, U.S. would have never acted, if it had searched for 
this legitimacy. Yet, even Kagan accepts that “there are many legitimate criticisms 
to be made about America’s conduct of the war.”261  
European Union and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Europeans did not hesitate from fully 
supporting the USA and condemning disastrous terrorist act.
262
 They indicated a 
strong solidarity to heal the wound created with the attacks. Even the French public 
that is well-known for its anti-American sentiments declared its wholehearted 
support to their American fellows. The monumental sentence that became the 
symbol of this support came from the popular French newspaper Le Monde in its 
front-page editorial: “We are all Americans now.”263 
Threat narratives of the Union have become similar to that of the USA after the 
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attacks. Like U.S. administration, EU officially defined terror as the biggest global 
challenge that Europeans have to face.
264
 Thus, without any doubt, EU expressed its 
willingness for solidarity with the American people in their fight against terror after 
the attacks and supported the military operation under NATO command in 
Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda established bases. However, the crisis in transatlantic 
relations came with the discussions about an operation in Iraq, possibly without any 
mandate from any international organisation including NATO. 
The tension increased with the reciprocal official declarations that blamed the other 
side. It reached its peak with U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s briefing 
within which he named those European countries that did not support an invasion in 
Iraq, mainly France and Germany, as the “old Europe.”265 The EU was divided in 
two groups when Spain, Italy, Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Portugal accepted UK’s proposal for supporting U.S. actions in Iraq. 
The rapid success in Afghanistan increased the courage of USA in its ability to act 
alone, if it is necessary. Astonished with the early success of U.S. troops, some 
analysts warned the European leaders that Europe’s importance in the eyes of 
American policy makers is much less after 9/11 than its level in the last half century. 
This, according to Wallace, forced Europeans to accept the fact that they have no 
more choice than supporting American policies without being involved in the 
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processes that lead to those policies.
266
 
In the early stages of Iraqi war, as in the example of Robert Kagan, some analysts 
believed that US proved its ability to “respond to the strategic challenges around the 
world without much help from Europe.”267 Kagan went further in this belief and 
argued that the opinions and statements of the EU do not have more importance in 
the eyes of Americans than those of other groups of states like ASEAN or the 
Andean Pact. With confidence, Kagan warned American leaders to “realize that they 
are hardly constrained at all, that Europe is not really capable of constraining the 
United States.”268 
Many Europeans argue that U.S. administration became blind with the American 
power and fallen into a trap of unilateralism that is characterised by an “instinctive 
refusal to admit to any political restraint on its action... placing itself above 
international law, norms and restrains when they do not suit its objectives.”269 
As it is observed more obviously after the war in Iraq, Europeans criticise 
Americans for overemphasizing the importance of political and military dimensions 
of international issues, while Americans criticize Europeans for caring too much 
about the role of diplomacy and economic aid packages in international politics.
270 
As Akşemsettinoğlu mentions, the disagreements between USA and EU has not 
been limited to issues related to Iraqi war. Rather, the list is much longer: “Kyoto 
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Global Warming Treaty, the International Criminal Court, the Multilateral Land 
Mines Treaty, relations with Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and a number of 
international trade issues.”271 What Iraqi War did was to put light on the cracks that 
already existed in transatlantic relations. 
While some observers believe that big cracks became visible in Western world 
(namely transatlantic community) after 9/11, some others believe that such a world 
never existed as it is imagined. The former group argues that the disagreement 
between U.S. administration and European leaders on the Iraqi issue is the “biggest 
surprise after 9/11.”272 On the other hand, the latter group claims that 9/11 awakened 
those who wished to see a united West and showed that “strategic perceptions of the 
two sides of the Atlantic Ocean differ considerably.”273 
As an example, Kagan starts his book with a strong assertion that “It is time to stop 
pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or 
even that they occupy the same world... On major strategic and international 
questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” Kagan 
believes that transatlantic partners differ from each other in terms of their “national 
priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and 
implementing foreign and defence policies.”274 
According to Kagan Muslim fundamentalism cannot be compared with the Soviet 
threat as a motive that forced Americans and Europeans to “prove (themselves) 
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unified and coherent.”275 He adds that whereas “once the United States risked its 
own safety in defence of a threatened Europe’s vital interests, today a threatened 
America looks out for itself in apparent and sometimes genuine disregard for what 
many Europeans perceive to be their moral, political, and security interests.”276 
Neo-cons do not seem to have learned any lessons from the situation in Iraq. They 
believe that solution is sending more troops to Iraq and spending more on defence. 
They do not accept any criticism about the legitimacy of the war in Iraq or the 
actions of the U.S. administration. They harshly criticize reports that raise questions 
about the U.S. foreign policy after the September 11 attacks. For instance, they do 
not approve the September 11 Commission’s Report that does not provide enough 
reasons to legitimize the war in Iraq. Daniel McKivergan, deputy director of the 
Project for the New American Century, argues that “sloppy September 11 
Commission staff report... and biased media coverage” prevented people from 
seeing the “unquestionable” ties between Saddam regime and terrorist 
organizations.
277
 
However, after the war in Iraq each party has to pass through a period of reflection 
within which they can make calculations about their previous interests narratives 
and related actions. For the part of U.S. administration, the failure in finding a 
solution for the situation in Iraq seems to have shown the importance of diplomacy, 
as in the cases of its approach towards Iran and North Korea. It also shows the 
importance of establishing a coalition like the one in the first Gulf War in 1991. 
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Moreover, its discourse about the roots and causes of global terror and the ways to 
fight against it became questionable. 
For the European part, the negative results of its failure to achieve integration in 
political and military matters became very obvious after its inability to influence 
post 9/11 developments, especially U.S. actions in Iraq. This situation also led to a 
new process within which EU questions its identity and the role it wants to play in 
the future. 
As the former French President Jacques Chirac puts it, many in each side seem to 
have understood that world crises cannot be addressed “by one nation acting alone 
on the basis of its own interests and judgments... Any crisis situation, regardless of 
its nature, in any part of the world, is of concern to the whole international 
community.”278 The situation in the Middle East proves the failure of combating 
terrorism and other problems solely with material means. 
In spite of all disagreements in the transatlantic relations, it is still fair to talk about a 
community that is comprised of European and Northern American countries what 
Schimmelfenning calls “Western international community,” while Flockhart names 
“Euro-Atlantic community.”279 This community seems to survive the problems 
faced after 9/11. Both parties try to heal the severe wounds of the crisis situation in 
the relations. Commonalities, instead of differences, have become more prevalent in 
the speeches of the leaders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. It has become 
common again to give reference to “democracy, individual liberty and the rule of 
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law” as the basic principles that “the freedom, common heritage and civilization” of 
the peoples of transatlantic community are founded on.
280 
 Opposition in Europe 
against comments that describe the USA as a force for good, instead of evil has 
decreased. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has become less marginal in 
claiming that “for all their faults, and all nations have them, the US are a force for 
good; they have liberal and democratic traditions of which any nation can be 
proud.”281 
Yet, there is still considerable opposition against “the rhetoric of shared values” that 
is seen as “an exploitation of history for present purposes, deployed by one side or 
another as circumstances dictate.”282 However, after the disappointment in both 
Europe and USA about the current situation in the international system, it has 
become relatively common to argue that transatlantic relations have no alternative or 
substitution. Figures such as Javier Solana asserted that Europe is the only global 
partner of USA, and vice versa.
283
 Likewise, in his 2010 National Security Strategy, 
President Obama claimed that United States cannot carry the burdens of the century 
alone, while confessing the fact that “America has not succeeded by stepping outside 
the currents of international cooperation.”284 Jose Manuel Barroso, European 
Commission President, argued “EU-US relations have strengthened considerably 
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[in] address[ing] common economic, political and environmental challenges... with 
shared values and interests.”285  
Common Threat Discourses and Security Agendas 
One important point that has been widely neglected in analyses about the 
transatlantic tension is the similarity between American and European discourses 
related to global threats that should be dealt with in the new international 
environment. Although their language and the solution suggestions were different, it 
does not seem wrong to argue that the EU capitals have been sharing similar 
concerns with Washington about the challenges that should be addressed in the post-
9/11 world. Official declarations revealed this considerably wide basis related to 
their views on the way to fight against these threats. One of the most obvious 
examples of this approach was the European Security Strategy adopted by the 
European Council on December 12, 2003. This strategy paper has become a 
milestone in determining the EU’s common foreign policy after 9/11 by reflecting 
the threat discourses of the Union and defining its security priorities.  
Both sides seem to have understood that they need each other in this effort. More 
analysts emphasize the need to combine American hard power with the European 
soft power in order to be successful. European leaders already took concrete steps by 
declaring their willingness to “share in the responsibility for global security and in 
building a better world.”286 This offer has been something that most Americans 
cannot reject, especially after the failure they have faced as a result of American 
unilateralism in Iraq and in the war against global terror. This has been reflected 
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well in the American official calls for help and cooperation in coping with recent 
popular uprisings in the Middle East region. 
Moreover, American and European leaders agree on the belief that the challenges in 
the post-9/11 world are different from traditional threats they faced during the Cold 
War. They commonly claim that “the first line of defense will often be abroad” and 
the “best defense is a good offense” in this new world.287 Last but not the least; they 
share similar views about the importance of the type of governance in the third 
world countries, especially in the Middle East. In order to fight with the root causes 
of the threats arising from these countries, they both believe in the vitality of 
promoting stable and democratic regimes. 
Questioning identities has become an important part of the new international 
environment. Within this novel environment, major agents in the structure, mainly 
the EU and USA, entered a period of reflection about their and other agents’ 
identities and roles in the international system. This process in the USA attracted 
more attention because of the far-reaching impacts of its actions after the September 
11 attacks. After a short period of vacillation between aggressively maintaining its 
role as the only superpower and securing itself by means of isolation from the 
threatening regions of the world, U.S. administration showed its determination to 
reinforce its role as the leader country in the international system by mainly using its 
hard power. In other words, incredible amount of American resources have been 
committed to engaging the world and proactively protecting its own security. It 
introduced itself as the leader of free democratic world that will fight against those 
who challenge the core principles of the civilized world. In this framework, Islamist 
                                                          
287
 Respectively, European Council, European Security Strategy, 7; The White House, 2002 National 
Security Strategy, 6. 
101 
 
fanaticism gained a prominent role as “the perversion of a proud religion” with its 
main characteristics like “intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and 
repression.”288 
Although they have not attracted the same level of attention within this framework, 
Europeans have entered a much more profound period of reflection about their 
identities and the place of the EU in the international system. It has become common 
to emphasize the negative impacts of being an economic giant and remaining a 
political dwarf. The desire for making the Union a global player is mentioned by 
Europeans more frequently and more emphasis is put in the EU’s international 
achievements in this respect.
289
 Failure to take any initiative in the Middle East for 
securing its interests that were ignored by Washington showed the importance of 
ability to act together in foreign policy issues. 
The discourses of the Europeans and Americans about the Muslim world have also 
had considerable influences in shaping their actions and the East-West relations, in 
general. This caused transatlantic partners to prioritise efforts to promote democracy 
and liberal values in the world, especially in the regions with Muslim populations. 
The EU has tried to use enlargement processes, its Neighbourhood Policy and aids, 
while the USA has attached importance to the Greater Middle East Project, in this 
respect. Moreover, they prepared plans to stabilise regions like the Middle East by 
integrating them into the global economic system.
290
 
Transatlantic partners have also determined supporting moderate actors in the 
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Islamic world against radical groups as a crucial part of their strategy in the new 
environment. They have increased their efforts to find successful examples or 
models, which are moderate and liberal Muslims in this world that can provide a 
better alternative for Muslims than armed struggle or terror. Preventing a possible 
clash of civilizations in any sense has become one of the top issues in their agenda.  
Last but not the least, transatlantic allies strongly agreed on the importance of 
Turkey as an asset in their strategy in the post-9/11 world. For them, a stable and 
prosperous Turkey became a desirable target to reach in order to cope with new 
threats and to secure their interests in regions where Turkey is politically, 
economically, culturally and historically involved to. This has opened the way 
increasing calls both in Europe and USA for closer integration of Turkey into the 
European Union. 
In the process that brought the opening of Turkey’s negotiation press in 2005, AK 
Party was frequently praised as a ‘model’ that had to be exported to the rest of the 
Muslim world.
291
 Its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was applauded in the mainstream 
western media as one of the rarest blends in the Islamic world and the champion of 
Turkey’s westernisation reforms.292 The European Union also praised the economic 
success of AK Party-ruled Turkey. Prime Minister Erdoğan became “the darling of 
the international community” during this period,293 a period when the Western 
political and media landscape mainly viewed Turkey as a success story under AK 
Party rule. 
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However, social world is in a continuous flux. This positive environment 
dramatically changed alongside the changes in discourses of the western actors. Rise 
of Islamophobia in the west has played a decisive role in the EU membership 
negotiation of Turkey, which has been ruled under the single party government of 
‘Islamist’ AK Party. Thus, Islamophobia is analysed in the following pages with 
various examples from different western countries. 
Rise of Islamophobia in Western Societies 
 
“Turkey does not belong to Europe, because it has a backward  
Islamic ideology that does not fit with European values.  
Islam and freedoms cannot coexist.”294 
Dutch PM Barry Madlener 
The European Union project opened the way for an unprecedented era of peace and 
prosperity among European countries for over five decades. In spite of this 
achievement, the roots of concepts such as racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia 
reach deep into the history of Europe. Indeed, these dangerous ideologies gave some 
of its bloodiest fruits on the European territory, with cases like colonialism, religion 
wars and the slaughter perpetrated by the German Nazis based on the belief about 
supremacy of Aryan race. The seeds of these ideational bases that prepare the 
ground for such cruel practices have fallen asleep in the cultural memories of some 
marginal segments of European societies. When they have found a fertile social and 
political environment in recent years, these seeds have re-sprouted alongside the rise 
of far-right political parties all around Europe. 
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This situation has been among the most important sources of intellectual obstacles 
impeding Turkey’s EU accession talks. In spite of Turkish state policy of denial 
about Ottoman past during a large part of the republican era, Turkey has been seen 
as continuation of the Ottoman Empire by majority of Europeans. Since Ottoman 
Empire had been the spearhead of Islam in Europe for centuries, Turkey comes to 
many Europeans’ mind first when Islam is mentioned. In other words, its Muslim 
population has been seen as the most decisive character of Turkey's national 
identity. Therefore, the rising Islamophobia in Europe has directly instigated 
Turcophobia. Moreover, due to around five million Turkish migrants all around 
Europe, Turkey has been one of the main targets of European xenophobic 
indignation. 
As has been pointed out by Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Islamic 
concepts like jihad were generally equated with terrorist acts in western discourses: 
“Jihad is a sacred concept for us as Muslims” Davutoğlu says, and continues: “It 
also means helping other humans and is the name given to the fight of a person 
against himself/herself. But the concept has been ruined and equated with terror by 
neocons and pro-Israeli groups [with the influence of terrorists acting in the name of 
Jihad].” In order to show the damage done by this flawed discourse, Davutoğlu 
gives an example: “Cihad (Turkish version of the word Jihad) is a commonly used 
male name in our culture. One of my advisors whose name was Cihad
295
 went to 
USA after September 11 attacks. He says everybody laid on the ground, when his 
colleagues called his name loudly to catch his attention in the airport.”296 According 
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to Davutoğlu, this reaction is a result of a conscious campaign against Islam and 
Islamic concepts after 9/11 terror attacks.  
This trend gained speed with rhetoric that associated terrorism with Islam in general. 
All types of hostility, including physical attacks, against Muslims living in Europe 
has increased. For example, more than 300 attacks against Muslims took place in 
UK alone, in the immediate aftermath of September 11. According to a poll held 
during this period, 26 percent of Britons thought that Islam is a threat to Western 
values.
297
 In some other European countries, the situation was even worse. 
The first large-scale social explosion of this attitude that had been rising beneath the 
surface happened because of a short film titled Submission by Dutch producer and 
director Theo van Gogh in 2004. The film consisted of stories told by a woman, who 
prays naked with the Qur'an al-karîm verses written on her body. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, 
the film’s script writer, was a female Dutch politician who claimed to have 
abandoned Islam after 9/11 terrorist attacks. This has increased the provocative tone 
of the film’s message. 
While depicting Islam as a bad religion, the film was attributing the actions of 
terrorists to all Muslims. Thus the film caused outrage in Muslim countries, with 
protests on the streets. Film’s director Gogh was killed by a terrorist, who was a 
Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent. Thereupon, 47 mosques were set on fire and 106 
other buildings owned by Muslims were attacked in the same month, according to 
the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Besides, it has become 
commonplace to insult Muslims on the streets, in public transport vehicles and even 
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during sport events. Anti-Islam leaflets were distributed in various parts of 
Netherlands. As a result, the film played into the hands of radical groups on both 
sides and led to the outbreak of intense violence. The Washington Times labelled 
these incidents as “mini-clash of civilizations.”298 
Another incident happened when Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published 
insulting cartoons depicting Prophet Muhammad as a terrorist on 30 September 
2005. As has been pointed out by BBC Arab Affairs analyst Magdi Abdelhadi, “the 
association of the Prophet with terrorism [has been very] offensive to the vast 
majority of Muslims.” The newspaper claimed that it was doing this in order to 
criticise Islam. Despite reactions from different parts of Muslim world, cartoons 
were re-released in various European countries in an inflammatory manner. This 
further aggravated anger in countries with Muslim populations. Various buildings 
owned by Western institutions were attacked in these countries. Danish embassies 
were set on fire in Syria, Lebanon and Iran. In Abdelhadi’s words, these reactions 
were linked to “America’s war on terror,” since it “is still largely perceived in the 
Arab world as a war on Islam.” 299 
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen described the situation as the biggest 
international crisis for Denmark since the Second World War. But he refused to 
apologise as had been asked by Muslim societies, claiming cartoons are within the 
boundaries of press freedom. However leaders like French President Jacques Chirac 
stated that the cartoons were clear sources of provocation and opposed their 
publication. Yet some other politicians were keen to add fuel to fire. For example, 
Italian Minister Roberto Calderoli was wearing t-shirts with these cartoons printed 
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on. 
Controversial Regensburg lecture of Pope Benedict XVI became another source of 
tension between Muslim and Christian worlds. During his speech delivered at the 
University of Regensburg in Germany on 12 September 2006, the Pope quoted an 
unfavourable remark about Islam, which was made at the end of the 14th century by 
the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Palaiologos: “Show me just what Muhammad 
brought that was new and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as 
his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” Muslim politicians and 
religious leaders immediately protested against what they perceived as an insulting 
mischaracterization of Islam. 
The Organization of the Islamic Conference declared it "regrets the quotations cited 
by the pope on the Life of the Honorable Prophet Muhammad," and continued: “The 
attribution of the spread of Islam around the world to the shedding of blood and 
violence, which is 'incompatible with the nature of God' is a complete distortion of 
the facts, which shows deep ignorance of Islam and Islamic history.”300 Thousands 
of Muslims rallied in protest at the comments in various countries.  
Leaders from Muslim countries have called on the pope to apologize for his 
remarks. For instance, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said 
"The pope must not take lightly the spread of outrage that has been created," and 
urged the Pope to apologize and withdraw his controversial comments.
301
 Pakistan's 
parliament issued a statement saying "The derogatory remarks of the Pope about the 
philosophy of jihad and Prophet Muhammad have injured sentiments across the 
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Muslim world and pose the danger of spreading acrimony among the religions."
302
 
Muhammad Hamid Ansari, Vice-President of India, said: "The language used by the 
Pope sounds like that of his 12th-Century counterpart who ordered the crusades.”303 
As a reaction to what Michael Hirst from The Telegraph describes as “apparently 
disparaging remarks about Islam,” 304 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan also said "I believe it is a must for (the Pope) to retract his erroneous, ugly 
and unfortunate remarks and apologise both to the Islamic world and Muslims. …I 
hope he rapidly amends the mistake he has made so as not to overshadow the 
dialogue between civilizations and religions.” In Hirst’s words, Erdoğan’s 
“comments were a milder version of the angry outpourings from Muslim leaders 
around the world.”305 
After angry reactions from throughout the Muslim world, the Pope apologised and 
said the medieval text which he quoted did not express his personal opinion. He also 
added a footnote to his controversial quotation: “In the Muslim world, this quotation 
has unfortunately been taken as an expression of my personal position, thus arousing 
understandable indignation. I hope that the reader of my text can see immediately 
that this sentence does not express my personal view of the Quran, for which I have 
the respect due to the holy book of a great religion.”306 However, the damage of the 
controversy over the relations between Muslim and Christian societies has been 
considerably high at the end of the day. 
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Another Islamophobic provocation came with a short film titled Fitna, by Dutch 
politician Geert Wilders released in 2008. The film presents the Qur'an verses 
alongside images of terrorist attacks and suggests tearing apart some pages of the 
holy book. The film ends with the following call to all Europeans: “In 1945, Nazism 
was beaten in Europe. In 1989, Communism was defeated in Europe. Now the 
Islamic ideology has to be defeated. Stop Islamisation.”307 Wilders should be 
satisfied with the fame he earned with this film, since he announced that he will 
produce a sequel, which is prone to include further heavy insults to Prophet 
Muhammad. He blatantly went so far as to say that Fitna II would be about “the 
barbaric life and the sick mind of Muhammad.”308 
Another agitation in recent years took place in the United States. Terry Jones, a 
pastor in Florida, became the focus of global attention when he threatened to burn a 
copy of the Qur'an on the ninth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. This 
unknown pastor of a small church, who is also the author of a book titled Islam is of 
the Devil, became famous throughout the world after this provocative proposal. He 
was directly addressed by the most senior officials, including U.S. President Barack 
Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates. He 
appeared in major media channels. General David Petraeus, commander of coalition 
forces in Afghanistan, warned that such a provocative action could jeopardize the 
lives of American soldiers working in foreign offices. In response to threat, protests 
were organised in various countries like Afghanistan and Indonesia. Finally, under 
pressure from the American administration, priests and his small community 
abandoned this plan. 
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But a few months later, in March 2011, the same priest burned a copy of the Qur'an 
after a symbolic self-organized court hearing. This ignited demonstrations in 
Afghanistan, which lasted many days, causing more than twenty-five casualties. 
American officials claimed that the priest’s action is not contrary to the law and 
within the scope of freedom of expression. Thus, they rejected taking any legal 
action against him. However, this has been perceived as a provocative act by 
Muslims all around the world, which clearly reflects hatred against Islam. South 
African journalist Tony Karon was drawing attention to similarities between media 
strategies used by al-Qaeda and this priest. In his words, Terry Jones managed to 
become famous by this “well-timed provocation, [which was] designed to stoke the 
fires of Muslim-Christian enmity like Osama bin Laden tried to do.”309 
Since there has not been any legal sanction against such insults, similar examples 
have repeated in several other places. In France, a blogger named Ernesto Rojas 
Abbate filmed himself burning a copy of the Qur'an and urinating on it to put out 
the flames. In the video he was using pages of the Qur'an “as a prop in a simulation 
of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.” He published these images on his 
website in order to strengthen his action’s impact. Islamic Council of France filed a 
criminal complaint about this person for “insulting the religious feelings” of 
Muslims. However, the court did not find the defendant guilty on the grounds that 
his action was within the boundaries of freedom of expression, although it 
confirmed that the video was “wilfully outrageous and deliberately provocative.”310 
Western media broadly questioned such acts only when U.S. Ambassador to Libya 
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Chris Stevens and three other Americans in the Libyan city of Benghazi were killed 
after publication of another provocative film named “Innocence of Muslims.” In 
CNN’s words, the film was portraying Prophet Muhammad as “thug, womaniser, 
child molester, homosexual and ruthless killer” while depicting Islam “as a 
fraudulent religion.”311 
In this 14 minute trailer, the last words of a Jew, who is supposedly killed by 
Prophet Muhammad is asked. He turns to his wife and says: “Sofia, this is my will: 
God remembers the Jews and brings them together in the Holy Land. I hope the He 
won’t forget our bones. And I wish Muhammad’s sons are given a restitution for 
their grandfather’s blood for the rape of our women for our children and our riches.” 
As has been put by Professor John Esposito from Georgetown University, the film 
played “plays right into the hands of extremists in the region who are using anti-
American sentiment to advance their own goals.”312 And extremists did not miss the 
chance to exploit such provocations to advance their own goals through violence. 
UN Secretary General Ba Ki Moon described the film as “hateful and disgusting” 
and added: “It is shameful to exploit the fundamental right to free expression by 
deliberately provoking bigotry and bloodshed. It is also wrong to exploit the anger; 
this only feeds the cycle of recrimination and senseless violence.”313    
“Such a demonization in a post-9/11 world” also resonated in comments of people 
                                                          
311
 CNN, “Actress from anti-Islamic film: ‘This makes me sick to my stomach’,” 12 September 2012. 
312
 Cited in Kari Huus, "Why films and cartoons of Muhammad spark violence," NBC News, 13 
September 2012. 
313
 Ban Ki Moon, “Secretary-General’s remarks to Opening Session of the General Assembly High-
Level Forum on the Culture of Peace,” New York, 14 September 2012. 
112 
 
like Brigitte Gabriel, “a potent public speaker”314 who was addressing a cheerful 
crowd in the Tea Party convention in fall of 2010 and warning them by saying: 
“America has been infiltrated on all levels by radicals who wish to harm America. 
They have infiltrated us at the C.I.A., at the F.B.I., at the Pentagon, at the State 
Department. They are being radicalized in radical mosques in our cities and 
communities within the United States.”315 
As the founder of ACT! for America, an organisation with 150.000 members who 
claim to be “self-appointed terrorism detectors,” Gabriel was describing their 
motivation by claiming that there is a “cancer” infecting the world.  In her words, 
“This cancer is called Islamofacism. This ideology is coming out of one source: The 
Koran.” 316 
Mainly as a result of such incidents in the post-9/11 world, hostile and xenophobic 
opinions on Islam were normalized in the eyes of the public by assessing them 
within the scope of freedom of expression. It has become more common to hold 
immigrants responsible for problems within the society. This opened the way to 
insult them, while degrading Islam and Muslims in public. First, some marginal 
parties have sought to exploit this inclination for the sake of short-term political 
interests. And then, broad-based political parties that are afraid of losing the votes of 
masses participated in this trend. By this way, mainstream political parties enabled 
these ideas to reach wider audiences. Rising economic problems in European 
                                                          
314
 Michael Welch, “Foreword,” in George Morgan and Scott Poynting (eds.), Global Islamophobia: 
Muslims and Moral Panic in the West (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012): xi. 
315
 Laurie Goodstein, “Drawing U.S. Crowds With Anti-Islam Message," The New York Times, 7 
March 2011. 
316
 Brigitte Gabriel, Because They Hate: A Survivor of Islamic Terror Warns America (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 2006): xxv. 
113 
 
countries exacerbated this process by strengthening xenophobic attitudes.
317
 
Calamities like Charlie Hebdo attacks only worsened the situation. 
As a result, such hostile rhetoric and attitudes created a suitable environment for the 
sprouting seeds of hatred in European societies. This process is not only an 
important factor in feeding anti-Turkey sentiments in Europe, but also a threat for 
the inner peace and future of Europe. As a sociologist, Welch uses “moral panic 
theory” in order to explain this trend: “moral panic over Muslims is understood as a 
popular demonology that produces folk devils at the local and national as well as 
international levels.”318 From a similar perspective, George Morgan and Scott 
Poynting were observing that “in the global ‘West’, the radicalized ‘Muslim Other’ 
has become the pre-eminent ‘folk devil’ of our time.” Although they accept that this 
process did not begin with 9/11, Morgan and Ponyting argue that this process has 
“expanded rapidly to reshape the politics of multiculturalism” in Western societies 
since then.
319
 
At this point, some examples may help in explaining this troublesome trend in some 
European countries: 
 “We Failed Multiculturalism” 
In recent years, it has become an increasingly prevalent attitude in Germany, like 
many other European countries, to speak and write against immigrants, especially 
Turks. For example, politicians like Horst Seehofer argue that immigrants from 
Turkey and Arab countries have difficulties in integrating Germany. Top-level 
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figures like Volker Kauder, chairman of the parliamentary group of the ruling 
Christian Democratic Party, claim that “Islam is not part of [German] tradition and 
identity… and so does not belong to Germany.” According to Interior Minister 
Hans-Peter Friedrich, who believes that Germany's identity has been "shaped by 
Christianity and the Enlightenment," says “That Islam is part of Germany is a fact 
that cannot be proven by history."
320
 
Similar views have been expressed in a much more severe tone by Thilo Sarrazin, a 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) member and former board member of the 
Bundesbank. With over 1.5 million copies sold, his controversial book titled 
“Germany Abolishes Itself” (Deutschland schafft sich ab), which attacked post-war 
immigration policy and multiculturalism efforts of Germany, became the best-
selling non-fiction book of a German policy-author of the decade.
321
 According to 
Sarrazin, Muslims have more problems assimilating in Europe than other 
immigrants. He also thinks that Turkish and Arab immigrants are overly dependent 
on the state and are making Germany “dumber.”322 These sentences summarise his 
attitude towards immigrants:  
"Integration requires effort from those that are to be integrated. I will not show 
respect for anyone that is not making that effort. I do not have to acknowledge 
anyone who lives by welfare, denies the legitimacy of the very state that 
provides that welfare, refuses to care for the education of his children and 
constantly produces new little headscarf-girls. This holds true for 70 percent of 
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the Turkish and 90 percent of the Arab population in Berlin."
323
 
In return for such views, the neo-Nazi party NPD offered him presidency of the 
Party in Berlin. 
His book’s sale success showed that his ideas are far from being in German society. 
In fact, a public survey conducted by the Emnid polling institute on behalf of the 
Bild am Sonntag newspaper found that almost every fifth German would (18 
percent) vote for a new party under Sarrazin’s leadership. The survey also showed 
that 51 percent of Germans supported Sarrazin’s views.324 Klaus-Peter Schöppner 
Emnid CEO said, for these respondents Sarrazin was someone “who finally speaks 
what many think.”325 
Mainstream politicians, who are influenced by the growing public support for such 
ideas, started using a similar dangerous rhetoric, instead of opposing them. German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel was amongst them. In a gathering of younger members 
of her conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party on 16
th
 October 2010, 
Merkel told that “the approach [to build] a multicultural [society in Germany] and to 
live side-by-side and to enjoy each other... has utterly failed.” Merkel’s this 
comment was one of the many contributions from mainstream politician to inflame 
the rising anti-immigration feeling in Germany. As a matter of fact, a recent survey 
was suggesting more than 30% of Germans believed the country was "overrun by 
foreigners". Another public opinion poll by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation was 
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showing that 30 percent of the population believed that "immigrants came to 
Germany in order to abuse the possibilities of the welfare state.” 326 
Hatred against the Turks in Germany did not remain only rhetorical, but also turned 
into action many times. In fact, there are many horrific attacks of neo-Nazi terrorist 
groups on Turks living in Germany. Many Turks, including women and children, 
were killed brutally in 1992 Mölln, 1993 Solingen and 2008 Ludwigshafen arson 
murders, 2004 Cologne Turkish street bombing, and a variety of unsolved murders, 
just to name a few. 
One of the most recent examples was revealed by chance in November 2011, after 
discovery of a neo-Nazi cell whose members were responsible for a crime wave 
reaching back more than a decade that includes the murders of nine immigrants, 
eight of whom were of Turkish origin. The killings, in the words of German Interior 
Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich, were signs of “a new form of right-wing-extremist 
terrorism.” Allegations surfaced in German newspapers that cell members “may 
have worked as confidential informants for Germany’s domestic intelligence 
service.” Chancellor Angela Merkel said the crimes revealed “structures that we 
never imagined.”327 
Investigators found a hit list of 88 political targets, most of whom were from 
Germany's Turkish and Islamic communities. Vice-President of Turkish-Islamic 
Union in Europe (Avrupa Türk İslam Birliği) Mahmut Aşkar, who was also amongst 
the 68 Turkish names in the list, expresses his frustration as follows: 
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“What concern me most are not these murders. As long as the hatred in the minds 
against Muslims and Turks continues, other versions of these events will happen. 
Blaming the neo-Nazi political party (National Democratic Party of Germany, 
NPD) for everything that has been happening in this country is wrong. All public 
opinion surveys show that there is prejudice against the Turks from up to 80 
percent of the society. Neo-Nazi cells are known addresses. What scare me most 
are the unknown sources of this hatred.”328 
Fully aware of the damage caused by its bad reputation about Hitler's racist 
massacres, German authorities entered a race to make statements expressing their 
grief after the outbreak of the scandal. Angela Merkel acknowledged that German 
police made many mistakes about preventing these murders and arresting the neo-
Nazi killers. During her speech at Bundestag, she confessed that they were 
“horrified by the extent of this hatred and racism," while acknowledging that it was 
“a shock” for Germany and “a danger to [its] standing in the world.”329 
Federal Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich and Justice Minister Sabine 
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger also apologized for their failure in preventing neo-
Nazi terror and promised to investigate the events thoroughly. All political parties in 
German parliament issued a joint declaration, which states "We are deeply ashamed 
that, following the monstrous crimes of the Nazi regime, right-wing extremist 
ideology has spawned a bloody trail of unimaginable acts of murder in our country."  
Bundestag President Norbert Lammert underlined the parliament's grief, shock and 
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dismay at the murders, and said "We are ashamed that the federal and state law 
enforcement authorities were unable to uncover or prevent the crimes that were 
committed over a period of years."
330
 Alongside many others, Sigmar Gabriel, 
chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), was criticising the 
double standards against Turkish and Muslim immigrants by saying, “All the streets 
would be closed down; all the top officials would take action immediately [if 
Islamists had attacked Germans]. But none of this was done [in the present case].”331 
Hajo Funke, a German political scientist from the Free University of Berlin, support 
this claim by saying that the German authorities “trivialise” right-wing violence. He 
claims that the authorities worry more about so-called ‘Islamist terrorists’ than far-
right groups that have done much more damage to German society with their 
crimes.
332
 Public figures also show the imminence increasing threat from these 
groups. For instance, figures from Berlin based Amadeu Antonio Foundation show 
that more than 1400 people in East Germany were subjected to racist violence in a 
single year in 2010.
333
 According to The Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution, the domestic intelligence service, there are around 25,000 people 
within far-right groups, of whom 9,500 could be violent.
334
 
As a result of these attacks, debates arose in the media and German society about 
closing neo-Nazi party, NPD, which is actively operating in some regional councils. 
In fact, there was an application to German Federal Constitutional Court for NPD’s 
closure in 2001. However, the court had rejected the application on the grounds that 
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there are large numbers of German secret service agents among party leadership, and 
thus it cannot be determined which policy of NPD is shaped by them.  
After a Workforce Acquisition Agreement, which was signed among Turkey and 
Germany in 1961, hundreds of thousands of Turkish workers were welcomed by 
German authorities with flowers. But a considerable portion of Turkish migrants feel 
as unwanted foreigners now. Some of them think that they have not faced the 
current social pressure ever in the past. Gravity of the threat has been accepted by 
Chancellor Angela Merkel herself, when she confessed that multiculturalism efforts 
have utterly failed in Germany. This increased the pace of negative developments in 
terms of legal difficulties and social pressure faced by immigrants. European leaders 
who claimed to achieve EU’s main motto (i.e. United in Diversity) on European 
continent, seemed to have hardships in applying this principle even within their 
countries. Admitting this failure at such levels did nothing but damage the hopes 
about Europe’s future.  
Rising concerns of immigrants reflect this pessimism. Tayfun Keltek, founder and 
chairman of the democratically elected umbrella organisation for migrants in North 
Rhine-Westphalia (LAGA NRW) and board member in Cologne Branch of Social 
Democratic Party of Germany SPD, is only one of the examples. Keltek is a leading 
figure among German citizens with Turkish descent, who actively promoted the 
integration of immigrants to German society. Yet, his name was on the hit list of the 
Neo-Nazi terrorist cell that was revealed in 2011. He expresses his disappointment 
about the German official response to these extremist groups by saying “I had full 
trust on German state until now. But this trust has been damaged by the latest 
incidents and recent developments. We observe racist tendencies among all 
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segments of German society, including but not limited to teachers, police officers, 
doctors and politicians. The West has been looking for an enemy since the collapse 
of Soviet Union and it has discovered Islam as a potential candidate. Perceptions 
about Muslims have changed after September 11 attacks. The approach of 
politicians and media provoke this enmity.”335 
Concrete results of this disappointment among immigrants have been observed in 
terms of labour mobility. Considerable amount of highly skilled Turkish migrants 
have left Germany in this framework. There are around 3 million people of Turkish 
origin in Germany and 700.000 of them carry a German passport. The number of 
Turks with German passport dropped for the first time in 2008, after steady growth 
for decades. This trend continued in the consecutive years. This alerted German 
authorities, who are aware of the possible dangers of this situation. For instance, 
German State Minister for Integration Maria Böhmer warned that “given the 
shortage of skilled labour, [Germany] cannot afford to lose the knowledge and 
qualifications of skilled immigrants.” Hans Heinrich Driftman, President of The 
Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry, said that Germany 
will end up with a labour shortage of five million within the next 15 years, if it does 
not change the way it integrates its immigrants.
336
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Undermining Basic Values of EU 
“My country, France, my homeland, my land is again invaded by an 
overpopulation of foreigners, especially Muslims... I am fed up with being under 
the thumb of this [Muslim] population which is destroying us, destroying our 
country and imposing its acts”337 French Actress Brigitte Bardot 
France has been another EU country that suffered from increasing xenophobia. It has 
been quite famous for its traditional opposition against Turkey’s EU accession. Yet 
its discriminatory policies against other minority groups in recent years extended the 
fronts in its fight against others. The infamous French Roma repatriation programme 
was one of the recent examples, which was called by the EU Justice Commissioner 
Viviane Reding as “disgrace.”338 The deportation programme came after the riots 
that arose in retaliation for the killing of a 22-year-old French Romani man by 
French police in July 2010. 
French government's answer was gradually hardening its stance by demolishing 
illegal Roma camps and sending thousands of Roma residing without authorization 
back to their countries. In his Grenoble speech, Former President Nicholas Sarkozy 
said that he had asked the interior minister to “put an end to the wild squatting and 
camping of the Roma.” As president, he promised that half of 539 illegal Roma 
camps in his country would be gone within three months.  
Although Paris has the legal right to require Romanian and Bulgarian citizens to 
obtain resident permits for stays of more than three months until 2014, under the 
transition conditions set when both countries joined the EU. Applying systematic 
deportation policy against a specific ethnic group raised an international outcry. 
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Some pundits like German journalist Ullrich Fichtner thought that what was 
happening in France “would most likely be referred to as ‘ethnic cleansing’ in less 
prestigious countries.”339  
One French MP even said, “the dismantling of camps and deportations were 
reminiscent of Nazi round-ups in France in the Second World War.” 340 United 
Nations Human Rights Council expressed its concern about "political speeches of a 
discriminatory nature in France," and urged French authorities to "avoid" such 
grouped deportations and "strive for lasting solutions."
341
 Pope Benedict XVI 
criticized deportation of Roma migrants and called upon acceptance of people of all 
origins and nationalities.  
Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for 
Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, said that she was “appalled” by French 
deportation policy and warned the French government about its legal consequences: 
 “This is a situation I had thought Europe would not have to witness again 
after the Second World War... Discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin or 
race has no place in Europe. It is incompatible with the values on which the 
European Union is founded. National authorities who discriminate ethnic 
groups in the application of EU law are also violating the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which all Member States, including France, have signed 
up to. I therefore find it deeply disturbing that a Member State calls so gravely 
into question, by the actions of its administration, the common values and the 
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law of our European Union.”342 
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, told the European 
parliament that the rights of the 12 million-strong Roma community had to be 
protected and warned European leaders to steer clear of the racism and 
discrimination of the past.
343
 Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Baconschi asked 
French politicians not to use Roma as scapegoats for political advantage, and 
expressed his concern “about the risks of populism and xenophobic reactions.”344 
These criticisms were not enough to convince French authorities to stand back. On 
the contrary, during presidential election campaign, politicians raced for having the 
most anti-immigration stance. Nicolas Sarkozy targeted freedom of movement, a 
basic EU value, and claimed that France would exit Schengen visa area, if the EU 
fails to clamp down on illegal immigration. Increase in the pace of immigrant influx 
as a result of social disruptions caused by the Arab Spring, worsened the situation. 
This augmented the Islamophobic tone in anti-immigration rhetoric. The French 
Interior Minister Claude Gueant, who was responsible for immigration, claimed that 
“all civilisations are not of equal value,” while stressing the need to “protect 
[French] civilisation” from foreign intruders.345 
Political debates during the presidential election campaign, showed how deep the 
impact of post-9/11 security discourses on shaping western public opinion is. When 
Muhammad Merah, a 23-year-old French-Algerian, killed seven people, a few 
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months before the elections, political arguments immediately focused on ‘Islamist’ 
threat. Sarkozy likened Toulouse shootings to 9/11 by saying, “trauma caused by the 
killing in Toulouse are somewhat comparable to the (trauma) caused by the 
September 11 attacks in the United States.”346 This opened the way for several 
police raids at different locations, more social pressure on Muslims. Some Muslim 
leaders were banned from entering France for a conference, on the basis that they do 
“not share the country’s values.”347 However, opposition parties described these 
moves as “a public relations stunt... and an electoral manoeuvre” by Sarkozy.348 
In its editorial titled ‘Mr. Sarkozy on the Low Road’, The New York Times criticised 
Nicholas Sarkozy for “pander[ing] to racism and xenophobia” by “assailing foreign 
immigrants, foreign imports and even the dietary laws of French Muslims” in order 
to earn far-right votes.
349
 Other presidential candidates also used similar anti-
Muslim discourses in their campaigns. For instance, Marine Le Pen, the presidential 
candidate of “the unabashedly xenophobic”350 National Front, complained that non-
Muslims in Paris were unwittingly eating halal meat. And suddenly “halal meat” 
became one of dominating issues during the French presidential campaign. Not to be 
overshadowed by Le Pen, Sarkozy called for stricter meat labeling and linked the 
issue to civilisational concerns: “We have to consider our holidays, the church and 
cathedral towers in our villages and towns, our eating habits, our morality, as aspects 
of our civilisation not just our religion: the civilisation of the French Republic.”351 
Based on findings of a poll, he even claimed that halal meat was “the No. 1 worry of 
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the French people.”352 Prime Minister Francois Fillon intensified the debate by 
suggesting that Muslims and Jews alike should abandon their slaughtering traditions, 
which he claimed did not “have much in common with today's state of science or 
hygiene.”353 
Sarkozy intensified his anti-immigration rhetoric, by promising to cut immigration 
by half during in five years. He openly said that there are “too many foreigners” in 
France.
354
 Marine Le Pen, immediately replied by promising to cut legal 
immigration by 95 percent. This xenophobic and Islamophobic approach soon 
turned into anti-EU rhetoric in political campaigns. 
At a giant rally, Sarkozy threatened to pull the country out of the Schengen passport-
free zone, unless other EU members did more to control immigration from outside 
the area.
355
 He also attacked EU trade rules, which he said had unleashed “savage” 
competition and he also threatened to act unilaterally, if the EU does not take 
necessary steps to protect European economies from the negative influences of 
foreign competitors. As has been put by political analyst Roland Cayrol, this kind of 
ultimatum pose a serious threat to the future of the European Union. Because, 
"rather than saying that France can only work in Europe, it's almost saying the 
contrary, that Europe must do what France tells it to, otherwise France will do so 
anyway." 
356
 
Far-right leaders like Marine Le Pen, who got nearly one fifth of French votes in the 
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last presidential election and also the highest French vote in the last EP elections in 
2014, are against EU membership form the very beginning. Le Pen describes the 
European Union as “a totalitarian structure and a rootless ... impotent empire.” She 
names it as “the European Soviet Union” and promises to fight it with all her 
strength.
357
 The popular support for such views in various European societies, keep 
sending worrying signals about the future of the EU. The defeat of Sarkozy because 
of the lack of support from Le Pen in the second round of presidential elections, 
reminds that its supporters can be the first victims of this rising xenophobic politics. 
Restraining Religious Rights 
Problematic situation in Europe about tolerance for religious rights of Muslims have 
become more prominent in the post-9/11 world. Several popular examples showed 
the magnitude of the decline in sympathy towards Muslims residing in European 
countries. One of the prominent incidents was the minaret referendum in 
Switzerland in 2009. A Turkish cultural association applied for permission to 
construct a minaret on the roof of its Islamic community centre in 2005. The first 
step towards controversy was taken by right-wing politicians mainly from the Swiss 
People's Party and the Federal Democratic Union on 1 May 2007 by the launch of a 
popular initiative that sought a constitutional ban on minarets.  
The Federal Council opposed the initiative and recommended that initiative "against 
the construction of minarets" be rejected as inconsistent with fundamental principles 
and rights in the Federal Constitution. Justice Minister Widmer-Schlumpf declared 
that the minaret initiative was contrary to core human rights and was endangering 
the religious peace. Federal Councillor Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf said that a ban on 
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minaret would be clearly contrary to the core values of Switzerland, while reminding 
that all other religious communities could build their buildings as they wish.
358
 
Article 18 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights says "Everyone has the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom... to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." It was 
problematic in itself to go to referendum about a human rights issue, since normally 
these are rights are not subject to public vote in democratic countries. Their 
boundaries cannot be constricted with any excuse including public vote. Human 
rights are commonly understood as “inalienable fundamental rights to which a 
person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being.”359 
Although it was controversial enough to go to referendum on this subject; the issue 
became more complicated with attacks by far right groups on some mosques during 
the propaganda process. Some anti-minaret groups published online minaret attack 
games on the websites. The main target of the players was to shoot minarets in the 
game, in order to prevent the muezzin’s call to prayer. Anti-minaret groups also 
distributed fliers that “feature a veiled woman against a background of a Swiss flag 
pierced by several minarets resembling missiles.” These posters were denounced by 
The Federal Commission against Racism on the grounds that they "defame 
Switzerland's peaceful Muslim population, feed prejudice and portray the Muslim 
community as wanting to dominate Switzerland, oppress women and trample on 
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fundamental rights."
360
 
Figures like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, author of the screenplay for Theo van Gogh's movie 
Submission and a former member of the Dutch House of Representatives, 
interestingly claimed that "Swiss ban on minarets was a vote for tolerance and 
inclusion." While equating minarets with "political symbols used by Communists 
and Nazis" and mentioning "a wider international confrontation between Islam and 
the West" Ayaan Hirsi Ali showed that at least a group within the minaret ban 
supporters were seeing this issue as some sort of a battle and said, “In the battle of 
ideas, symbols are important.”361 
In spite of all warnings from the Swiss government, parliament and NGOs about the 
possible negative ramifications of a ban, the constitutional amendment banning the 
construction of new minarets was approved by 57.5% of the participating voters. 
Only four of the 26 Swiss cantons opposed the initiative. Article 72 of the Swiss 
Federal Constitution now says: "The building of minarets is prohibited." In Ian 
Traynor’s words, “banning minarets in a country [with a population of around 
400,000 Muslims] that has only four mosques with minarets and no major problems 
with Islamist militancy, stunned the Swiss establishment,”362 alongside Muslims all 
around the world.  
Traynor, Europe editor of The Guardian, was not alone in having difficulty in 
understanding this ban. As expressed by Amila Buturovic, associate professor of 
religious studies at York University in Toronto, the minaret ban has been perceived 
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by Muslims as "an unfortunate exhibition of Islamophobia."
363
 It was a serious 
warning about the xenophobic and Islamophobic tendencies among European 
nations. And the result of the referendum was a crushing defeat for the supporters of 
religious freedoms, since “the government, mainstream political parties, the 
churches, the main newspapers, the national president, the powerful business lobby, 
and the Vatican all opposed the ban.”364 
Professor John Bowen from Washington University in St. Louis, Mo., said "The 
Swiss campaign played on people’s fears,” and added: “Just look at the posters that 
were used, with images of minarets, burkas and missiles. It was a phony association. 
The minarets have nothing to do with terrorism or political Islam or the 
maltreatment of women.” 
Apart from these examples, anti-EU far-right and far-left parties have gained strong 
ground all across the European Union. Such parties reached a peak performance in 
May 2014 European Parliament elections by winning considerable share of the votes 
in countries like France, U.K., Italy, Greece, Denmark, Austria, Hungary and 
Lithuania. Both François Hollande and David Cameron were “humiliated after their 
parties were trounced into third place by anti-EU parties of the right.”365 In January 
2013, British Prime Minister David Cameron promised an "in/out" referendum on 
British membership of the EU in 2017, after a period of renegotiation with the EU, if 
the Conservative Party wins an outright majority at the 2015 general election. Anti-
EU Ukip’s sweeping victory in the European Parliament elections in May 2014 
became a historic blow for established political parties since it was the first time 
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since the general election of 1906 that a party other than Labour or the 
Conservatives has topped a national election.
366
 
As has been mentioned earlier, this study claims that understanding the international 
social context is crucial in grasping the background of media discourses and their 
influences on actors. Moreover, the flaws of rationalist materialist predictions are 
embedded within the “truth” claims related to this context. Since the worsening of 
Turkey-EU relations came alongside the rise of Islamophobia, developments in 
Turkey’s EU membership negotiations after the start of the process in October 2005 
are evaluated in the next chapter. The reasons for opposition against Turkey’s 
membership is analysed with a specific focus on religious arguments.  
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MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS: A BUMPY ROAD FROM THE 
BEGINNING 
After a positive Commission report on Turkey, EP Foreign Affairs Committee 
declared that the negotiations should start. However, like other bodies, they felt the 
necessity to strongly re-emphasise the open-endedness of the process in various 
places of their decision.
367
 The expectation was a smooth beginning for a long and 
tiring journey. However, in spite of all formal promises given unanimously by all 
member states and official documents declaring positive results about opening the 
negotiation talks, the ceremony about opening negotiation process was thrown into 
crisis and turmoil by Austria’s last minute “hostility” towards Turkish 
membership.
368
 Austria “raised last-minute objections to opening entry talks with 
Turkey,” suggesting that the EU should consider the option of a "privileged 
partnership" status for Turkey. More interestingly, Austria asked the opening of 
negotiations with Croatia in return for lifting its objection against Turkey and 
Austria's chancellor claimed “that if the EU trusts Turkey to make progress, it must 
trust Croatia too.”369 Svetlana Milevska from European Stability Initiative was 
drawing the following conclusion from this incident: "Unless you have very 
powerful friends inside the EU you are not going to make progress. It is not enough 
just to meet the standards. Croatia started negotiations because one EU member 
state, with the support of others which were less visible but there, made this a 
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condition.”370 
José Manuel Barroso declared in the opening ceremony that he can “guarantee, on 
behalf of the European Union, that Turkey will be treated in the same way as all 
other candidates.”371 But, this promise became questionable from the very first day. 
The difficulties experienced in taking the decision to open negotiation process gave 
strong signals about the nature of the issue. The insistence of France on a future 
referendum and the demand of Austria to open talks with Croatia in return of 
dropping its opposition to Turkish membership talks showed that some member 
states have some other plans in their minds. More interestingly some pundits did not 
hesitate to refer to Austria’s battles against Ottoman Empire and its strong Roman 
Catholic roots to explain its opposition.
372
 
Moreover, the negotiation framework disappointed many Turks with its emphasis on 
open-endedness, absorption capacity, potential long transitional periods, 
derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses.
373
 For instance, 
the difference in open-endedness issue is the fact that any result other than 
successful completion of the negotiations would be seen as a failure for both the 
candidates and the Union in previous cases, especially the one in 2004, while this 
kind of failure is seen as an openly desired result by many Europeans, including the 
French president and the German Chancellor, in the Turkish case. Slovenian Prime 
Minister Janez Jansa explained the logic behind this emphasis on open-endedness 
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with the aim of preventing everybody from having “the illusion that everything will 
go smoothly.”374 
Another problematic concept in terms of Turkey’s membership hopes is absorption 
capacity. Proponents of the crucial importance of this concept especially in terms of 
Turkish membership, like Chairman of the European Parliament Committee on 
Foreign Affairs Elmar Brok, openly argue that this criterion is more than enough to 
prevent Turkey’s membership even if it fulfils all requirements.375 Although it is 
argued that the criterion has been valid for all previous candidates, the effort to 
determine what ‘absorption capacity’ means came only in 2006 with a Commission 
report.
376
 In other words, it was not even clear what the concept means during 
previous enlargement waves. 
On the other hand, some analysts like Professor Ludger Kühnhardt, Director of The 
Center for European Integration Studies at University of Bonn, believe that the 
debate on the absorption capacity of the Union is used as a tool by “those who are 
afraid of the effects of their own [acts] and curse European integration for things 
which in fact their own national governments and the leftovers of their respective 
sovereignty have caused.”377 Likewise, Vural Öger, member of the Socialist Group 
in the European Parliament, also claims that this debate is used “to formulate a new 
criterion to be imposed to candidate countries, especially to Turkey.”378  
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Although he agreed that the absorption capacity is a criterion, then-EU 
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn cautioned that Europeans have to “avoid 
making enlargement hostage to a theological debate on the final borders of Europe” 
and wanted European politicians not to disrupt the negotiation process irresponsibly, 
“for the sake of Europe.”379 For some observers, rather than being a result of 
enlargement, the debate about the absorption capacity arose with confusion in the 
minds of Europeans about their identity and a loss of confidence after the failure of 
the ratification process of the Constitution. At this point there is a general agreement 
that discussions about further enlargement are highly influenced by a number of 
problems and fears, real or imagined, some of which have nothing to do with 
enlargement.
380
 
Although such status does not exist in the Union acquis, some members, including 
Germany and France, started proposing a privileged partnership to Turkey. This 
caused serious reaction from Turkey and was totally rejected from the very 
beginning. Turkish side claims that there is an obvious fact that many refrain from 
mentioning: not any single EU member state will accept giving away their 
membership rights and simply adopting what other EU members do even if they 
believe that what EU does is “good” for everybody. Set aside membership rights, it 
is not secret that all member states debate for long days or months to agree on their 
voting weights or on a commissioner chair that is supposed to be non-national. The 
reaction of member states towards decreasing the number of commissioners shows 
how sensitive the issue is. 
Renaming failure in membership negotiations by inventing concepts like “privileged 
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partnership” does not change the essence of the issue in the eyes of Turks. For the 
Turkish government, it is not really easy to convince the Turkish public to try to 
adopt all EU acquis while European leaders keep offering Turkey a status, i.e. 
privileged partnership, which does not even exist in the acquis. Another point that 
necessitates attention is the frequency of usage of this term by European leaders only 
for Turkish membership negotiations. 
There is also a misunderstanding that the customs union between Turkey and the EU 
is a good basis for establishing a privileged partnership status. However, the customs 
union is seen by Turkey as a step towards full membership. That’s why it accepted 
to apply those customs also towards third parties even though it has no power in the 
decision making mechanisms. It is impossible for Turkey to continue this one-sided 
relationship that favours the EU if it loses the full membership perspective.  
Olli Rehn, European Commissioner for enlargement, also warned that “the regular 
talk of privileged partnership only undermines the EU’s credibility and weakens the 
conditionality in Turkey.” He highlighted the fact that this kind of behaviours only 
reduce “the political incentive for reforms and causes political backlash among 
ordinary Turks.”381 
The Commission has been favouring the continuation of negotiations without 
artificial interference from member states. Commission officials, like the president 
Jose Manuel Barroso, repeatedly reminded the fact that the process is handled by 
them “on the basis of a mandate handed down unanimously by the member states.” 
                                                          
381
 Judy Dempsey, “Merkel visit to Turkey complicates life at Home,” International Herald Tribune, 
4 October 2006. 
136 
 
382 
However, later developments proved that those who expect a highly problematic 
process were right. Although, as has been clearly mentioned by the former president 
of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, in his speech at the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, “the fact that Turkey belongs to Europe was recognised already 
in [the] Association Agreement of 1963,” Turkey’s Europeanness became 
questionable for many Europeans after the opening of the negotiations.
383
 
Following such verbal oppositions, practical obstacles arose in the process. In 
December 2006, the European Council decided to provisionally suspend eight 
chapters from the accession negotiations with Turkey as a reaction to Turkey’s 
refusal to apply the additional protocol to the agreement on the EU-Turkey Customs 
Union to Cyprus, which was supposed to expand the agreement to cover all the new 
Member States that acceded to the Union on 1 May 2004. However, Turkish 
government insists that the Union should first keep its promises given to Turkish 
Cypriots in 2004 after the rejection of Annan Plan by the no votes of Greek 
Cypriots. The EU seems to be unable to keep that promise because of the veto of 
Cyprus as a member state. This issue turns out to be a deadlock for the time being. 
Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik emphasizes that decision to suspend 
chapters is “a clear break in the negotiations.” According to her, “"tailor-made 
partnership, say in the form of a European-Turkish Community” is more realistic 
option than full membership.
384
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During German presidency, France pushed hard to block opening one of the three 
negotiation chapters that were ready to be opened. That chapter was the key area of 
economic and monetary policy. The only reason for Sarkozy to lobby hard to 
prevent opening that negotiation chapter was the political, economic and symbolic 
importance of the chapter by giving a full membership perspective. In the words of a 
German official, not opening that chapter “was a political decision emanating from 
Paris.” Turkish side reacted to this decision by claiming that, for the first time ever, 
a negotiation chapter is not opened “on the grounds that it would bring Turkey 
closer to full membership.” 385  More important point is the fact that it has not been 
the last time. 
Most of the difficulties came with the transformation of official discourses after the 
changes in governments of some member states, especially Germany and France. It 
is not a secret for anybody that French President Nicolas Sarkozy was firmly 
opposed to Turkish membership. He based his arguments on geographical and 
cultural elements by claiming that the EU is not only an idea but also a geographical 
entity. Although he seemed to accept the fact that the EU should keep its promise to 
continue negotiations, his strongest comment on Turkey came in 2007 when he 
claimed that “Turkey has no place inside the European Union.” Although he does 
not show any reason for that argument, he claims that accepting Turkey will mean 
“enlarging Europe with no limit” and can lead to risk “destroying European political 
union.”386 
During the process, France used every chance to block negotiations. Even though it 
                                                          
385
 Dan Bilefsky, “Sarkozy blocks key part of EU entry talks on Turkey,” International Herald 
Tribune, 25 June 2007. 
386
 EU Business, “Turkey has no place in EU: Sarkozy,” 14 January 2007. 
138 
 
was symbolic, it was seen as a victory of France when French officials prevented 
their European colleagues from using the words “accession” or “membership” in a 
foreign ministers’ statement on EU enlargement strategy concerning Turkey. Volkan 
Bozkır, then Turkish ambassador to the EU and now Foreign Minister of Turkey, 
reflected the situation in Ankara by saying “we are heartbroken and tired of 
waiting.” He also warned the European politicians that EU is losing its influence on 
Turkish people by such acts. In his words, in a very short period of time “the EU has 
lost its leverage on Turkey. It has used up all its ammunition except for stopping the 
negotiations totally.”387 In reaction to Turkish complaints about French discontent 
with the word ‘accession,’ Olli Rehn advised the Turkish government to “focus on 
reforms instead of words.”388 
Other blow came when France accepted to hold referendum for new enlargements. 
The initial aim was to hold referendum only for Turkey by mentioning only those 
candidate countries with populations over 5% of the Union’s entire size. Desmond 
Dinan pointed out that “when Chirac promised a referendum in France on future EU 
enlargements, he “clearly had Turkey in mind.”389 As clearly mentioned by Andrew 
Duff, vice-chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, this French 
law is “an unfortunate example of French xenophobia towards Turkey.” His 
proposal for solving this problem is to transform France into “a more mature 
parliamentary democracy” instead of “a place where populism and plebiscites 
rule.”390 
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Spanish scholar Jose Torreblanca criticises French and Austrian politicians for their 
populist decision to hold referendum about Turkey’s membership by boldly asking 
them to “imagine” what could have been the result “if Spain’s membership in the 
European Union had been subjected to referendum in 1981.”391 This situation also 
clearly undermines the credibility of decisions taken by the Council in all other 
areas. Because it shows that elected governments’ unanimous decisions are not 
really legitimate or enough; and they should be subject to public vote, especially on 
important topics. However, this is not the case. This kind of approach was not 
applied for any crucial decision, including all previous enlargement decisions or 
treaties. This causes questions to arise whether Turkish membership issue is more 
important than all actions taken by the Union to date, including the constitution 
making process of the Union or all other enlargements with 22 more member states 
from original 6 members of the Union. 
The European Commission tried to answer the questions in the minds of Europeans 
after the big enlargement wave in 2004 by publishing a paper named Myths and 
Facts about Enlargement.
392
 In that document the Commission argues that the 
enlargement was done in a democratic way because of the consent of all member 
governments in the Summit. However, it is a serious question how this explanation 
can be legitimised while some member states insist on the necessity to take Turkish 
issue to public vote. 
Turkey is pretty reactive against the behaviour of the European politicians at this 
point of the process. This was reflected well when the French initiative to establish a 
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Mediterranean Union was not seen in Ankara as a sound plan. Rather, after the 
general image that “Sarkozy indicated that joining such a club may be a better 
course for Turkey to follow than joining the EU,” it has been perceived as a trap. It 
became possible for Turkey to participate in the project only after the assurances 
from other member states and the Commission about the plan that it is “not directed 
against Turkey, nor is it aimed at diverting the focus away from Turkey’s EU 
accession talks.”393 
This physiological situation is also reflected in declarations of Turkish leaders. As a 
reaction to special partnership offers, Tayyip Erdoğan, then Turkish prime minister, 
claimed that no country, except Turkey, “has ever been offered a conditional or a 
special membership, or a conditional or special negotiation period.” These types of 
behaviours, he continued, are perceived by Turkey as “ugly” ones.394 
Turks are assured by officials from the highest levels that “there will be no new 
conditions.”395 What Turkish representatives asked from their EU counterparts is to 
respect the basic principle of international law, as has been said by German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel who is also against Turkish membership: pacta sunt 
servanda. As mentioned by a Swedish diplomat, “anyone who ignores this principle 
with regard to Turkey loses political credibility and flouts official EU policy.” 396 
Turkey also draws attention to the fact that although it is argued that the Union’s 
absorption capacity has always been relevant, the report on the EU's capacity to 
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integrate new members came only in 2006.
397
 
Turkish side consistently emphasised the importance of keeping the goal of full 
membership firmly in place is essential to “keep the reform process alive.” Thus, it 
criticised the EU for slowing down the negotiations. In a press conference, then 
Foreign Minister Ali Babacan asked why the technical reports on 11 of the 35 
negotiating chapter were not completed by the Commission. 
398
 
Another criticism from Turkey is the double-standard applied by the Union in terms 
of membership criteria. The argument follows that the Union actors and public is 
closely monitoring the developments and the reforms process in Turkey. The 
conditionality principle is strictly applied in Turkish case. However, the EU is 
criticised for not showing the same sensitivity and not really caring about the 
fulfilment of the membership criteria in the last enlargement wave. It is believed that 
the Union accepted those countries with political decisions. The decisions to close 
the negotiation chapter often seemed to be arbitrary.
399
  
The latest developments in Bulgaria proved that these arguments are not baseless. 
Although high attention is paid on criticising Turkey and problems about 
implementations, the real crisis came in 2008 from Bulgaria, a member state, which 
was punished for wasting the Union funds with corruption. Commission spokesman, 
Johannes Laitenberger, did not hesitate from saying that “the fight against high-level 
corruption and organised crime is not producing enough results” in Bulgaria. 
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Commission Report on Bulgaria confessed that “institutions and procedures look 
good on paper but do not produce good results in practice.”400 
Transparency International's 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index gathered views on 
176 countries worldwide. According to this global survey based on expert opinion, 
Greece is perceived to have the most corrupt public sector of all EU countries, 
mainly due to the country's continuing economic turmoil and widespread tax 
evasion. The Index also revealed that Turkey has a much better score in terms of 
public sector transparency than EU countries like Italy, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Greece.
401
 While majority of Eurozone countries states were failing to stay 
within the confines of the Maastricht criteria and were thrown into economic 
turmoil, Turkey enjoyed both a balanced budget and a healthy environment for 
investment.
402
 
What Makes Turkey’s Negotiations Different and Harder? 
Turkey’s EU membership negotiation process has attracted unprecedented level of 
attention all around the world. Thus, it has been subject to “lively, heated and 
sometimes acrimonious” debates.403 Even those who are not really interested in EU 
related issues are keen to talk about Turkey-EU relations. Because of the popularity 
of the issue, it became almost impossible to escape from emotional and ideational 
perspectives. This negotiation process is no more an issue that is dealt only by 
European and Turkish bureaucrats. Rather, it is something that even ordinary 
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citizens are used to hear or read on the news. 
Turkey’s negotiation process is different and more problematic than the previous 
ones. It took less than one year after the start of the negotiations for the Enlargement 
Commissioner Olli Rehn to warn the parties about a potential “train crash.”404 
Contrary to the formal discourse, the process is much more than a technical 
procedure. Although, post-9/11 social environment provided some arguments for 
supporting Turkey’s EU membership in interest calculations, it also created 
considerable obstacles at the same time by being source of the fear and confusion in 
the minds and hearts of Europeans. This has been reflected well in the fact that “the 
more Europeans have began to see Islam as an existential threat in post-September 
11 era, the more they tend to define Turkey as one of the potential ‘others’ of the 
EU’s emerging identity.”405 
Although the opposition in Turkey towards EU membership is a factor in 
determining the pace of negotiations, it is not what makes Turkish membership 
different than others. Because, the character of that opposition is not too much 
different than what can be observed in other candidate countries. On the other hand, 
the real challenge comes from the scale of opposition in the EU against Turkish 
membership, which is unprecedented in the enlargement history. 
The reasons behind the difficulties in the negotiation process are mainly based on 
identity and interest discourses among Europeans that are shaped within the 
changing international context. Non-material factors play a considerable role even in 
those cases that might be argued to be material factors such as geographical location 
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or Turkey’s big population. The debates on the borders of the Union or the debates 
about the labour force requirements of Europe in the future show the importance of 
constructivist perspective in understanding such issues. As mentioned by Antonio 
Missiroli, “it is extremely difficult to base the debate [about Turkey] on an objective 
assessment” because of the fact that “where one stands depends on what one sees” in 
this case. Turkey’s characteristics like its population, size, and geographical location 
are perceived as “strategic assets” by some, while they are seen as “structural 
liabilities” by others. 406  
There are various arguments used by those who oppose a potential Turkish 
membership. Its identity, geographical location, religion, culture, large and 
agricultural population come among the most popular ones. However, the tension in 
the debates dramatically increased when the opposition about Turkey’s EU 
membership became based on arguments with religional and civilisational basis. It is 
generally argued that economy or any other material criteria will not be the real 
concern in deciding about Turkey’s full membership. This argument is supported 
with the relative success of Turkey about these criteria. Very few Europeans can 
deny the fact that Turkey’s situation, in measurable material terms, is similar to the 
two newcomers in the Union, namely Bulgaria and Romania, and at least as good as 
Spain and Portugal when they applied.
407
 
Thus, emotional, identity-related and civilisational arguments seem to dominate the 
opposition against Turkey’s EU membership. For instance, former French president 
Valery Giscard d’Estaing argues that “Turkey’s capital is not in Europe; 95 per cent 
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of its population lives outside Europe; it is not a European country.”408 However, his 
real concern is the identity and Muslim population of Turkey. Although Turkey is 
officially accepted by the Union to “sufficiently” share the European values that are 
described in Article 6(1) of TEU before, some Europeans like Edmund Stoiber, the 
Bavarian prime minister, believe that “Turkey is not part of Europe’s community of 
values,”409 without mentioning what these values are. Looking at these examples, 
many commentators believe that there is at least a certain amount of hostility to 
Turkey in some EU member countries.
410
 
The reasons for objections have sometimes become harsh as in the example of 
Dutch European commissioner, Frits Bolkestein, who warned that Turkey’s 
membership will mean “the Islamisation of Europe” without hesitating to claim that 
it will mean “the relief of Vienna in 1683 will have been in vain.”411 For Turkish 
public, nothing can be more awkward than using this argument to oppose Turkey’s 
membership to a Union that arose from the ashes of the most brutal war the world 
has ever seen. This shows a lack of understanding even at commissioner level about 
the logic behind the establishment of the Union on the basis of cooperation of two 
recent enemies, namely France and Germany. 
One interesting argument of those who oppose Turkish membership like Wolfgang 
Schauble, deputy head of the CDU/CSU group in German Bundestag, is that Europe 
has made a crucial mistake by “postpon[ing] for too long a discussion about the 
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ultimate limits of EU extension and about the meaning of European identity.” 412 
Although David Phillips criticises him in the same article for reflecting the view of 
Europe’s older generation, Schauble asserts that Europe should stop lying to Turkey 
and be “honest” enough to say that it will never be a full member.413 This 
perspective is well reflected by a speech of another CDU member in the Bundestag 
who claimed they are the honest ones by saying Turkey can only have a privileged 
partnership, while SDU is giving wrong hopes (or lying) to Turkey about full 
membership. 
Turkish public is becoming increasingly indignant towards the EU because of the 
perception that Europeans are not keeping their promises and applying double-
standards against Turkey. This anger is making it harder for the government to 
introduce reforms and slowing down the negotiation process. This point is 
emphasised by European Commission Vice-President Günter Verheugen, in an 
interview when he warned that “Europe is sending Turkey almost exclusively 
negative signals.” He continued that “we are focusing on the weaknesses of the 
country and not encouraging them to change. This is feeding a reluctance to make 
the reforms we are asking for, which in turn leads Europe to the view that the Turks 
simply can’t manage it.” According to him, this “is a dangerous spiral that threatens 
to lead to a global political failure of the highest order.”414  
Like many other analysts Amanda Akcakoca observes that “the national consensus 
on Europe is fading away, with every reform being portrayed as a concession to the 
                                                          
412
 Wolfgang Schauble, “A Still-European Union” in Wolfgang Schauble and David L. Phillips, 
“Talking Turkey,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2004), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 
articles/ europe/2004-11-01/talking-turkey (Accessed 14/02/2013). 
413
 Ibid. 
414
 Günter Verheugen, interview in Bild am Sonntag, 8 October 2006 cited in EUobserver, 
“Verheugen defends Turkey’s EU membership,” 9 October 2006. 
147 
 
Union.”415 For those in Turkey who oppose EU membership, the main reasons are 
fears about losing sovereignty, territorial integrity or Turkish culture/religion, the 
belief that Europeans hate Turks and ‘they play with us’ perception. Some also think 
that Brussels is much far away to Turks and some do not see a desirable future in the 
Union. 
This situation is exploited by some Turkish politicians in order to block the reforms 
leading to EU membership. Many of them blame foreigners including Europeans for 
Turkey’s own problems and mistakes. Many tend to picture reforms as concessions 
to Europeans. Many others seem to forget that it is Turkey who applied for 
membership and use some European politicians’ attitudes as a reason to oppose 
introducing reforms that are in the interest of Turkey.  
According to Gerard Delanty, identities can be constructed in two ways. First, they 
can be constructed on a sense of belongingness and solidarity arising out of shared 
lives. This type of construction is apparently dominant in European public and 
political rhetoric. However, there is a second way of construction, which is generally 
overlooked in European case. In this latter type; 
…the ‘We’ is defined not by reference to a framework of shared experiences, 
common goals and a collective horizon, but by the negation of the Other. 
Identification takes place through the imposition of otherness in the formation 
of a binary typology of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. The purity and stability of the ‘We’ 
is guaranteed first in the naming, then in the demonisation and finally, in the 
cleansing of otherness…The defining characteristic of the group is not what 
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members have in common but in what separates them from other groups.
416
 
As has been put by Necip Yıldırım from Uludağ University, Turks have been the 
relative other for Europe for long periods of time in the history. Since Ottoman 
Empire had been the main bearer of Islam for centuries, the words ‘Turk’ and 
‘Muslim’ have been used interchangeably by the Europeans.417 
Peggy Heller from University of King’s College, Canada, points out this 
construction process by saying, “Europeans increasingly came to describe 
themselves as Western during the rapid modernisation in the nineteenth century due, 
in part, to their perception of essential differences between Western Europe and 
whatever part of Europe was deemed Eastern, including the Russian Empire, the 
Balkans and the Ottoman Empire.” 418 The conflicts in these regions were called in 
England and elsewhere in Europe as the ‘Eastern Question’.419 Thus, the European 
idea of Ottoman Turkey as Eastern contributed to its idea of itself as Western.
420
 
According to Paul Blokker and Gerard Delanty, one specific form of identification 
of Europe became “widely shared among European elites” after the end of Cold 
War. This identification is mainly based on “reassertion of the age-old idea of 
Europe as representing a specific, European civilisation grounded in the Occidental, 
Judaeo-Christian legacies of Europe,” with special “emphasis is on Christian Europe 
and Europe as the bastion of Western Christianity.” This identification inevitably 
causes “a more binary (and age-old) understanding [that] sets up Christian Europe 
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against the Islamic Orient (currently mostly taking the guise of Turkey).”421 In her 
popular textbook on the European Union, Desmond Dinan emphasises this point by 
saying, “Although Western Europeans had legitimate economic and political reasons 
to doubt Turkey’s suitability in the foreseeable future, many were motivated 
primarily by anti-Muslim prejudice. All could hide behind the excuse of deep-rooted 
Greek hostility toward Turkey.”422 
Swedish diplomat Ingmar Karlsson claims that if Turkey is rejected on cultural or 
religious basis, it can easily be argued that Greece should have been kept out for its 
Eastern Orthodox religion, or “semi-Orientals” like Romanians and Bulgarians 
should not have been accepted, or Albanians and Bosnians should be forced to be 
the outsiders forever. She adds that this will be a serious message to Muslims 
already residing in the Union that they are “second-class citizens.”423 
In Ludger Kühnhardt’s words, “it would constitute a blatant betrayal of trust if 
Turkey’s orientation towards Europe and European promises to Turkey were refused 
by the EU itself.” He emphasises at this point that the core of European credibility, 
namely “honesty,” should not be demolished by the EU itself.424 
The time for Europeans to discuss the Europeanness of Turkey was when Turkey 
applied for association agreement in 1959. According to Article 237 of Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community (1957), “Any European State may 
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apply to become a member of the Community.”425 By accepting Turkey’s 
application all EEC members unanimously declared that Turkey is a European 
country. 
Since “European identity” of the applicant country is important for the Union, this 
condition was openly expressed in Treaty on European Union (TEU) as well. 
According to Article 49 of Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty, 1992), 
any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) TEU may 
apply to become a member of the European Union. Article 6 (1) describes these 
principles as those of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member 
States.
426
 
The Union had another chance to discuss Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’ in 1987, when 
Turkey applied for full membership. Again the EU member states accepted that 
Turkey is eligible for application. The EU members declared that Turkey was 
eligible contrary to countries like Morocco that was rejected for not being a 
European country. After the formal candidacy in 1999 and opening of negotiation 
process in 2005, it is not possible for Turkish side to understand this questioning any 
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more. 
For many Turks, adopting EU acquis is a serious commitment and it can be done 
only with partners, which do not keep questioning Turkey’s identity each and every 
year again and again in spite of all previous declarations. 
 
“Islamist” AK Party? 
For almost all analyses on AK Party-led Turkey, Islam is accepted as an inseparable 
and generally the most preponderant element of Turkish identity. This approach 
gained more popularity after the end of Cold War and reached its peak with AK 
Party governments. One of the first controversial examples was Huntington’s highly 
debated and cited work The Clash of Civilizations, which depicts the hegemonic 
description of Turkish identity as a Muslim state. In his words, Turkey is 
“historically the most obvious and protypical torn country” that “rejected Mecca” 
and that is “rejected by Brussels.”427 He is confident that Turkey will not become a 
member of the Christian EU because of its Muslim identity.  
At this point, the important role of the international context, which has seen the rise 
of Islamophobia, on how inferences are drawn from this “Islamist” label should be 
mentioned. This concept has become a keyword to define anything that is from the 
Muslim world. For instance, BBC’s usage of the title “Islamist” as the single 
adjective to define different actors within the very same week ranges from Egypt's 
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President Mohammed Morsi
428
 to Somalia’s Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys 
(considered a terrorist by the UN and the United States)
429, from a ‘militant network’ 
in Germany
430
 to ‘Al-Qaeda-linked militants’ in Syria431 and the rebels ousted by 
France from Northern Mali
432, from Afghanistan’s Taliban433 to Erdoğan and AK 
Party.
434
 
İhsan Dağı from Middle East Technical University in Ankara defines AK Party 
leaders as post-Islamists, as those who have Islamic views but do not prescribe 
construction of an Islamic society by means of state power.
435
 Yet, among many 
others, Katerina Dalacoura from London School of Economics and Political Science 
claims that AK Party “does have sufficient links with Islamism as a political 
ideology to merit considering it as an Islamist party.” Thus, she rejects the term 
‘post-Islamism,’ since she believes this concept assumes that “‘Islamist liberalism’ 
is an oxymoron” in the sense that “once liberal and democratic values have been 
incorporated within it, Islamism has been ‘transcended’.”436 
A lifestyles survey conducted by the KONDA market research company found that 
9.7% of Turks consider themselves to be ‘fully devout’, while 52.8% would describe 
themselves as a ‘religious person who strives to fulfil religious obligations’. On the 
other hand, 34.3% are ‘believers who do not fulfil religious obligations’, while 2.3% 
say they do not believe in religious obligations and 0.9% of the population are 
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atheist.
437
 
The arguments that are shown as proofs of Islamisation under AK Party rule 
necessitate closer look instead of being taken for granted. For instance, one of the 
few examples depicted as a sign of Islamisation in the hands of AK Party 
government is the attempt to increase the legal restrictions about purchase and 
consumption of alcohol in Turkey has been. However, some countries that cannot be 
described as “Islamist” already have tighter restrictions for alcohol usage than 
Turkey, where existing laws set 18 as the minimum legal age for buying and 
consuming alcohol. For instance, minimum age limit is 20 in countries like Japan 
and Iceland, and 21 in United States.
 438
 Some U.S. States have legislation that make 
providing to and possession of alcohol by persons under 21 a “gross misdemeanor” 
with a potential punishment of $5,000 and a year in jail (or more).
439
 
During the height of Gezi Park incidents, the sale of alcohol was forbidden around 
the areas where there were tense clashes between the police and the protestors, in 
order to help establishing public order. In her infamous interview with Chief 
Adviser to Prime Minister Erdoğan İbrahim Kalın, CNN’s Christian Amanpour was 
interestingly relating this measure to “theorcracy” by saying: “I need to ask you 
about the alcohol issue. Because that does worry a lot of Turkey’s young, secular 
people, who used to be able to have a beer in Taksim Square. Why has this measure 
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been passed? People are worried about a creeping theocracy.”440 It is a mystery if 
she could have asked the same question if she was simply reminded that “alcohol is 
prohibited in [New York City’s] Central Park [at all times]... to ensure that everyone 
can enjoy the Park safely.”441 
Yet, some observers like Fadi Hakura of the Chatham House think-tank still believe 
that “the current government in Turkey is an Islamic-rooted, socially conservative 
government which is implementing a socially conservative agenda, and part of that 
agenda is increasing restrictions on alcohol.” 
Erdogan’s views on alcohol and gender politics give credence to fears that his aim is 
to transform Turkey into a fully-fledged Islamic state. However, while there have 
been concerns that he has become increasingly autocratic and intolerant of dissent, 
he is also considered to be a pragmatist. The degree to which he tightens alcohol 
regulation may therefore be determined more by a tactical judgment on his part.
442
 
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan insists that strong alcohol restrictions are necessary 
to protect Turkish youth as has been ordered in Turkish Constitution and have 
nothing to do with alleged religious sentiments of his party.
443
 Indeed Article 58 of 
The Constitution of The Republic of Turkey says: “The state shall take necessary 
measures to protect the youth from addiction to alcohol, drug addiction, crime, 
gambling, and similar vices, and ignorance.” 
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In the next chapter, negative representation of AK Party in the mainstream western 
media in cooperation with Turkish mainstream media is analysed by taking Gezi 
Park incidents as a case. It is claimed that this negative representation was important 
in shaping the possibilities for Turkey-EU relations negatively. Moreover, it is 
argued that power relations in the media determine a specific dominant discourse 
that discriminates against a specific Other. “The role of media in demonizing certain 
Others” 444 is underlined in that respect.  
 
 
NEGOTIATIONS HIT THE ROCK BOTTOM:  
WESTERN MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON AK 
PARTY DURING GEZI PARK PROTESTS & AFTERWARDS 
On 20 June 2013, in the wake of Ankara's crackdown on mass demonstrations in 
Taksim Square, Germany blocked the start to new EU accession talks with Turkey 
and put reservations about proceeding with the regional policy chapter of EU 
membership talks, which would be the first chapter to be opened in three years. An 
EU diplomat was saying “Germany was simply not ready to give its support. The 
ongoing protests obviously had an impact on the decision.”445 
The prospects for Turkey’s EU membership are looking bleaker than ever now, as is 
the representation of Erdoğan and AK Party in the mainstream western media. 
Turkey’s relatively independent foreign policy choices and domestic developments 
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that started with Gezi Park protests and continued during the power struggle 
between Turkish government and Gülen Movement made things worse.  
This chapter focuses on how mainstream media discourses and narratives function, 
how they shape and fix meaning in a way that excludes alternative views and 
alienates certain groups. Despite the new communicative opportunities presented by 
mediums like social media, mainstream media remains the key site of discourses 
with significant media power over discourses that represent and shape western 
societies. The analysis of language in mainstream media is “an important element 
within the research on contemporary processes of social and cultural change.”446 The 
mainstream media has an important role in influencing identity and policy narratives 
that are dominant among public and elites. The term ‘mainstream’ here roughly 
denotes the most widely circulated print media as well as the most heavily trafficked 
online media. It is not meant to carry a value-based connotation. 
Many EU countries and EU bodies have increased their criticisms about the AK 
Party government and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during and after Gezi Park 
protests. Political leaders from various EU member states are much more frank in 
their opposition to Turkey’s EU membership by saying that a country like Turkey is 
not and/or cannot be part of Europe.
447
 
In a continuous interaction process, Turkish government’s discourse has shown a 
parallel downturn in terms of Turkey’s EU membership prospects. For instance, in 
his statement that marked Turkey’s first high-level acknowledgement that its 
decades-long bid for membership may never be successful, Egemen Bağış, Minister 
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of EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator at the time, said Turkey will probably never 
become a member of the European Union because of stiff opposition and 
“prejudiced” attitudes from the bloc’s current members.448 Haluk Ilıcak, Turkey’s 
undersecretary of the Ministry of EU Affairs reflected mental preparations for the 
possibility of ultimate failure in negotiations by saying “The process means more 
than the accession. Once the necessary levels are achieved, Turkey is big enough to 
continue its development without the accession.”449 
Public opinions show a similar trend. According to the “Transatlantic Trends 2013” 
public opinion survey released by the German Marshall Fund of the United States 
(GMF), the desire of Turks to join the European Union has cooled considerably over 
the past decade and only 44% of Turkish respondents favoured joining the European 
Union in 2013, down from 73% in 2004. 34%, up from 9% in 2004, said that it 
would be bad for Turkey to join the EU. Citizens of EU member states are much less 
enthusiastic about Turkey’s EU membership, since only 20% of EU respondents 
said that Turkey’s accession would be good, while 33% said it would be bad and 
37% said that it would be neither good nor bad.
 450 
Contrary to the official discourse, Turkey’s membership negotiation process is much 
more than a technical procedure that is dealt only by European and Turkish 
bureaucrats. This thesis rejects the analyses, which assume that membership 
negotiations have opened or halted upon objective cost-benefit calculations of 
rational actors. It argues that, alongside other factors like the performance of Turkish 
                                                          
448
 Cited in Alex Spillius, "Turkey 'will probably never be EU member'," The Telegraph, 21 
September 2013. 
449
 Haluk Ilıcak, His speech at the conference of the Turkish Ministry of EU Affairs, İstanbul, 7 June 
2013. 
450
 The German Marshall Fund of the United States, "Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2013," 46. 
158 
 
government, AK Party’s positive representation in the western mainstream media 
within the immediate post-9/11 social context provided an environment for 
supporting Turkey’s EU membership in European identity and interest discourses 
(as will be analysed in the preceding chapter). Moreover, changing conditions and 
representations became part of considerable obstacles for Turkey’s membership later 
on by producing sources of fear and confusion in the minds and hearts of Europeans. 
This has been reflected well in the fact that “the more Europeans have began to see 
Islam as an existential threat in post-September 11 era, the more they tend to define 
Turkey as one of the potential ‘others’ of the EU’s emerging identity.”451 Later on, 
‘autocracy’ allegations about Erdoğan, who seems to have the political power to rule 
Turkey in the foreseeable near future, have created a scarier blend. The 
representation of AK Party and its leader in the western media has played a key role 
in this discursive interaction and change. 
“Islamist” has become the single dominant adjective used for AK Party, Erdoğan 
and Davutoğlu lately, especially with the downfall of Turkey-EU relations and the 
increase of active foreign policy choices of AK Party government that are relatively 
more independent from its traditional western allies. Personal attacks against 
Erdoğan have become more common firstly in the pro-Israeli and neo-con segments 
of the western media. For instance, Bloomberg View columnist and The Atlantic’s 
national correspondent Jeffrey Goldberg, who was named as "the most influential 
journalist/blogger on matters related to Israel"
452
 by Columbia Journalism Review 
contributing editor Michael Massing, has said that: "It's time to call Turkish Prime 
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Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan what he is: a semi-unhinged bigot."
453
 Gideon 
Rachman, the chief foreign affairs commentator for the Financial Times was joining 
the group by saying "I'm beginning to think Erdogan may actually be quite 
stupid."
454
  
Especially after the anti-government Gezi Park protests in 2013, it has become much 
more commonplace in the mainstream western media to call Erdoğan autocrat455 
and even dictator.
456
 There has been close relationship and even cooperation 
between domestic anti-government groups and considerable number of authors in 
the western media to enhance this representation of Erdoğan.457 His policies like 
banning Twitter until it recognises Turkish court decisions, while emphasising that 
he does not care what others (especially western media) would say about him, 
accelerated this trend.
458
 This was followed by the widespread criticisms in the 
mainstream Western media about increasing number of AK Party supporters for not 
seeing the reality(!) and “rewarding” Erdoğan for his wrongdoings. In addition, 
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political tactics were provided for Erdoğan’s critics to beat him up in the next 
elections.
459
 
While Erdoğan’s long-time opponents are welcoming this change by claiming that 
“western depictions of Turkish politics have finally begun to catch up with the 
authoritarian reality,”460 Merve Şebnem Oruç from Daily Sabah summarises this 
radical change in Erdoğan’s representation in the Western media discourses by 
saying: 
“Almost all the stories on Turkish politics penned by Western or West-
obsessed Turkish writers start with the same cliche: "Once upon a time, Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was a moderate, successful, exemplary 
Islamist democrat. Oh, we loved him so much. When the Arab Spring spread, 
many pointed to Erdoğan-led Turkey as a model for guiding the 
transformation of the Middle East. But those days are over. Suddenly - yes, 
suddenly - Erdoğan became an autocrat - no wait, he became more evil: a 
dictator. He became "the dark one" in the Middle East. He somehow ruined 
the country; now, Turkey is a mess. And it all started with the holy Gezi Park." 
Their code is simple, actually.”461 
What Happened in Gezi Park? 
As has been mentioned earlier, Turkish general election held in 2002 was named by 
many writers as a political earthquake. Just after its election victory, Justice and 
Development Party’s (AK Party) identity and its possible performance in 
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government have been subjects of fierce debates both at home and abroad. 
Surprising developments like Arab Spring and unprecedented factors like Israeli-
Turkish hostility complicated the already hot debate on AK Party-led Turkey’s 
identity and foreign policy destination. Identity debates concerning AK Party-led 
Turkey have fluctuated within a wide spectrum of labels, including but not limited to 
European, Middle Eastern, Asian, Eurasian and/or Muslim. Unexpected turmoil 
caused by so-called Taksim protests became a fruitful case for observing the 
complexity and variety of representations of AK Party and its leader. Thus, it is 
analysed in the coming pages with a special focus on sharp differences in competing 
narratives about the same event.  
Turkey has been paralyzed by mass protests over the eviction of a peaceful sit-in at 
Istanbul’s Gezi Park on 31 May 2013. The demonstrations sparked and spread to 
various cities around Turkey in a short period of time, and they have widened into 
broader protests against AK Party and specifically Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan. Foreign media, including but not limited to CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, France 
24, German ZDF and Russia Today showed unprecedented interest in the events, 
compared to previous domestic incidents in Turkey, and described them as “the 
biggest challenge to Erdogan and his governing Justice and Development Party 
during their decade in power.”462 CNN broadcasted seven hour continuous live 
coverage to its American audience about Taksim events on 11 June 2013. At the 
same time, media outlets like The Guardian and Associated Press portrayed the 
demonstrations as “Turkey's most widespread anti-government protests in 
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decades.”463 From the very first day of the protests, journalists such as Richard 
Seymour started to talk about “a potential Turkish Spring.”464 
Amid escalating tension and growing opposition, the Turkish government started a 
negotiation process with the representatives of the Gezi Park protesters. Deputy 
Prime Minister Bülent Arınç met with representatives of the Taksim Platform, a 
solidarity group formed to oppose the planned demolition of Gezi Park in Taksim. 
The group listed its demands, including a decision to end the redevelopment of the 
park. During their press conference, committee members were asked if they would 
want a referendum in Istanbul over the fate of the relevant park. Ironically, the 
committee representative said that they don’t want referendum over the issue. They 
even claimed that “in developed democratic countries there cannot be a referendum 
held” over such an issue, and wanted the government to abide by their demands 
without questioning them.
465
 This approach clearly put “democratic demands” 
argument of the protestors in jeopardy. Moreover, they declared that they are also 
against projects of third Bridge on the Strait and third airport in İstanbul. 
In the following meeting with the representatives of the protestors, the government 
stepped back from its initial redevelopment plan about Gezi Park and proposed a 
referendum on the issue. A deal with the representatives was reached on 14
th
 of June 
and the government asked the protesters to evacuate the park. The protesters, who 
were divided over the decision of whether to stay, first announced that they would 
leave, but later issued another statement declaring they reject the referendum over 
the redevelopment plan and declared that they would “stay in the park and continue 
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the resistance,” without defining any deadline or concrete aim.466 Upon this 
decision, police forces evicted Taksim Square and Gezi Park on 15
th
 of June, but 
protests continued in various scales elsewhere. 
Many different groups of people joined these protests for different reasons and some 
of these people are the members of some illegal and terrorist organizations. 
Alongside flags of marginal far-left political parties like Turkish Communist Party 
(TKP) and Workers Party (İP) and their youth organisations like Turkey Youth 
Union (TGB), which later showed up in the western headlines by attacking 
American soldiers in İstanbul in November 2014.467 The Union was declaring in its 
statement about the incident that “The TGB members dedicated the protest to our 
martyrs and to the millions of innocent people slaughtered by the imperialism in the 
Middle East.”468 
The protestors were also openly carrying signs and flags of organisations like PKK 
and DHKP-C, which are both recognised as terrorist organisations by Turkey, EU, 
USA and UK. These organisations have been involved in terror attacks against 
Turkish and foreign targets in the past, suicide-bombing of US Embassy in Ankara 
on 1 February 2013 being one of the latest incidents.  
A considerable group of activists hurled fireworks, fire bombs and stones at police. 
Interior Minister Muammer Güler stated that  within the first five days of the 
protests 280 workplaces, 6 public buildings, 103 police vehicles, 207 private 
vehicles including live broadcasting vans of news agencies, one residency, one 
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police station, and 12 AK Party district buildings were damaged, with a total cost 
over 40 million dollars.
469
 Moreover, vandalism of the protestors targeted 
international companies like Starbucks, which declared its concern over their 
personnel’s safety and condemned hatred speech of protestors against the 
company.
470
 Etyen Mahçupyan, a prominent author and journalist with Armenian 
origin, explains the background of the protests as follows: 
“To reduce the matter to errors made by the government in connection with 
the incidents would be a superficial explanation. Indeed, at the very heart of 
the incidents is the reaction by secular groups to the “lack of power” they feel 
in the face of being banished from the political center... The incidents were 
soon derailed and turned into a completely anti-government spree of violence. 
Hundreds of public and private vehicles were set on fire and shops were 
damaged or vandalized, as was the cultural center of the Greek Consulate. 
Aggressive groups led by neo-nationalists performed their “duties” with both 
flags and pavement stones in their hands. Meanwhile, many headscarved 
women faced harassment by protesters.”471 
Foreign and domestic anti-government media alongside majority of foreign analyses 
based their arguments on the assumption that protestors were representing all 
segments of Turkish society except AK Party supporters. Foreign media outlets like 
The Economist asserted that these mass protests were “the expression of the long-
stifled resentment felt by nearly half of the electorate who did not vote for the ruling 
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Justice and Development (AK) party in the June 2011 parliamentary elections.”472 
Moreover analysts like Paul Mason from BBC, claimed “the breadth of social 
support - within the urban enclave of Istanbul - was bigger than Greece and closer to 
Egypt.” However, the only source of his assertion was a quote from a protestor 
saying "Everyone is here - except the AK Party."
473
 
However, two out of three major political parties (i.e. Turkish nationalist MHP and 
Kurdish nationalist BDP) strictly criticised these protests and vandalism applied by 
these groups. If voter bases of these political parties are kept in mind (AK Party 
%50, MHP %13, BDP %7 in 2011 General Elections), political representatives of a 
decisive majority of the electorate (more than 70%) expressed their opposition to 
these protests. Both MHP and BDP denounced the protests and asked their followers 
not to participate in these events. Devlet Bahçeli, one of the hard line opponents of 
Erdoğan and leader of Turkish nationalist MHP said “sympathisers of PKK terrorist 
organisation and marginal leftist groups” provoke these protests to destabilise the 
country. He unequivocally refuted claims about a possible “Turkish spring,” and 
denounced vandalism that targeted public and private properties. Bahçeli also 
condemned efforts as “baseness” in the media to link MHP supporters with these 
protests and said that any member of MHP who wants to participate in these 
demonstrations should resign from the party before doing that. He also underlined 
that the only place to overthrow AK Party government is the ballot box, not these 
provocative protests. 
474
 
Selahattin Demirtaş, leader of Kurdish nationalist BDP, asserted that the protestors 
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mainly aimed to sabotage the peace initiative designed to bring an end to the 
decades-long Kurdish insurgency. Likewise, Vice-Chairman of BDP Group in 
Parliament İdris Baluken noted that slogans and symbols of status quo have 
prevailed in these protests and added “we will never position ourselves side by side 
these racist, sexist and militarist groups under any circumstances.” According to 
Baluken, the protests were merely a result of revanchist feelings of those groups 
(mainly Kemalists) that “have been holding Turkish society under captivity for 
decades.”475 Indeed, as has been noted by Hugh Pope, a veteran author on Middle 
Eastern matters, majority of protestors were chanting “We are the soldiers of 
Mustafa Kemal [Ataturk].” This showed that they mainly belonged to opposition 
Kemalist sect.
 476
 
Likewise, Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), the political representative of Nationalist 
View Movement as the fourth biggest opposition party after Republican People’s 
Party (CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, 
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP, Barış ve 
Demokrasi Partisi) condemned the provocations of “marginal groups” for “turning 
the streets into battlefields.” The Party published an official declaration to denounce 
western media for naming the events as “Turkish Spring” and announced that their 
supporters will never be involved in such “violent” protests that are abused by 
“illegal and marginal groups.”477 
Public survey conducted by Andy-Ar Center for Social Research after two weeks 
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from the beginning of the protests, 83% of Turkish population was not supporting 
continuation of the protests, while only 7% endorsed the continuation of the 
demonstrations (10% undecided).
478
 Even foreign observers who are sympathetic 
towards Taksim protest like Piotr Zalewski of Time Magazine accepted that “the 
protests have included mostly young leftists, environmentalists and secularists, all of 
them core government opponents.”479 
CHP was the only major political actor that continuously supported the protests. As 
has been emphasised by Bekir Berat Özipek from Istanbul Ticaret University, 
protests were mainly in rich districts of Istanbul, where wealthy Kemalists are 
residing, instead of relatively poorer areas.
480
 Supporters of the protests in Turkey 
ran a full-page ad in New York Times to explain why the demonstrators are so angry 
with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his government. They initially 
explained their ideological background by defining themselves as “the proud 
inheritors of Atatürk’s legacy.”481 A comprehensive survey conducted among 
protestors inside and outside Gezi Park by GENAR Research Center reveals that 
74% of protestors were supporters of the main opposition leftist/Kemalist party CHP 
and 15% of protestors were supporters of socialist/Kurdish nationalist BDP. The 
remaining major group (6%) consisted of supporters from other left-wing parties: 
Turkish Communist Party, Workers Party and Democratic Left Party.
482
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Coalition of Supporters for the Protests 
Taksim protestors received support from an interesting coalition of domestic and 
foreign actors with anti-AK Party leanings. As has been mentioned, a coalition of 
left-wing parties (including Republican People’s Party, Turkish Communist Party, 
Workers Party and Democratic Left Party) was the main domestic driving force 
behind the demonstrations. Anti-government print media (including Hürriyet, Sözcü, 
Milliyet, Aydınlık, Taraf, Cumhuriyet and Radikal) has played a prominent role as 
well. Foreign media, including but not limited to CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, France 24, 
German ZDF and Russia Today followed an identical anti-Erdoğan attitude during 
this process. 
Decisive majority of foreign media coverage included only views from the 
protestors and academics/journalists/analyst that are famous for their anti-Erdoğan 
attitude. Erdoğan-bashing became prominent in discourses of a wide range of 
journalists, academics and politicians. Their comments are provided as “specialist 
opinion” without mentioning their ideological preferences, although most of them 
have expressed their support for the protests or participated in demonstrations 
themselves or even declared to give extra points to their students who join the 
demonstrators (as in the case of Professor Veysel Batmaz from İstanbul University). 
As James Reynolds from BBC News underlines, it seemed to be "tempting to 
conclude from the demonstrations in Taksim Square and Gezi Park that the entire 
country is against Turkey's Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan."483 Very few 
foreign media outlets felt the necessity to provide what those who oppose the 
demonstrators think. Yet, most of those few reporters interestingly preferred to 
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interview AK Party supporters in poor areas of İstanbul, which possibly provided 
the suitable background for strengthening image of modern seculars vs. backward 
Islamists dichotomy in their discourse.
484
 
There was an interesting parallelism between the publications of different meadia 
outlets that are normally clashing on all other issues. For instance, Nasr TV in Iran 
was showing its capabilities as a propaganda tool by fabricating lies, like claiming 
that the Turkish government was “destroying Taksim Square as a historical site and 
was aiming to stop revolution and progress.” Interesting coverage prepared more as 
a propaganda video than news reporting by Nasr TV was saying: “Erdoğan 
government does not stand for Islam; it does not stand for democracy. But, it is 
another pawn in the hands of the Americans.” As the strongest ally of Syria’s Assad 
regime, Nasr TV was explaining the motive behind the Taksim protests as the 
opposition from Turkish people to AK Party government for “working with the 
Americans and the Saudis and others to overthrow the government in Damascus.”485 
Interestingly, commanders from Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian army published support 
videos for protestors, with banners saying “resisting Syrian people is shoulder to 
shoulder with resisting Turkish people.”486 
The demonstrators were also supported by global hacker network Anonymous and 
Redhack, the largest Turkish Socialist hacker organisation. These groups launched 
cyber attacks under the title “Operation Turkey #opTurkey” against websites of 
Turkish Presidency, Prime Ministry, various ministries, state organisations, AK 
Party and some media companies like NTV, the most popular private TV news 
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channel in Turkey.
487
 Moreover, several Twitter accounts like the one owned by The 
U.S. Consulate in İstanbul were compromised to publish tweets supporting the 
protests.
488
 
Egyptian author Fehmi Huveydi quoted Moshe Feiglin, Deputy Speaker of Israeli 
Parliament, saying "we are praying for protests in Turkey to continue until Erdoğan 
is toppled,” while Former Foreign Minister Avigador Lieberman, renowned for his 
anti-Turkish sentiments, was saying “Turkey’s domestic issues are not our business, 
but I cannot hide my happiness about the protests.” 489 
In his interview with The Voice of Russia Radio, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, founder and 
the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Vice-Chairman of 
the State Duma, asserted that Erdoğan’s policies are not in the interest of Russia and 
Taksim protests are the same as The Orange Revolution that took place in Ukraine 
from late November 2004 to January 2005. He also claimed that “Erdoğan has no 
future” and called Turkish military to take control of government.490 
Curiously, some wealthy families in Turkey, which have supported military 
interventions in the past, expressed their support for the demonstrations, although 
they have impressively increased their wealth during economic success story of AK 
Party. Koç Holding, the top industrial conglomerate owned by the Koç family as one 
of Turkey's wealthiest families, supported the protests. It has even called the 
students of Koç University to participate in the protests. Ironically Koç University 
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campus has been built on forestland in İstanbul by cutting tens of thousands of trees 
in 1990s. Tayyip Erdoğan, as Mayor of Istanbul then, was the fiercest opponent of 
the project. Although he could not prevent the construction of the campus and was 
forced to give up his mayorship because of his infamous prison sentence, he 
achieved to prove that the land Koç University was illegally built on forestland 
owned by state and Koç University became leaseholder of the land, since the 
campus was already built by then.
491
 Cem Boyner
492
, Chairman of Boyner Holding, 
one of the leading non-food retail groups in Turkey, and Ergun Özen, CEO of 
Garanti Bank owned by Doğuş Group, one of the top three largest private-sector 
conglomerates in Turkey, were among those who openly declared their support for 
the protests. 
Alleged members of Ergenekon Terror Organisation, a secularist ultra-nationalist 
organisation in Turkey, who are indicted on charges of plotting to foment unrest, 
among other things by assassinating intellectuals, politicians, judges, military staff, 
and religious leaders, with the ultimate goal of toppling the AK Party government, 
expressed their strong support for the demonstrations. Moreover, they linked Taksim 
protests to their own demonstrations against what they call AK Party 
“dictatorship.””493 
Some foreign analysts, like Steven Cook, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at 
the Council on Foreign Relations, and politicians like Claudia Roth, Co-Chair of 
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German Green Party, came to İstanbul to join the protests in person and published 
anti-Erdoğan messages.494 Efgani Dönmez, a parliamentarian from the Austrian 
Green Party, proposed to deport supporters of Erdoğan from Austria. Referring to 
the Austrian advocates of Erdogan with Turkish origin, who have announced a big 
demonstration in Vienna with participation of up to 5000 Erdogan fans as a reaction 
to Taksim protests, Dönmez said “5000 one-way tickets and no one would weep for 
those...”495 Some foreign analysts like Professor Udo Steinbach, head of the 
Governance Center Middle East |North Africa at the Humboldt-Viadrina School of 
Governance in Berlin, did not even hesitate from likening Erdoğan to dictator Assad 
of Syria and defaming by calling him “cement head.”496 
Social Media as the Driving Force behind the Protests 
Social media is a useful open platform in which any type of information and thought 
can be shared. Nevertheless, it can also have negative influences.  As Elif Shafak, 
one of the most internationally famous Turkish writers, emphasised regarding her 
experiences during Taksim protests, “social media is open to misinformation, 
baseless rumours, hate speech and conspiracy theories.”497 During these protests, it 
served as the main platform for organising events and communication. However, it 
was also the source of information chaos as well. Some provocative messages have 
been distributed, including calls for violence. Moreover, these messages have found 
an important place in the Turkish and international mainstream media. 
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One of the iconic inflammatory news, which proved to be false later, was that a girl 
aged 26 was overrun by a police armoured vehicle and died during the protests.  
Anti-government public figures including some singers and TV stars (some of them 
having over a million Twitter followers during the protests) shared this false news 
with their followers.  It was re-tweeted by thousands of protestors. Newspapers like 
Cumhuriyet, with Kemalist ideology, declared that they were absolutely certain 
about the story.  At the height of tensions, Adnan Keskin, Vice-President of main 
opposition party CHP, telephoned pro-CHP TV station Halk TV and claimed that he 
has confirmed the death of the girl from his sources. He asserted that the mainstream 
media was under the influence of the government and condemned the media for not 
covering this story. Then a photo alleged to be a proof for a person overrun by a 
police vehicle has been widely distributed among supporters of the protest, including 
CHP members. However, it was later understood that the story was totally a 
provocative lie. The photo distributed as proof turned out to be an old photo of an 
accident abroad. Adnan Keskin had to admit that he was wrong and blamed Twitter 
for misleading him. Other public figures who shared the story on their Twitter 
accounts silently deleted those tweets. 
One other baseless rumour was the claim about Istanbul Police using Agent Orange 
(a deadly toxic substance used by U.S. military as part of its chemical warfare 
program during the Vietnam War) against protesters. This news was highly 
distributed among protestors since it was published on CNN’s website in its iReport 
section, where users share their story. After being spread by tens of thousands of 
protestors, the piece was removed by CNN a few days later with the following 
statement: “This iReport, which claimed that police in Istanbul have been using 
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Agent Orange against protesters, has been removed. CNN reporters there have seen 
no indication this is the case. Police in Istanbul have been using a colored substance, 
according to protestors, which may be the source of the confusion.”498 
Another manipulated iconic photograph was allegedly showing some police officers 
using pepper spray towards a dog. However, the uniforms of police officers were 
blurred in the distributed photo. Newspapers like Britain’s Daily Mail used this 
photo alongside others in their news coverage under the title “Now DOGS are being 
tear-gassed: Heartbreaking images of pets caught in carnage as police target 
protestors for a fifth day in Turkey.”499 Daily mail reporter explained his source as 
follows:  “The latest photographs, which were uploaded to Twitter, are believed to 
show dogs caught up in the carnage near Gezi Park in Istanbul.”500 However, un-
blurred original photo came out later and the police uniforms in the photo showed 
that the photo was not even taken in Turkey. Thereupon, Daily Mail removed the 
photo from its website. 
The claims about the government interference to access to social media websites 
was one other provocative lie used by protestors and shared by others to erupt public 
reaction. Influenced by these rumors, journalists like Byron Acohido from USA 
Today started talking about "reported Internet censorship" to prevent social media 
access of protestors.
501
 However, let alone being censored, social media has seen 
record levels of accession from Turkey during the protests. As a study by New York 
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University revealed, “at least 2 million tweets with hashtags related to the Turkish 
protests were sent in just eight hours on May 31 when protests gathered steam, 
around 90% of them from Turkey and 50% of them from İstanbul. In comparison, 
Egypt's main protest hashtag was tweeted less than 1 million times throughout the 
country's entire revolutionary period and only about 30 percent of people tweeting 
during the Egyptian revolution in 2011 were actually in Egypt.”502  
Detailed analysis by Sandra González-Bailón at the Oxford Internet Institute and 
Pablo Barberá of New York University's Social Media and Political Participation 
laboratory also show how systematically social media was used during the protests. 
As their analysis show, “just one percent of users generated about 80 percent of all 
retweets. According Bailón and Barberá, this means the protest has been driven by 
so-called "authorities," who generated content, and "disseminators," who pushed it 
out there by quoting and retweeting. Besides, “by the fourth day, more than 30% of 
unique users employing protest hashtags were English speakers; Twitter accounts 
like “YourAnonNews”, “AnonOpsLegion” or “AnonOpsMob”, part of Anonymous, 
a network of hacktivists, also started to appear among the most retweeted.
 “503 
Some of the many other similar fictitious news and manipulated photos distributed 
by anti-government journalists, politicians, activists, TV celebrities and managers of 
prominent companies that turned out to be tools for provocations were as follows: 
“Police is using real bullets... Keep up; if we continue the protests for over 48 hours, 
the government will fall according to EU laws... Son of Vice-Prime Minister Bülent 
Arınç is shareholder of the shopping mall (alleged) to be built on the Gezi Park... 
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Thousands of police officers resigned to protest government... There is only one 
name to be used for politics that uses chemical weapons against its own people for 
20 hours: fascism. The name of the government that allows this is: dictatorship... 
Police is distributing water containing drugs in order to put the protestors to sleep 
and detain them... (Using a photo from Intercontinental Istanbul Eurasia Marathon) 
Tens of thousands are crossing the Bosporus Bridge to join the protestors... Help! 
Spread the word. Istanbul on fire @nytimes @AFP @BBCWorld... Hundreds of 
Islamists are heading to Taksim with Kalashnikovs…  It is unbeliavable!!! The 
government is killing its own people/us in front of us/its people again @CNN... 
Turkish PM Erdoğan calls for a mass slaughter of the protestors!504 
Erdoğan-phobia within Dominant Discourse in Mainstream Media 
Gezi Park protests served to introduce Erdogan to Western intellectuals as an 
"Islamist despot" who does not tolerate any opposition.
505
 It has become 
commonplace to insult Recept Tayyip Erdoğan during and after Gezi Park incidents 
in Turkish and international mainstream media. Interestingly, despite 
authoritarianism over Turkish media allegations against Erdoğan, Turkish media 
was filling up with such insults.  Mümtazer Türköne from Gülen’s Zaman daily 
likened Erdoğan to a “spoilt and talebearer child.”506 Yılmaz Özdil from Hürriyet 
newspaper was warning Erdoğan by saying, “Nobody would even like to remember 
you [after your death]. You have no place to sleep [A Turkish idiom used for people 
who have so many sins that nobody in this world or the afterlife loves him/her]. Riot 
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control vehicles will have to wait upon your grave in order to prevent people from 
spitting on your grave.”507 
Roni Margulies, Fethullah Gülen’s Taraf Daily columnist and member of 
Revolutionary Socialist Workers' Party (Turkey) was claiming that Prime Minister 
Erdoğan will be taken to the gallowses, as he deserves it.508 Another journalist 
Ahmet Şık was saying, “You will see; Erdoğan will either escape or be arrested or 
become a dictator. He is going for the third option, but this nation will not allow 
that.”509 Columnist Mümtazer Türköne from Zaman daily, the highest circulated 
newspaper in Turkey, was accusing Erdoğan for suffering “severe necrophilia.”510 
Erdoğan was also being portrayed as a traitor and a tyrant.511 
James Traub, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a contributing 
writer for The New York Times Magazine, The New Yorker, The Atlantic Monthly, 
National Review and Foreign Affairs, claimed that Erdoğan was ruling Turkey “by 
tyranny-of-the-majority.
512” With “his authoritarian style,” Financial Times argues, 
“Erdogan is demonstrating to the world that Turkey is a country with a shaky 
democracy, a flawed constitution and a diminishing number of allies.” 513 
Decisive majority of foreign media and anti-government Turkish media acted as if 
Taksim Square redevelopment program was new and covered the story as if a 
spontaneous public uproar occurred against a recent decision taken unilaterally by 
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Erdoğan himself. Dictatorship and/or authoritarianism arguments against Erdoğan 
were mainly based on this false information. Even after weeks of government efforts 
to repeatedly give details of the project and its decision process, majority of foreign 
voices insisted on misleading their readers and claiming “Gezi Park generation is 
refusing to simply comply with the government's dictates.”514  
However, the Project was far from being new, since it was introduced with details 
by Erdoğan himself before 2011 General Elections, among other projects related to 
İstanbul, like third Bridge on the Strait and third airport in İstanbul. More 
importantly, the decision for the project had been taken by İstanbul City Council, 
which consists of representatives from all major political parties, not the 
government. The project of Taksim Square that caused replantation of some trees 
(the main reason behind the protests) was supported by all political parties at the city 
council, including the opposition parties CHP-MHP-BDP, and it was accepted 
unanimously at the İstanbul City Council in 2011.515 After an application for 
overruling the project, High Commission for Protection of Cultural and Natural 
Heritage approved the project as a whole on 1 March 2013. 
This being said, foreign media, including BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera reported that 
the protests started to prevent the government from demolishing a park and building 
a shopping mall in its place. This was the argument of some protestors. However 
these media outlets did not try to learn what was really happening about that park. 
The construction was for rebuilding Taksim Square for pedestrians. Only 13 trees 
were replaced to another park within this project. (Interestingly, more than 30 trees 
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were cut – not replaced – at the Warwick University campus, while this section of 
the thesis was being written.) More importantly the decision for this construction 
was taken unanimously in İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality Council, with the 
votes of opposition parties. On top of that, Fahrettin Kayhan, member of the Council 
from main opposition party CHP, was thanking AK Party for this project and saying 
“We as CHP support all projects like this, which are designed in the interest of 
people. It is a big deficiency that this project was not produced by previous 
governors of İstanbul.”516 
Moreover, some journalists did not hesitate to blatantly lie about what was 
happening during the events. For instance, some protestors threw Molotov cocktails 
at police on 11 June 2013. However, Luke Harding from The Guardian was 
describing the situation in a mocking tone, influenced by social media rumors, as 
follows: “a small group of four or five "demonstrators" throwing molotov cocktails 
at police. At one point they advanced on police lines in a comic Roman-style 
phalanx while holding the flag of a fringe Marxist party. The ‘protesters’ were in 
fact middle-aged undercover police officers, staging a not very plausible ‘attack’ on 
their own for the benefit of the cameras.”517  
However, within a few hours, the identities of these demonstrators were revealed as 
members of a far-left political party (Socialist Democracy Party SDP) as opposed to 
claims in social media that he was a policeman in disguise.  And it was revealed that 
they were previously convicted and served prison sentences. They were arrested by 
police on the same day at the headquarters of SDP with illegal guns and machetes. 
                                                          
516
 Cited in Hilal Kaplan, “Ağaç ve Hükümet,” [Tree and Government], Yeni Şafak, 2 June 2013. 
517
 Luke Harding, "Erdoğan's reaction to Turkey protests reveals ominous Putin parallels," The 
Guardian, 11 June 2013. 
180 
 
Turkish daily Hürriyet, a major anti-government media outlet that first voiced 
suspicion about these demonstrators for being undercover police officers, had to 
accept its mistake.
518
 However, foreign correspondents and analysts like Luke 
Harding did not feel the necessity to apologise from their readers for simply lying 
and misleading them or even updating their articles to provide the true information. 
News outlets like BBC and Russia Today (RT) prepared live update timelines, which 
consisted of messages and tweets from protestors and their supporters without 
checking the authenticity of the information.
519
 They preferred to act like notice 
boards for the messages of demonstrators, while simply ignoring the other side of 
the story. These media outlets did not show interest in and chose to ignore when, as 
a reaction to Taksim protests, hundreds of thousands welcomed Erdoğan with mass 
rallies in three different cities on 9 June 2013 after his trip to North Africa. 
Especially, unprecedented crowds in Ankara waving Turkish flags and chanting 
their support for Erdoğan was so huge along the 25 kilometer highway from the 
airport to the city centre that he had to stop and give speech in four different 
locations in a row along the way. The same attitude continued about the mass rally 
in İstanbul on 16th of June, which has been one of the largest if not the largest, rallies 
in Turkish history with well over 1 million participants according to official figures. 
As has been pointed out by Mustafa Akyol, a liberal Turkish writer and journalist, 
“the classic Orientalist prejudices prevailed in western media” during these protests, 
and “subjective consciousness that prefers secular Turks over pious Turks” 
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dominated their discourse.
520
 For instance, anti-government protestors were 
generally referred as people and citizens in media coverage, while AK Party 
supporters are called by some as Erdoğan’s “troops”.521 Erdoğan contested this 
approach by asking, “Are the people only those at Gezi Park? Aren't those who 
came to meet us at the Istanbul airport the people too? Those who are gathered now 
in Ankara; aren't they the people, too?”522 This sense of elitism that is widely shared 
by secular Turks in Istanbul is well reflected in the attitude of figures like Ersin 
Kalaycıoğlu, a professor of international relations at Sabancı University, who 
complains that the city had “been invaded by Anatolian peasants” who were 
“uncultured.” 523 
Ivan Watson from CNN depicted the protests as a result of “culture wars” between 
pious Muslims and secular urban circles in Turkish society.
524
 Usage of the “urban” 
term only for seculars is key here, since that indirectly means that AK Party 
supporters are rural. However, this has no base in reality, since AK Party has 
repeatedly won elections in all major cities including İstanbul and Ankara, with few 
exceptions like İzmir. 
Hugh Pope says “there’s a lot of talk among my Turkish friends of the Gezi Park 
demonstrations being a turning point”.525 Understanding this situation is key in 
grasping how a specific type of discourse is generally determining the perceptions of 
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foreign observers. Most of these friends belong to a specific sect of political 
spectrum, mainly Kemalists. This makes it much confusing to understand election 
results in Turkey. Because majority of Turkish people, which do not have the chance 
to be “friends” of these observers think and act differently. 
Foreign media reporters mainly residing in certain districts of Istanbul are 
surrounded by Kemalist friends and colleagues. They have limited contact with the 
rest of the society, although they are supposed to be in a position to see domestic 
developments in Turkey more thoroughly. A unanimous British colleague who 
stayed in Istanbul for more than a year says “I have not met any single person who 
supports Erdoğan in Istanbul. All my friends say how much they hate him. I have no 
idea who votes for him.” The anomaly of this situation is better understood if it kept 
in mind that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been the governor of Istanbul for after 1994 
local elections and his party won elections in Istanbul since 2002. 
Lack of basic knowledge about Turkey, worsened the situation in news coverage of 
some foreign media outlets. As has been put by Mahir Zeynalov, columnist at 
Turkish daily Today’s Zaman, “several international media staged systematic attack 
on Turkey during protests while the rest just exaggerated out of lack of 
knowledge.”526 For instance, a TV program named Grand Soir 3 was using Tunisian 
flag on its screen, instead of Turkish flag, while covering Taksim protests at France 
3, the second largest French public television channel. 
From the Government’s Perspective 
Contrary to general argument in anti-AK Party media, Taksim protests are not “the 
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biggest challenge to Erdogan and his governing Justice and Development Party 
during their decade in power.”527AK Party has faced much bigger opposition 
protests during its ten year rule. So-called “Republic Rallies” before the elections in 
2007 have been the largest series of protests with millions of participants in total, 
according to the organisers. The government believed that Taksim Park protests and 
their results would increase AK Party votes even more, like the Republic Rallies, 
which actually increased its vote in the elections although they were designed to 
demonize AK Party,. 
However, AK Party still took the Taksim demonstrations very seriously from the 
beginning. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan denied claims about shopping 
mall construction plan and declared that a city museum will be built there. He also 
said his government opposes violence and is open to "democratic demands" raised 
by demonstrators.  "What we are against is terrorism, violence, vandalism and 
actions that threaten others for the sake of freedoms," Erdoğan said in a televised 
conference in İstanbul and added "I am open-hearted to anyone with democratic 
demands."
528
  
As has been almost unanimously accepted by observers from both supporters and 
opponents of the demonstrations, it was soon understood that the main issue of 
disagreement was not about trees or the park. Especially the vandalism of protestors 
and intensification of public polarisation revealed that the fault lines are much 
deeper. Even leading figures of the protests confessed that trees and environmental 
arguments were just symbolic tools to be used for stimulating masses. Indeed, 
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Mehmet Ali Alabora, an actor known for his anti-government attitude, tweeted 
“Dear friend, the issue is not only Gezi Park, did not you still get that? Come join 
us.”529 Tayfun Kahraman, Chamber of City Planners Head of Istanbul Branch and a 
member of Taksim Platform that met with Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç as 
the representative of Taksim protestors, confessed that they were aware of the fact 
that there was pedestrianisation of Taksim square, instead of a shopping mall 
construction, and no trees were cut for this project. “Yet, if false news about 
shopping mall construction and cutting trees did not spread through social media,” 
he continued, “we could not have seen this wave of protests.”530 
Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that they received intelligence reports three 
months before Taksim demonstrations that foresee mass protests against the 
government. However, he emphasised that they did not expect these demonstrations 
to start from environmental debates, since in his words “preservation of nature and 
forestation are the areas where AK Party has been strong most.” Indeed, over 2 
billion 800 million saplings were planted during AK Party’s ten year rule.531 
Erdoğan has slammed the interest lobby and stock Exchange speculators repeatedly 
in his speeches during the protests. He portrayed them as the main actors behind the 
demonstrations and warned them: "The interest lobby should better behave itself. 
This lobby exploited my people for years. We have shown patience for a long time. I 
am not saying this only for one bank or two but for all whoever making this lobby. 
Those who have started this fight against us, you will pay the price heavily."
532
 This 
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groups was claimed to be against AK Party, since it has lowered overnight interest 
rates of Central Bank as low as 4,7% in 2013, compared to 44% in 2002 when it 
came to power. 
In an interview with BBC, Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Bağış said that the 
protests initially began 'peacefully and sincerely' but eventually 'other groups' 
became involved, and that they identified '11 different terrorist organizations that 
have encouraged people to become a part of this demonstration and turned this into a 
parallel campaign of a vandalism which no country accepts'.
533
 He also claimed the 
demonstrations are linked to “interest lobbies” wishing to profit from instability in 
the country. Bağış reflected the opinion commonly shared among AK Party 
supporters and those who withdrew their support from the protests after the rise of 
vandalism and abnormal foreign media coverage trying to create a ‘Turkish Spring’ 
story out of demonstrations. He claimed that the protests were connected to forces 
that want to prevent Turkey’s rise, by saying “Turkey is not wanted as a regional 
power by many. Turkey’s rise has given reason for many countries to become 
anxious as Turkey’s prominence means peace, prosperity and stability in the Middle 
East. There are strong links between the protests and national and international 
pressure groups wishing to profit from instability in Turkey.” 534 
AK Party’s top policymakers vociferously criticised foreign media and alleged that 
foreign interest groups are working to subvert Turkey’s success. Egemen Bağış 
reflected this feeling by saying: “The international media’s approach to this issue 
has been quite unique. I don’t think that CNN International did as much reporting on 
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Boston marathon explosions, or on the demonstrations which ended with many more 
casualties throughout Europe, or even on what is happening in Syria today. In Syria, 
a dictator is killing hundreds of citizens of its own country every single day. CNN 
International is ignores that, but runs a three-hour non-stop report from Taksim 
Square, without commercials.”535 
Prime Minister Erdoğan openly explained his concern about a plan to overthrow AK 
Party government by undemocratic means, saying “Overthrowing the elected 
government and ignoring the election results are habits of the past. Today they have 
no relevancy."
536
 Even analysts with critical stance against AK Party, like Kerem 
Öktem, research fellow at the European Studies Centre, St Antony's College and 
Karabekir Akkoyunlu, researcher at the London School of Economics, share this 
concern and underline “Turkey's recent record of undemocratic manipulations to 
bring the [AK Party] government down,” mainly with the involvement of those 
groups who support the Taksim protestors: 
“Kemalist elites, the military, the judiciary and the so-called "deep state" 
rogue elements acting within the visible state structures, conspired to terminate 
the Justice and Development Party's government from the very moment of its 
first election in 2002. Ever since, the party had to face several attempts at 
power grab, from an ultra-nationalist conspiracy in the mid-2000s based on 
unresolved assassinations of Christian missionaries and the murder of Turkish-
Armenian journalist Hrant Dink to the so-called Republican Marches against 
the election as President of Abdullah Gül to the Constitutional Court's only 
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narrowly averted closure case against the ruling party in 2008.”537 
There is a parallelism in the eyes of AK Party electorate among Menderes, Özal and 
Erdoğan, all of whom gained strong public support as pious leaders from center-
right with their performance in economic development and democratisation of 
Turkey. Adnan Menderes was the first democratically elected Prime Minister of 
Turkey, after decades of one-party rule of Atatürk’s CHP. He was toppled by a 
military coup in 1960 and killed with death penalty alongside his two ministers with 
baseless allegations. This incident is accepted as one of the worst black marks in 
Turkey’s democratic history.  
Allegations against Democrat Party government in the headlines of the press during 
the 1960 military coup period are revealing the atmosphere of the time and 
providing hints in understanding media’s relationship with undemocratic 
interventions in Turkish political history. In order to legitimise the military coup, 
Democrat Party was accused for establishing a dictatorial regime by using all 
authoritarian means, including repression, censorship and even massacres. One of 
most shocking allegations was a report titled “Students Were Minced in Machines,” 
claiming that hundreds of university students were killed with torture upon the order 
from Democrat Party and grinded in state-owned mince machines. This allegation 
was falsified and called disinformation many years later by the Journal’s Chief 
Editor Orhan Birgit, who published the allegation at that time. Birgit, who became 
Republican People’s Party’s MP and spokesperson after the coup, confessed that 
there were many similar fabricated allegations against Democrat Party in the media 
and this particular “grave disinformation” was first fabricated by high-ranking 
                                                          
537
 Kerem Öktem and Karabekir Akkoyunlu, “From victim to villain: Erdogan's unfinished 
transformation," CNN, 9 June 2013. 
188 
 
military officers and then distributed by them through media.
538
  
Other allegations against Democrat Party government in the press showed a similar 
pattern: “Democrat Party was to plot a massacre if not taken over.” (Dünya, 31 
May); “Murdered students’ graves detected” (Cumhuriyet, 29 May); “Government 
to deport İnönü” (Yeni Sabah, 30 May); “New corpses found in ice houses and pits” 
(Cumhuriyet, 2 June); “9 found dead in İstanbul” (Ulus, 11 June); “Officers were to 
be murdered in mass” (Vatan, 9 June); “Plot to annihilate! Democrat Party plot to 
abolish universities and the armed forces” (Dünya, Second Edition, 31 May).539 
Hüseyin Kocabıyık, Chief Advisor of Former Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller 
between 1995 and 1999 was highlighting similarities between accusations and 
attacks against Çiller before 1997 military coup and against Erdoğan in the current 
power struggle from the same circles: 
“Those who accuse Erdoğan for being a thief had been doing the same things 
for the first and only woman Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. Military, 
judiciary, capital owners, Republican People’s Party and Aydın Doğan [media 
tycoon] organised the 28 February coup in cooperation.  They were 
blackmailing Çiller to leave her seat then. They are doing the same thing for 
Erdoğan now. They were accusing Çiller for being a drug smuggler, nuclear 
smuggler, CIA spy and of course the most corrupt politician. Today they are 
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accusing Prime Minister Erdoğan for being a corrupt dictator, who divides the 
country and sends arms to Al-Qaeda.”540 
Özal was another popular leader who was democratically elected after 1980 military 
coup, and received unexpected public support as a reaction to military intervention. 
He died in 1990, and recent forensic analysis of his corpse revealed high doses of 
lethal chemicals in his body. This has strengthened the public belief that poisoning 
was his cause of death. Among others, Levent Kırca, a Turkish actor and a hard line 
Erdoğan opposer, threatened Erdoğan and his supporters in his interview with pro-
CHP TV station Halk TV, and claimed that Erdoğan’s fate will be similar to 
Menderes.
541
  
Thus one of the main slogan for Erdoğan supporters against the protests was “You 
hanged Menderes and poisoned Özal. We will not let you take down Erdoğan.”  
Referring to military coup against Menderes government, Mustafa Elitaş, Co-Chair 
of AK Party Parliamentary Group, emphasised the parallels between two incidents 
and defined chaos caused by the protests as an attempt for modern coup d’état.542   
This perception about ‘flawed anti-AK Party’ media coverage evaporates the power 
of these media outlets to influence the ideas of AK Party supporters. On the 
contrary, it enables the government to claim to be on the right track if those anti-AK 
Party media outlets are criticising AK Party. 
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Different Stories for the Same Event 
Differences in perceptions and identity narratives were reflected in the comparisons 
made about Taksim protests. For those, who are sympathetic to AK Party, like 
Marwa Maziad, a columnist at Egyptian newspaper Almasry Alyoum and a visiting 
researcher at İstanbul Şehir University, “uprising represents a needed dose of 
opposition for a healthy and viable democracy.”543 Yet, a prominent anti-
government journalist and author Ahmet Altan defined the protests as “the most 
genuine, most unforgettable and most impressive public resistance in Turkish 
history” and compared Erdoğan with Spanish dictator Francisco Franco. 544 
Ian Buruma, Professor of Democracy, Human Rights, and Journalism at Bard 
College, was analysing the events from “class” prism and saying “The protesters, 
whether they are liberal or leftist, tend to be from the urban elite – Westernized, 
sophisticated, and secular. Erdoğan, on the other hand, is still very popular in rural 
and provincial Turkey, among people who are less educated, poorer, more 
conservative, and more religious.”545 
Foreign media correspondents and analysts who lack basic information about 
Turkish politics inferred some other interesting and naive meanings from the 
protests. BBC Newsnight economics editor Paul Mason was among them, as he 
likened the events to “Paris Commune”, which was an early socialistic and 
communalistic government that briefly ruled Paris in 1871. He was reporting from 
the Istanbul streets: “To any student of social history the sight of an urban middle 
class using its fingers to dig up cobblestones, form a human chain and pile them 3ft 
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(1m) high to make a barricade screams the words "Paris Commune". That is what I 
saw in the streets around Besiktas stadium last night and the comparisons are 
ominous.” Although Turkish police briefly withdrawn from Taksim Square in 
Istanbul with the order from the local authorities during the events, Paul Mason was 
asserting “there is again the echo of that event in Paris. Then, too, the state pulled 
out, leaving the urban middle class and workforce of Paris to run the city for 100 
days. But it ended in tragedy and bloodshed.”546 
There were various arguments about the actors behind the protests.  For instance, 
Aaaron Klein, senior staff reporter and Jerusalem bureau chief of WorldNetDaily 
(WND) headquartered in Washington, D.C., linked the protestors with American 
administration. Klein was claiming that Turkey protest leaders were trained by 
Obama online gurus and emphasised that “directors of a youth movement helping to 
lead the anti-government protests rocking Turkey (namely Genç Siviller, or Young 
Civilians with liberal ideology) participated in a 2009 U.S. State Department-
sponsored training summit on how to use social media to organize societal 
change.”547 However, Turgay Oğur and Ceren Kenar, both journalists and 
participants of this summit from Genç Siviller, were highly critical about the 
protests. Turgay Oğur asserted that the attitude of western media can be explained as 
ill-will at best, for depicting Erdoğan as “an Islamist Middle Eastern dictator”, 
although he was the one that advised secularism to Middle Eastern leaders and has 
never intervened in his people’s lives and was bravely driving Turkey towards social 
peace.
548
 Yet Genç Siviller, as an NGO, actively supported the protests. 
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Some analysts, which were following the provocations on Twitter didn’t hesitate to 
stereotype the protests and compare them to those of the Arab Spring and labelled 
the protests as the Turkish Spring, not knowing many of the images and notes they 
receive over Twitter were actually fraudulent.”549 Stephen Walt from Harvard 
Kennedy School was putting Turkey into the basket of Arab Spring countries and 
saying “If heaven exists, Edmund Burke is watching Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt, 
Libya, etc. and nodding: ‘See what happens when rules disappear?’”550 CNN was 
citing a protestor claiming "This is an uprising, a protest against the increasing bans. 
Perhaps just like we saw the Arab Spring, this will be the Turkish Spring."
551
  
This argument was mainly based on a claim that Erdoğan is a dictator like the ones 
toppled during Arab Spring. Only two days before the protests broke out, Jean-
Maurice Ripert, the ambassador of the European Union to Turkey, was praising AK 
Party government for “reiterat[ing] its commitment to the EU accession” and for 
“the impressive progress over the last months, with important steps towards meeting 
the Copenhagen criteria,” which stresses the requirement for preservation of 
democratic governance and human rights. 
552
 However, after the start of The Gezi 
Park protests, foreign media was suddenly flooded with accusations about Erdoğan 
for being a dictator.  
For instance, by interviewing with a few people from Arab streets, Reuters 
correspondents were impatient to reach premature, if not premeditated, conclusions 
about Turkey and its image in the Arab world: “Two years ago, Tayyip Erdogan was 
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mobbed by adoring crowds in Arab capitals and Turkey seemed set to expand its 
trade and influence across the region on the back of his support for the upstart 
democrats of the Arab Spring. Today, his crackdown on protests at home has 
sickened some of those who hailed an unlikely liberator from the land of their 
former Ottoman overlords; they now scorn the prime minister as little better than the 
dictators they ousted.”553 Fırat Demir from University of Oklahoma supported this 
claim by arguing that social engineering and authoritarian decision-making have 
become AK Party's top policy tools.
 554
 
However, both election results and public surveys by domestic and foreign research 
centers show a completely different picture about Erdoğan’s and AK Party’s 
democratic credentials. As a leader who has won three general, two local elections 
alongside two referenda Erdoğan keeps his popularity among electorate. Jacop 
Poushter, Research Associate at the Pew Global Attitudes Project, summarises the 
situation by saying: “As anti-government protests continue in Istanbul and other 
Turkish cities, a March 2013 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center shows 
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan to be broadly popular in Turkey. A majority (62%) 
had a favorable view of Erdoğan, while just 34% viewed him unfavorably. This is 
basically unchanged from 2012, when 59% of Turks had a positive view of the 
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader.”555 
AK Party also proved its wide basis by being the most successful party in 65 out of 
81 provinces in Turkey, including İstanbul and Ankara, in 2011 General Elections. 
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According to January 2013 official records of Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals, 
AK Party outscored its rivals with 7.551.472 registered members. Its main rival 
CHP has only 953.416 registered members, while MHP and BDP follows with 
363.393 and 44.156 members consecutively.
556
 
Based on these records, another group reject claims about a possible Turkish Spring. 
Fadi Hakura, associate fellow and manager of the Turkey Project at the London-
based think-tank Chatham Housei was within this group by claiming “Despite the 
rising emotions sweeping Turkey, this is not equivalent to the "Arab Spring" that led 
to the toppling of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Unlike Egypt and 
other Arab countries, Turkey is a functioning, albeit incomplete, democracy and has 
been since 1950. Erdoğan received a resounding mandate of almost half the vote in 
the last general elections in 2011. He still remains the most popular politician in 
Turkey, while the opposition is widely seen by many Turks as weak and 
ineffective.”557 
Ceylan Ozbudak from Al Arabiya agreed with Hakura emphasised that “the Arab 
Spring started as an uprising against the tyrants of Baathist regimes who had been 
oppressing the people under juntas or dictatorships for decades. Turkey is not a 
dictatorship, nor is it a junta regime.”558 On comparisons to the Arab Spring, Tuna 
Kuyucu, assistant professor of sociology at Bogazici University in Istanbul, says 
"The similarities are very small. Arab uprisings were mass events preceded by 
massive economic crises. In Turkey, this is an upper-middle-class movement, 
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mostly about people defending lifestyle matters."
559
 
İhsan Bal, Head of Center for Security Studies at International Strategic Research 
Organisation in Ankara, underlines the general tendency in the Western media to 
liken Taksim ”to places such as Tahrir or Bengazi where dictator’s reigned as 
opposed to the protests in London, Madrid, Athens and Wall Street which are much 
more similar cases.” In his words, this is a result of a “wider trend in Western media 
that subconsciously wants to dress Turkey’s experiences in Middle Eastern 
robes.”560 
However, another approach is to accept each case on its own terms, since each event 
is unique. Within this framework, Bahadır Kaleağası, the international coordinator 
for the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD), said the international 
investors had noticed that these country-wide protests were unlike the other more 
violent protests in the European Union or Arab Spring. “They see that these 
incidents are not the factor of political instability. The beginning of the protests is 
different than the situation in Athens or Cairo. This is a post-modern reaction that 
aims to protect historical and ecological heritage and seeks expansion of freedoms 
and more accountable public authority.”561 
Uneasy Relationship between AK Party and Media 
It is fair to claim that there is a strong relationship between politics and journalism 
and “almost everywhere in the world, most of the media is still politically 
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differentiated along with general public orientations.”562 Yet there are still important 
variances about media systems in different countries. Daniel Hallin and Paolo 
Mancini propose a three-fold typology of media systems by taking four criteria into 
account: (1) development of media markets; (2) the extent to which the media 
system reflects the major political divisions in society; (3) the development of 
professional journalism; and (4) the degree and nature of state intervention in the 
media system.
563
 
The first model Hallin and Mancini outline is North Atlantic or Liberal Model, 
which is characterised by medium newspaper circulation, neutral commercial press, 
strong professionalization and market domination. The second one is Northern 
European or Democratic Corporatist Model, which is featured by high newspaper 
circulation, external pluralism in national press, strong professionalization and 
strong state intervention alongside protection for press freedom. The Third model is 
Mediterranean or Polarised Pluralist Model, which is characterised by low 
newspaper circulation, high political parallelism, weaker professionalization and 
strong state intervention.
564
 
As a Mediterranean country, Turkey has historically been closer to Polarised 
Pluralist Model in this categorisation. Similar to previous terms, it has been possible 
to observe the consequences of increasing polarisation in Turkish society during AK 
Party rule. Media was not immune from the influences of this polarisation. The lines 
between pro and anti government media have become thicker each and every day. 
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This has forced journalists and media administrations to take sides. This limited the 
space for freedom of expression especially for those who contradict their 
newspaper’s or TV channel’s editorial line. When journalists were sacked for having 
ideological/intellectual contradictions with their bosses and editors, they were 
welcomed by the opposite side for the same reason. 
Turkey’s mainstream media is owned by moguls who operate in other major sectors 
of the economy like telecommunications, banking and construction. An extensive 
study conducted for the European Union by a group of journalists and independent 
media experts from across the continent found similar problems throughout 
southeastern Europe.  
“Many media owners and leading journalists have vested political and economic 
interests and use their position to engage in ruthless “media wars” against political 
opponents. Journalism and media associations tend to replicate political or 
ideological demarcation lines… For a lot of owners, their media appear to be little 
more than “arrow and shield” that they use in power struggles and as instruments to 
achieve business goals by influencing political and administrative decision-
makers.”565 
This relationship has become more problematic in Turkey with the involvement of 
some religious groups in media circles. For instance, as a journalist who claims to be 
victim of problems regarding freedom of press in Turkey, Mahir Zeynalov was 
reflecting his position about journalism and Gülen Movement: “I sacrifice my head 
to this sacred truth, for which hundreds of millions of heads were sacrificed. Even if 
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you turn the world into fire for us, we will not give up this sacred duty.”566 Only two 
days after he left Turkey, Zeynalov was attacking pro-government Star daily and 
claiming that it should not be called a newspaper, but a piece of paper.
567
 By this 
way, he was showing his approach to freedom of press. 
Businessman Akın İpek, the owner of Bugün daily and Kanaltürk TV, was clear 
about his position as a media boss: “I would sacrifice all of my possessions for a 
single smile of [Fethullah Gülen].” In his article about İpek’s loyalty to Gülen, 
Ahmet Kurucan from Zaman daily was endorsing and sharing that approach by 
saying “You cannot understand servants... It is an honour for us to be servants of 
Hizmet [i.e. Gülen Movement].We are all like Akın İpek.” 568 
There is a tendency in the western mainstream media to assume that there is a 
domination of pro-AK Party media in Turkey. There is no dispute about the fact that 
there has been a clear separation of opinions among Turkish media outlets especially 
since Gezi Park incidents that has become sharpened after the power rift between 
AK Party and Gülen Movement. Generally speaking newspapers like Sabah, 
Türkiye, Star, Yeni Şafak, Akşam, Takvim, Güneş and Yeni Akit have had pro-AK 
Party positions, while dailies like Zaman, Posta, Hürriyet, Sözcü, Haber Türk, 
Bugün, Milliyet, Aydınlık, Şok, Cumhuriyet, Yeni Asya, Yurt and Yeni Çağ defended 
a pro-Gülen position in this debate. 
As has been underlined by Mustafa Karaalioğlu from daily Star, if mainstream 
Turkish media and Gülen Movement’s media is added, the total amount of 
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newspapers that “categorically oppose AK Party” consist of nearly ¾ of the total 
circulation.
569
 Moreover, Turkey’s two English language dailies were also both in 
the anti-AK Party camp (Gülen Movement’s Today’s Zaman and Aydın Doğan’s 
Hurriyet Daily News). In order to show the distribution of the balance among pro-
government and anti-government newspapers, providing the circulation numbers of 
the ten largest dailies (excluding two sports newspapers) gives tangible data: 
 
Average Daily Circulation of Top 10 Newspapers 
 between 13.01.2014 and 19.01.2014 
Source: Press Announcement Association 
Newspapers with Pro-Gülen Stance 
During the Political “Battle”570 
Newspapers with Pro-AK Party 
Stance During the Political “Battle” 
Zaman 1.174.257 Sabah 330.434 
Posta 415.225 Türkiye 184.053 
Hürriyet 402.770 Star 136.469 
Sözcü 364.726 Yeni Şafak 128.092 
Haber Türk 229.759 Takvim 108.534 
Bugün 167.644   
Milliyet 166.858   
Total 2.921.239 Total 887.582 
It has become one of the most commonly used criticisms against AK Party to claim 
that the government, specifically Erdoğan, is applying pressure on the media. 
Whenever, anti-AK Party journalists faced problems they received high international 
media attention. Almost all of them used this chance to blame the AK Party 
government for oppression. For instance, in her interview with Matthew Cassel, 
columnist Ece Temelkuran, who had to leave her position from pro-Gülen Habertürk 
daily, was saying: 
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“I am freaking out, it's not the imprisonment necessarily, but now I feel like I have 
this stamp of persona non grata by the government. I am afraid I might be 
unemployed for a while because no newspaper would employ me because of that 
stamp.”571 
However, she continued writing articles for national and international media. Her 
books remained as bestsellers. Moreover, she became editor-in-chief of left-wing 
Birgün daily the next year. It was surprising to read her reason for leaving her 
editor-in-chief position after only three months: “I need to write a book. I have not 
decided about its subject yet.”572 
During the height of tension between Turkish government and Gülen Movement, 
BBC has been quoting “Turkish journalists” saying “We have serious problems with 
freedom.”573 Interestingly the only two journalists, BBC was interviewing for this 
analysis was from pro-Gülen Movement newspapers (i.e. Amberin Zaman, a 
columnist at pro-Gülen Taraf, and Yavuz Baydar, a columnist at Gülen’s Today's 
Zaman). These two journalists were interviewed as victims of government for being 
“sacked from pro-government newspapers.” There was no mention about the 
journalists who were sacked from pro-Gülen newspapers during the same time 
period. They did not seem to have any value in the eyes of western media, as shown 
in this BBC piece, since anti-government journalists were accepted to talk in the 
name of “Turkish journalists” as a whole. 
                                                          
571
 Matthew Cassel, "Firing Turkey’s Ece Temelkuran: The Price of Speaking Out," Al Akhbar 
English, 6 January 2012. 
572
 Ece Temelkuran, "Artık Gitme Zamanı," [It is Time to Go], Birgün, 21 October 2013. 
573
 BBC News, “Turkish journalists: 'We have serious problems with freedom',” 24 December 2014. 
201 
 
Yet, there is another part of the story that is not adequately told in the mainstream 
western media. Some very well-known journalists were fired from anti-AK Party 
newspapers for the ideas they defended in their columns. One important example 
was Andrew Finkel, who was fired from Today’s Zaman, for objecting the 
imprisonment of renowned journalists Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener. These two 
journalists were imprisoned for writing books that criticise Gülen Movement. Finkel 
was saying that “it should not be a crime to write a book that bothers Gülen 
Movement.”574 
Bülent Keneş, the editor-in-chief of Today’s Zaman, was explaining their decision 
by saying, “as an editor-in-chief you have the right to choose whom to work with 
and whom not to work with in consideration of the daily’s editorial policy. I 
exercised this right when I started working with Finkel. I used this right again when 
extending my appreciation for his contributions and parting ways. I don’t think this 
has anything to do with a free press or the freedom of thought.”575 
Another example were Ahmet Taşgetiren, who had to leave Gülen’s Bugün daily for 
being closer to the AK Party government’s position during the Erdoğan-Gülen 
power struggle. Another journalist was columnist Ergun Babahan was fired from his 
post at Today's Zaman via a twitter message by Bülent Keneş, over a number of 
controversial tweets he posted about Fethullah Gülen. Just moments after Babahan’s 
tweets, Today's Zaman Editor-in-Chief Bülent Keneş announced via Twitter that he 
was no longer working for the paper: "Babahan had his opinions published in TZ 
[Today's Zaman] twice a week. I hereby declare that he will remain a bitter memory 
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at TZ."
576
 The apology of Babahan for mistyping the controversial word in his tweet 
and unintentionally offending Gülen and his followers did not change this 
decision.
577
 
Pro-AK Party media has also become victim of hate speech in this process. For 
instance, while sharing the link of an analysis of Daily Sabah titled “No Surprises 
Expected in Local Elections”, which reflected predictions for an AK Party victory in 
İstanbul and Ankara (which actually turned out to be true in the actual elections), 
Hürriyet Daily News columnist Emre Deliveli was reacting by saying, “you wish, 
you lying, scheming, treacherous traitor assholes!”578  
By his heavily re-tweeted post from his Twitter account with more than 600.000 
followers, Taraf daily columnist Mehmet Baransu revealed personal information 
(including home address and citizenship number) of journalist Elif Çakır from pro-
AK Party Star newspaper and 24 TV. Upon increasing death threats following this 
disclosure, Çakır had to move out of her house and request personal protection from 
police forces.
579
 
Another example was Hüseyin Gülerce whose TV programme was ended on 
Gülen’s Mehtap TV channel. Although he has been praised as a leading figure in 
Gülen Movement’s media for long years, his programme was ended because of his 
critical stance against using undemocratic means to topple the government. In his 
tweets that ostracised him from Gülen Movement, Gülerce was saying, “I cannot 
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accept plots against Prime Minister Erdoğan. If he has to leave his seat, this may 
occur as a result of the will of delegates in AK Party Congress or the will of 
electorate in elections. But foreigners cannot send my country’s prime minister 
away. In the name of democracy, fairness and conscience, we should not consent to 
provocations and plots.”580 
Although it is generally, presented as if Erdoğan is in a personal power struggle with 
Turkish mainstream media, the problematic relationship of this media is far from 
being limited to Erdoğan himself. AK Party supporters could not escape from this 
hate speech of the mainstream Turkish press as well. For instance, Enver Aysever, 
who presented a discussion program on CNN Turk and who became member of CHP 
Party Council, was tweeting to his 660K followers that “rightists/conservatives don’t 
read book, don’t go to theatre, don’t listen to music, don’t respect to the nature.”581 
Similarly, Ercan İnan from Vatan daily was criticising AK Party for hiding behind a 
“mass that does not read and listen; and that cannot learn.”582 Columnist Emre Uslu 
from Taraf and Today’s Zaman dailies was claiming that “ignorance” is the only life 
buoy of AK Party.
583
 
In his infamous article, as columnist of Hürriyet daily, Bekir Coşkun was despising 
AK Party supporters as “men scratching their bellies,” who watch entertainment TV 
shows instead of news programmes.
584
 Another Hürriyet columnist and a popular 
social media figure Yılmaz Özdil, who has more than 1,6 million Twitter followers 
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as of March 2014, was naming AK Party supporters as “barrel-headed.”585 Mine 
Kırıkkanat from Radikal newspaper was comparing Turkish people to bears and 
describing the AK Party voters as “short-legged and long-armed hairy men.”586 
Interestingly two years later, Kanat was citing similar observations of Le Monde’s 
Guillaume Perrier as a supporting proof for her arguments.
587
 
In reference to Aziz Nesin who claimed that ‘sixty percent of Turkish people is 
stupid’, Müjdat Gezen, an activist Kemalist actor, was saying “Some polls show the 
support for AK Party is at fifty percent. According to Aziz Nesin’s standards, that 
should be sixty percent.”588 Aybars Turan, President of National Education 
Foundation, was likening AK Party supporters with “donkeys”.589A former model, 
who co-presented a show on NTV news channel was complaining, “I cannot bear the 
fact that the vote of a shepherd in the mountain is as valuable as mine.”590 
There were similar insults within political arena. The statements on placards in the 
election rallies of opposition parties were part of the insulting discourse, saying 
things such as “We do not want shepherd Recep and his sheep. One becomes an AK 
Party supporter when he loses his honor.”591 As the leader of the main opposition 
party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was openly praising a banner in his election rally in Bursa 
which says “I will not vote for the AK Party because I have a brain.”592 Leader of 
Nationalist Movement Party Devlet Bahçeli was identifying AK Party voters as 
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“inauspicious.”593 Leader of Justice and Equality Party Osman Pamukoğlu was 
claiming that only “ignorant, hungered and rent-seeker” people vote for AK Party.594 
Serdar Turgut from Haber Türk daily was characterising the act of voting for AK 
Party as “unscrupulous, weird and contemptible conduct.” And he was expressing 
his disappointment that the majority of Turkish people will again vote for AK 
Party.
595
 
The İstanbul mayoral candidate of the main opposition Republican People's Party 
(CHP), Mustafa Sarıgül, was claiming that “If AK Party wins İstanbul mayorship 
again, Allah forbid, they will start raking with machine guns. They will first rake 
Republican People’s Party and then Nationalist Movement Party. They will then 
rake TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), European 
Union and remaining few journalists.  They will rake TUSKON (Turkish 
Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists), The [Gülen] Community and 
free-thinking youth in social media.”596 Interestingly, he punched a protestor in the 
face on the same day he posted these tweets. His justification for his action was 
more interesting: “We later identified that person. He turned out to be an AK Party 
supporter. He was not a citizen; he was a brother of an AK Party member.”597 
As has been underlined by Chief Editor of Today’s Zaman Bülent Keneş before 
Gülen Movement separated its ways from AK Party, “The roots of this elitism and 
condescending /discriminative language can be traced back to the first generation of 
the republican era,” within which Kemalist elites “isolated themselves from the 
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people.”598 “The same twisted point of view manifested itself once more after the 
transition to a multiparty system in 1950.” Keneş continues:  As the supporters of 
“the longstanding dictatorship of the CHP,[ Kemalist elite] insulted the popular 
choice, saying that the feet have replaced the heads.” 
Interestingly, there has been a double standard in the mainstream media even about 
the deaths according to their political leanings. For instance, thousands of people 
attended the funeral of 15-year-boy Berkin Elvan, who died in March 2014 after 
being in a coma for 269 days resulting from being hit in the head by a gas canister 
fired by police in Istanbul during Gezi park protests in June 2013. It sparked anti-
government protests in different cities, which attracted massive foreign media 
coverage. Berkin’s story was identifies as a “symbol of the heavy-handed police 
tactics against demonstrators” during Gezi protests.599 Foreign media outlets like 
BBC News interviewed with the Elvan’s father. 
Government officials and pro-government media reported that “illegal groups 
exploit the public grief with violent attacks on civil servants and civilians.”600 22-
year-old Burak Can Karamanoğlu was shot from his head by protestors and a police 
officer died of a heart attack while in a car that is stoned by protestors. The only pro-
government English newspaper Daily Sabah, which recently started publication as 
an alternative to other two anti-AK Party English dailies totally dominating the field 
(i.e. Hürriyet Daily News and Today’s Zaman), was among the sources reporting 
about unlawful incidents. Interestingly correspondents of foreign news outlets were 
ridiculing these reports simply because of their prejudice against AK Party. For 
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instance, Alex Christie-Miller, Turkey correspondent for the Times of London, and 
also for the Christian Science Monitor and Eurasianet.org, was criticising Daily 
Sabah’s coverage and saying “I reckon the AKP's international reputation was 
taking less damage when Sabah was just in Turkish.”601 
However, a few hours later, extreme-left Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-
Front (DHKP-C), a terrorist organisation that is infamous for its US Embassy 
suicide blast
602
 and attacks on the Ministry of Justice and AK Party headquarters in 
Ankara
 603
 alongside many other previous crimes, accepted the responsibility for 
killing Burak Can Karamanoğlu, burning down AK Party’s election offices and 
raking a police vehicle with machine guns.
604
 Not surprisingly, Ragıp Soylu from 
Daily Sabah remained empty handed when he asked for an apology from foreign 
correspondents, including Alex Christie-Miller, for their unfair insults. Moreover, 
there was not a single word about the funeral of Burak Can Karamanoğlu in the 
mainstream foreign media (like CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera and France 24), which 
covered Elvan’s funeral extensively the previous day. There was a similar silence 
when DHKP-C murdered Mehmet Selim Kiraz, the prosecutor who was handling the 
Elvan case, in March 2015. 
Oltac Unsal, the Head of The World Bank Group’s infoDev global grant program, 
was the main organiser of the Indiegogo crowd-funding campaign to raise money for 
a full-page ad in the New York Times about Berkin Elvan’s death.605 When asked 
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why he used the money for an ad in NYT instead of donating it to the victim’s 
family that is in need of help, Unsal’s answer was revealing: “Our aim in publishing 
this ad is to punch Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s lights out by means of media. Donation 
is totally another story.”606 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The story of Turkey’s fluctuant EU membership bid, which dates back to 1959, has 
experienced many ups and downs at various stages. There have been many different 
factors at play throughout the process and Turkey-EU relations have not been 
happening between two unitary and rational actors. The actions and interactions are 
continuously influencing the outcomes alongside many other factors, including 
material ones. Unexpected developments like the recent turmoil in Ukraine or the 
refugee crisis caused by the Syrian war have been continually affecting the pace of 
the process as well. Thus, no single study is exclusively enough in grasping all 
aspects of Turkey-EU relations.  
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While the main focus in the literature is generally on what AK Party has or has not 
done while analysing the good and bad times of the relationship in the post-9/11 
period, the role of other actors like mainstream international media is generally 
neglected in influencing the possibilities of Turkey-EU relations both in positive and 
negative directions. Standing closer to the poststructuralist approach, this thesis 
analyses the changing nature of competing representations of AK Party in the 
western mainstream media and political discourse, which is widely neglected in 
spite of its importance in the process. “The role of media in demonizing certain 
Others” 607 is underlined in that respect. 
This thesis rejects the analyses, which assume that membership negotiations have 
started or halted upon objective cost-benefit calculations of rational actors. It argues 
that, alongside other factors like the performance of Turkish government, AK 
Party’s positive representation in the western mainstream media within the 
immediate post-9/11 social context provided an environment for supporting 
Turkey’s EU membership in European identity and interest discourses. Moreover, 
changing conditions and representations became part of considerable obstacles for 
Turkey’s membership later on by producing sources of fear and confusion in the 
minds and hearts of Europeans. This has been reflected well in the fact that “the 
more Europeans have begun to see Islam as an existential threat in post-September 
11 era, the more they tend to define Turkey as one of the potential ‘others’ of the 
EU’s emerging identity.”608 Later on, ‘autocracy’ allegations about Erdoğan, who 
seemed to have the political power to rule Turkey in the foreseeable near future, 
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have created a scarier blend. The representation of AK Party and its leader in the 
western media has played a key role in this discursive interaction and change. 
This thesis rejects rationalist materialist assumption on natural and pre-given 
identity understanding. Within that framework, it deconstructs concepts and labels 
like Islamist or secular, which are taken for granted within debates. It analyses 
dominant discourses on AK Party and Turkey’s identity, as well as foreign policy 
predictions emanating from these discursive positions. Thus, it highlights the 
changes and interactions among different sources of discourses during the relevant 
period, benefiting from the latest discursive data, especially during the Gezi Park 
incidents in Turkey that has caused Turkish-EU relations to hit rock bottom. It 
focuses on the western mainstream media coverage of the incidents that dominantly 
included views from the protestors and academics/journalists/analyst that are famous 
for their anti-Erdoğan attitude.  
The prospects for Turkey’s EU membership are looking bleaker than ever now, as is 
the representation of Erdoğan and AK Party in the mainstream western media. 
Turkey’s relatively independent foreign policy choices and domestic developments 
that started with Gezi Park protests and continued during the power struggle 
between Turkish government and Gülen Movement made things worse. Many EU 
countries and EU bodies have increased their criticisms about the AK Party 
government and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during and after Gezi Park 
protests, mainly focusing on the authoritarian tendencies of Erdoğan and the pitfalls 
of the majoritarian style democracy in Turkey. Political leaders from various EU 
member states are much more frank in their opposition to Turkey’s EU membership 
by saying that a country like Turkey is not and/or cannot be part of Europe. 
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This thesis takes Turkey-EU relations as the policy area to analyse the relationship 
between discursive representations and policy choices. If one only analyses the 
material factors in Turkey and EU, that has no use in understanding the changes in 
Turkey-EU relations. Although there have been some developments that caused 
negative reactions from the West, changes in material conditions of Turkey in 
meeting the membership criteria do not reflect the dramatic negative change in 
Turkey’s EU membership destination. Although, the pace has been criticised, new 
reform steps have been taken in addition to already existent reforms that hardly 
anyone in Turkey and abroad denies. Moreover, there have been considerable 
positive developments about the reasons that were used to support Turkey’s 
membership bid, such as good performance of Turkish economy or its importance in 
terms of Europe’s energy security. 
This qualitative research claims that the dominant rationalist materialist and 
essentialist analyses in the literature and media fell short of understanding Turkey, 
its new governing party and Turkey-EU relations. It challenges the plausibility of 
essentialist arguments like “they hate us”, “they will not take us”, “they are not like 
us,” or “they will ruin us.” Moreover it argues that these dominant approaches have 
had decisive influences on western actors’ perceptions and actions related to AK 
Party and Turkey under its rule. As it underlines “the power of incomplete, 
ambiguous, and contradictory discourses to produce a social reality that we 
experience as solid and real,”609 this thesis examines how language constructs 
phenomena and how that influences policy choices. Since “discourse is not produced 
without context and cannot be understood without taking context into 
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consideration,”610 it pays special attention on the role of social context during the 
relevant period (i.e. post-9/11 period up until now). 
Moreover, this thesis argues that material elements have a secondary status, because 
they gain meaning only through intellectual processes. As has been pointed out by 
Kevin Dunn, reality “is unknowable outside human perception, and there is never 
only one authority on a given subject.”611 In Friedrich Nietzsche’s words, “There are 
no facts in themselves. It is always necessary to begin by introducing a meaning in 
order that there can be a fact.”612 
The mainstream media has an important role in influencing identity and policy 
narratives that are dominant among public and elites. When they explain why some 
ideas win out over others, comparative politics scholars tend to “emphasize neither 
the constitutive power of ideas nor an idea’s intrinsic force, but rather its ability to 
clarify uncertainty or reconcile the interests of elites.”613 Differently from other 
negotiation processes, public opinion has always been a substantial part of Turkey’s 
membership debate. Contrary to the formal discourse, the process has been much 
more than a technical procedure. Turkish membership has been an important subject 
of various national election campaigns in EU member states. New laws that required 
national referendum in some of these members (i.e. France and Austria, both of 
which are among the countries with the least public support percentages in polls 
about Turkey’s EU membership) regardless of the success of Turkey’s negotiations 
increased the role of media and public opinion in the process. 
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It is possible to claim that “the EU appears to have reached the limits of a top-down, 
elite-driven Project.”614 What people on the street think is becoming more and more 
important especially after the rise of public resentment in numerous member 
countries against the policies of EU. This trend has become much more visible after 
the last European Parliament elections that increased the pressure on the mainstream 
political parties and EU bodies, while providing an increasing voice for anti-EU and 
anti-enlargement actors.  
Nick Couldry describes ‘media power’ as “the concentration in media institutions of 
the symbolic power of “constructing reality” (both factual representations and 
credible fictions).”615 Despite the new communicative opportunities presented by 
mediums like social media, mainstream media remains the key site of discourses 
with significant media power over discourses that represent and shape western 
societies. Since mainstream media outlets are vertically structured organizations 
staffed by professionals that are geared towards large, homogeneous (segments of) 
audiences, they remain the main carriers of dominant discourses and 
representations.
616
 In this framework, it is possible to claim that mainstream media’s 
corporate structure and its large audience-base allow for discourses’ representations 
to be spread widely in a highly uniform and repetitive way.
617
 
As has been put by Hansen, “the emphasis in discourse analysis on the importance 
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of language makes knowledge of a particular language and its codes essential.” One 
of the solutions in meeting this requirement is to “shift the focus of the analysis to 
texts that were aimed at an international, usually English speaking, audience.”618 
English-language mainstream media that target a more general audience has been 
the main resource for this thesis. Mainstream American and British media are 
included in this group in addition to English-language mainstream media outlets like 
Der Spiegel, France 24 and RT News. Since they are part of debates in western 
political discourse by being followed by a considerable amount of western elite 
audience and by being contributed by western authors, English-language media 
outlets like Al Jazeera and Haaretz are also included.  
Moreover, mainstream western media publications in other languages were used by 
benefiting from various online translation services when they are referenced in 
Turkish and English language media. Mainstream Turkish media was also 
extensively used as a source, since its interaction with the rest of the western media 
is key in understanding AK Party’s representation in western political/media 
discourse. Although mostly print media is taken into account in this thesis, there is a 
fruitful area for future analyses that will focus on empirical data from other media 
sources like TV coverage and radio broadcasting. 
Within that framework, this thesis is particularly interested in the way in which AK 
Party and specifically Erdoğan have been represented in the Western mainstream 
media discourse, and how these representations have influenced specific encounters 
in Turkey-EU relations. The changes in the dominant representations over time have 
a special place in this analysis. It is claimed that western media and political 
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discourse on AK Party had decisive influence in limiting possible policy options for 
policy makers. Positive and praising discourse on AK Party and Turkey that 
dominated western political landscape enabled EU leaders to open the way for 
membership negotiations.  Similarly, negative and even demonising discourse on 
AK Party became the biggest obstacle for the continuation of the negotiations. 
This thesis puts emphasis on the contested meanings of AK Party and Erdoğan and 
traces how the dominant representation has shifted over time. Because, as has been 
argued by Iver Neumann, when “a discourse maintains a degree of regularity in 
social relations, it produces preconditions for action.”619 It is claimed that the 
changes in representations of AK Party and Turkey under its rule defined the limits 
of possible policy choices both for the EU and Turkey. Analysing these changes  
reveal important clues in understanding how the opening of negotiations emerged as 
a political option, how other options were shunted aside at that time, and how those 
options became dominant after some time.  
Both positive and negative political and media representations of AK Party have 
been crucial in re-shaping possibilities for the nature of the EU-Turkey relationship 
and EU’s position about Turkey’s accession process. This does not mean that there 
is a single factor that explains everything about the ups and downs of the 
relationship or a scapegoat for the obvious failure of the negotiation process. It 
should be emphasised that, instead of directly causing foreign policy actions, this 
thesis claims that socially constructed representations “frame the context of the 
‘perceived’ reality of decision-makers at any given time.”620 As has been put by 
Teun van Dijk, “media influence, and hence power, is usually indirect and rarely 
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total.”621 This conception obviously leaves an important room for agency. This 
highlights the importance of the concept of ‘logic of appropriateness’ that is referred 
as the behavioural logic emphasised by constructivist analysts. According to this 
approach “a certain course of behaviour is adopted because it is in agreement with 
the intersubjectively shared, value-based expectations of appropriate behaviour 
emanating from the actor’s social environment.”622 
Within this framework, this thesis accepts the important role of mainstream media in 
shaping identity and policy discourses that are dominant among elites and public. In 
other words, the mainstream media continue to influence people’s understanding of 
the most salient issues of the day. Founded on the idea that media texts do not have 
innate meanings, but instead are assigned meanings by media consumers, this thesis 
employs a qualitative discourse analysis rather than a quantitative content analysis. 
It does not deal with discussions on whether politicians are sincere in their public 
discourses or they simply try to use it as a tool to achieve their hidden goals. It is 
assumed that media texts are a significant target of discourse analysis because of 
their central role in the production and reproduction of dominant discourse.
623
  
The media is uniquely positioned to exert control over discourse through its 
operation as a central institution of information production and its relations to other 
dominant institutions.
624
 Although dominant ideologies and their variations are 
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jointly produced by the elites, “media elites have the special role and persuasive 
power to control dominant discourse reproduction among the population at large.”625 
It is predominantly media elite’s definition of the situation that contributes to the 
manufacturing of public opinion, if not to the opinions of the political elites. 
In the process that brought the opening of Turkey’s negotiation press in 2005, AK 
Party was frequently praised in the mainstream western media as a ‘model’ that had 
to be exported to the rest of the Muslim world.
626
 Its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
was applauded as one of the rarest blends in the Islamic world and the champion of 
Turkey’s westernisation reforms.627 The economic success of AK Party-ruled 
Turkey was also praised. Prime Minister Erdoğan became “the darling of the 
international community” during this period,628 a period when the Western political 
and media landscape mainly viewed Turkey as a success story under AK Party rule. 
Turkey’s supporters in EU welcomed the opening of negotiations as “truly historic 
for Europe and for the whole of the international community.” And they hailed the 
deal as an important step in undermining “Islamist extremists by showing that the 
EU is not an exclusively Christian club” and helping “relations with millions of 
Muslims in today's EU.”629 
After the dominant discourse in coverage of Gezi Park incidents and the negative 
representation of AK Party and Erdoğan in the mainstream western media, “in 
member countries’ parliaments and the European Parliament, the chorus of voices 
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demanding that accession talks be suspended is growing.”630 Indeed, Germany 
blocked the start to new EU accession talks with Turkey in June 2013 and put 
reservations about proceeding with the regional policy chapter of EU membership 
talks, which would be the first chapter to be opened in three years. In the words of 
an EU diplomat, “Germany was simply not ready to give its support. The ongoing 
protests obviously had an impact on the decision.”631 Andreas Scheuer of the 
Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party to Angela Merkel's 
Christian Democrats (CDU) was saying, “Erdogan's Turkey has no place in 
Europe.” Green Party chairman Cem Özdemir was supporting him that an Erdoğan-
ruled Turkey is an “increasingly authoritarian state.”632 
Reuters was announcing AK Party’s latest election victory in March 2014 to its 
subscribers with the title “Erdogan victory puts icy Turkey-EU relations in deep 
freeze,” while claiming that “the EU is very unlikely to nudge Ankara's accession 
hopes along until Erdogan shows he is prepared to protect civil liberties, justice and 
the rule of law - and govern like a mainstream European prime minister.”633 In the 
words of Alexander Christie-Miller from The Times, “The European Union is 
expected to put Turkey’s membership application on ice amid fears that the 
country’s Prime Minister is steering his Government towards autocracy.”634 By 
continuing the same discourse, Alan Cowell from New York Times claims that “after 
months of increasingly authoritarian rule” by Erdoğan,” the portals of the club seem 
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more than ever to be closing on Turkey.”635  
"The path to an authoritarian government is paved," claimed Bild in its coverage of 
Erdoğan’s election. In an article entitled "What Germans need to know about 
Erdogan", the paper wrote: “It’s not easy to explain to a German why 20 million 
Turkish people voted in a president caught in the middle of a multi-million Euro 
corruption scandal. To understand, one has to be Turkish.”636 
The Economist was drawing a similar conclusion about the latest incidents that 
“further dents Turkey’s hopes of joining the European Union.” It is warning that 
“Turkey is sliding backwards, with more than a whiff of authoritarianism about the 
prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,” while reminding that Erdoğan’s “Islamist-
flavoured AK party has been in power since November 2002.”637 
Before her visit to Turkey, The Observer was warning Angela Merkel not to “make 
Erdoğan look respectable” before 1 November 2015 elections and saying: “Turks are 
witnessing the murder of democracy over time. Angela Merkel should have no part 
in this. Whatever the stakes, on migration or Syria or anything else, neither should 
the EU.”638 
For some, this new picture is a relief since it is a step back from the "worrying 
dynamic" in the West that had "stopped seeing political Islam as a hostile ideology”, 
and “started to actively aid the consolidation of Islamist power, particularly in 
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Turkey, on this newly found pink cloud.”639 Anti-AK Party figures in Turkey, like 
journalist Ece Temelkuran are happy to see this change in the mainstream western 
media. Her complaints one year before the Gezi Park incidents show the sharp 
contrast in mainstream western media discourses on AK Party and Erdoğan: 
“Turkey has managed to maintain a democratic image to the outside world through 
international and national propaganda. Mainstream western media is serving their 
own governments' foreign policy interests. So they wanted to see this model of 
Muslim democracy, which looks good from outside and has freedom of people, ‘bon 
pour l’orient’ (French for “good enough for the orient”). It's not good enough, 
neither for people in Turkey or the rest of Middle East.”640 
There is no linear or causal relationship between media representations and policy 
choices. Social world is so much complex to detect which factor comes before 
another one. They continuously interact with each other. It is also not possible (or 
even necessary) to detect what actors ‘really’ have in their minds while talking and 
acting. It depends on one’s personal position to choose which media discourse 
would be praised as key to truth or discredited as propaganda. However, it is clear 
that these representations have a crucial place in discussions on Turkey-EU relations 
and its future. There is an expanding area to be covered in further comparative 
studies that do not take dominant discourses on AK Party in the western mainstream 
media as given facts. 
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